Opinion
C078951
03-15-2017
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. JOHN DANIEL ESTRADA, Defendant and Appellant.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Super. Ct. No. CRF120814)
Defendant John Daniel Estrada raises a contention that was recently rejected by our Supreme Court in People v. Morales (2016) 63 Cal.4th 399 (Morales), i.e., he was entitled to have excess credit for time served applied toward a one-year parole period imposed pursuant to Penal Code section 1170.18, subdivision (d), during resentencing under Proposition 47, as approved by voters in the General Election, November 4, 2014, effective November 5, 2014 (Proposition 47). We affirm.
Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
BACKGROUND
Under the terms of a negotiated plea agreement, defendant pleaded no contest to felony possession of methamphetamine, admitted having served a prior prison term, and was sentenced to serve a stipulated split sentence of three years (one year to be served in local custody and the remaining two years under mandatory supervision).
After Proposition 47 was passed, defendant filed a petition requesting that his conviction be reduced to a misdemeanor and that he be resentenced accordingly. (See § 1170.18.) The prosecution filed a response indicating it did not object to defendant obtaining relief under Proposition 47.
At the hearing on the matter, the trial court granted the request to reduce the conviction to a misdemeanor, imposed a jail sentence of time served, and also imposed a one-year parole term pursuant to section 1170.18, subdivision (d), which provides in relevant part: "A person who is resentenced . . . shall be given credit for time served and shall be subject to parole for one year following completion of his or her sentence, unless the court, in its discretion, as part of its resentencing order, releases the person from parole." Defense counsel objected to the parole term because defendant had already served one year in custody and "probably ha[d] less than six months left on mandatory supervision." The trial court granted the prosecution's request that such a parole term be imposed.
DISCUSSION
Defendant's sole contention on appeal is that the trial court was required to apply his excess credit for time served toward his one-year parole period. He relies on section 2900.5, subdivision (a) of which provides in relevant part: "In all felony and misdemeanor convictions, either by plea or by verdict, when the defendant has been in custody, . . . all days of custody of the defendant . . . shall be credited upon his or her term of imprisonment . . . . If the total number of days in custody exceeds the number of days of the term of imprisonment to be imposed, the entire term of imprisonment shall be deemed to have been served." Subdivision (c) of this section then defines "term of imprisonment" to include "any period of . . . parole." (§ 2900.5, subd. (c); see also In re Sosa (1980) 102 Cal.App.3d 1002, 1006 [presentence custody credits in excess of a prisoner's term of imprisonment reduce the prisoner's time on parole]; In re Ballard (1981) 115 Cal.App.3d 647, 650 ["section 2900.5 credits may be applied against either or both of the period of incarceration and the parole period"].)
During the pendency of this appeal, our Supreme Court decided Morales, supra, 63 Cal.4th 399, holding, "credit for time served does not reduce the parole period" provided for in section 1170.18, subdivision (d). (Morales at p. 403.) The court explained that while "section 2900.5 states . . . (1) the person is entitled to credit for time served, and (2) the credit can reduce or eliminate the period of parole," section 1170.18, subdivision (d), "states the first of these but not the second. Instead, it states the person is to receive credit for time served and is subject to parole." (Morales at p. 406.) Rejecting the Court of Appeal's conclusion the voters intended to make section 1170.18 identical to section 2900.5, the court further explained the ballot materials concerning Proposition 47 evidenced a contrary intent: "The arguments contained in the official ballot pamphlet for Proposition 47 say nothing relevant to this issue, but the analysis does. The Legislative Analyst's analysis of Proposition 47 is four pages long. [Citation.] Included is a discrete single paragraph captioned, in bold print, 'Resentencing of Previously Convicted Offenders.' [Citation.] This paragraph explains in simple language that certain offenders currently serving felony sentences for the reduced crimes may have their sentences reduced to misdemeanor sentences. It says nothing about credit for time served. But the last sentence of this paragraph states the following: 'Offenders who are resentenced would be required to be on state parole for one year, unless the judge chooses to remove that requirement.' [Citation.]" (Morales at pp. 406-407.) The court found this last sentence to be "easy to understand and entirely unambiguous" in its "promise[] that offenders would be on parole for one year unless the judge deemed it not necessary. . . . 'In the case of a voters' initiative statute, . . . we may not properly interpret the measure in a way that the electorate did not contemplate: the voters should get what they enacted, not more and not less.' [Citation.]" (Id. at p. 407.)
The Attorney General asks that we also take judicial notice of these ballot materials. We grant the request pursuant to Evidence Code sections 452 and 459. However, we also note we are bound by our Supreme Court's interpretation of these materials. (Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450, 455.) --------
Based on Morales, supra, 63 Cal.4th 399, we affirm the trial court's decision to impose the one-year parole term.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
/s/_________
HOCH, J. We concur: /s/_________
BLEASE, Acting P. J. /s/_________
DUARTE, J.