Opinion
A168616
09-17-2024
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. CARLOS ESTRADA, Defendant and Appellant.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Filed 9/18/24.
(Sonoma County Super. Ct. No. SCR-21687-2)
ORDER MODIFYING OPINION; NO CHANGE IN JUDGMENT
BY THE COURT:
It is ordered that the opinion filed herein on September 17, 2024 be modified as follows:
On page 2, in the third paragraph, in the first sentence replace the word "fired" with "used" so that the sentence reads, "Estrada concedes that under the special circumstance allegations, he admitted that he had an intent to kill and under the sentencing enhancement allegation, he admitted that he used a gun during the commission of the crime."
There is no change in the judgment.
STREETER, Acting P. J.
We resolve this case by a memorandum opinion pursuant to California Standards of Judicial Administration, section 8.1. (See also People v. Garcia (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 847, 853-855.)
GOLDMAN, J.
In 1994, Carlos Castillo Estrada pled guilty to one count of first degree murder (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a)) with two special circumstances: the victim was a peace officer (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(7)), and the murder was committed during an escape from custody (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(5)). He was sentenced to prison for a term of life without the possibility of parole. Estrada also admitted a sentencing enhancement alleging that he personally used a firearm in the commission of the offense. (§ 12022.5.) As part of the plea, the parties stipulated that Estrada's codefendant fired the first shot that entered the victim.
Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
In April 2022, Estrada filed a petition for resentencing pursuant to section 1172.6. In July 2023, the trial court summarily denied the petition on the ground that Estrada's admission to the two special circumstances and to the firearm enhancement allegation rendered him ineligible for relief as a matter of law.
Originally numbered section 1170.95 when enacted in 2018 as Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.) (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 4), the statute was renumbered to section 1172.6 effective June 30, 2022 (Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 10). Because this statutory change does not affect our consideration of the issues raised in this appeal, we refer to the statute as section 1172.6 throughout the rest of this opinion even though it was referenced in the proceedings below by its former enumeration.
In November 2023, the California Supreme Court issued its opinion in People v. Curiel (2023) 15 Cal.5th 433, 461, holding that a true finding on a special circumstance allegation that requires that the defendant had the intent to kill does not necessarily render a defendant categorically ineligible for resentencing relief under section 1172.6. The court explained that an intent to kill is only one possible element of the crime of murder. "It does not by itself establish any valid theory of liability. [Citation.] For example, 'under direct aiding and abetting principles, an accomplice is guilty of an offense perpetrated by another [e.g., murder] if the accomplice aids the commission of that offense with "knowledge of the direct perpetrator's unlawful intent and [with] an intent to assist in achieving those unlawful ends."' [Citation.] . . . A finding of intent to kill does not, standing alone, cover all of the required elements." (Id. at p. 463.)
Here, Estrada concedes that under the special circumstance allegations, he admitted that he had an intent to kill and under the sentencing enhancement allegation, he admitted that he fired a gun during the commission of the crime. Estrada contends, and the Attorney General agrees, as do we, that the order denying Estrada's petition for resentencing must be reversed because, under Curiel, Estrada's admissions do not conclusively establish his liability for murder as a direct aider and abettor.
As the Attorney General explains, Estrada's admissions "do not conclusively establish that [he] intended to facilitate the commission of a murder with knowledge of his codefendant's unlawful intent. Section 190.2, subdivision (a)(5) and (7) do not encompass the defendant's knowledge of another person's unlawful conduct and intent. Even where special circumstances are found true, it is possible for a defendant to act with intent to kill but without knowledge of the actual perpetrator's intent or the intent to facilitate the actual perpetrator's conduct." The Attorney General continues, "The firearm use enhancement does not require any particular act or mental state, and thus [Estrada's] admission of the enhancement allegation does not establish [his] knowledge of or the intent to facilitate the actual perpetrator's purpose."
Direct aider and abettor liability also requires that the defendant's act that aids or facilitates the target crime must "in fact" assist in achieving the murder. (People v. Perez (2005) 35 Cal.4th 1219, 1225.) The Attorney General correctly concedes that the trial court erred in concluding "[a]s matter of logic and common sense" that the personal use of firearm by Estrada during the commission of the murder was necessarily "an act that aids, facilitates, promotes, encourages or instigates the target crime of murder." At the prima facie stage, the trial court may not rely on logical inferences but rather must determine whether existing factual findings conclusively establish that the petitioner is liable for murder under current law.
DISPOSITION
The order denying Estrada's petition for resentencing is reversed and the matter is remanded with directions to the trial court to issue an order to show cause and hold an evidentiary hearing.
WE CONCUR: STREETER, Acting P. J., DOUGLAS, J. [*]
[*] Judge of the Superior Court of Contra Costa County, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.