Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Monterey County Super. Ct. No. SS073204A
Duffy, J.
Defendant Alexandro Esquibel was convicted by plea of carrying a loaded, unregistered firearm in a vehicle in violation of Penal Code section 12031, subdivisions (a)(1) and (a)(2)(F) and misdemeanor participation in a criminal street gang in violation of section 186.22, subdivision (a) after his motion to suppress evidence obtained following a traffic stop was denied. He was placed on three years formal probation and ordered to serve 180 days in county jail. On appeal, defendant challenges the denial of his motion to suppress, contending that the traffic stop that led to police discovery of a loaded gun in a stash under his car’s floorboard violated his Fourth Amendment rights. We affirm.
Further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise stated.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
We take the facts from the testimony at the preliminary hearing and the motion to suppress. For purposes of our review, as noted below, we view the facts in the light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling. (People v. Lawler (1973) 9 Cal.3d 156, 160; People v. Martin (1973) 9 Cal.3d 687, 692 [on review of order on suppression motion, appellate court considers record in light most favorable to trial court’s order, resolving all factual conflicts in manner most favorable thereto].)
At approximately 3:00 o’clock in the morning on November 22, 2007, Salinas Police Officers Anaya and Alfred, along with two other officers, each responded to a report of a domestic disturbance between a man and a woman in the parking lot shared by Denny’s Restaurant and Jack-in-the-Box near the intersection of De La Torre Street and Airport Boulevard in Salinas. The officers approached an SUV in the parking lot and found people in the vehicle, among them a woman who was intoxicated and very upset. They suspected that she had had some sort of altercation with a man who was no longer present at the scene but neither she nor the other people in the car cooperated by giving information about the incident to the officers.
Officers Anaya and Alfred investigated by making contact with a few people waiting in their cars in the Jack-in-the-Box drive through to ascertain if any of them had witnessed a disturbance. Defendant, then 23 years old, and his passenger, 20-year old Louis Bravo, were in defendant’s car as next in line waiting for the food they had ordered when the officers approached them. The contact lasted between five and six minutes and defendant and his passenger offered no information about the disturbance. Officer Alfred recognized defendant from a prior gang-related contact and the conversation between them, overheard by Officer Anaya, included that topic. Officer Alfred further asked defendant, who was also acquainted with the officer from the gym, if he was on probation and defendant replied that he was not. Officer Anaya then went back to his car and left by exiting the parking lot onto De La Torre Street. No one was arrested in connection with the domestic disturbance that had drawn the officers to the area.
Defendant denied that the officers even asked them about the domestic disturbance.
According to defendant, during this contact, Officer Anaya said to Officer Alfred, “Let’s find a reason to pull these guys over, because I know they’re up to no good.”
As Officer Anaya drove onto De La Torre Street, he was behind a Jeep Cherokee, which suddenly applied its brakes to avoid hitting a car pulling out of the Jack-in-the-Box driveway in front of it. That car was driven by defendant. Officer Anaya initiated a traffic stop for defendant having failed to yield to oncoming traffic by first activating his siren and later his overhead and spot lights. The Cherokee between Officer Anaya and defendant immediately yielded for the officer and then defendant pulled over after traveling a short distance and turning left with the officer directly behind him. Officer Anaya stopped his car behind defendant’s.
The police report indicated that Officer Anaya had stopped the car for violating Vehicle Code section 21802, subdivision (a)—failure to stop and yield at an intersection with a stop sign. But the officer testified that he was mistaken and had intended to cite in the report Vehicle Code section 21804, which requires a driver to yield to passing cars before entering a highway, as the violation prompting the stop. Defendant testified that when the officer first spoke to him after initiating the stop, he cited not either of these sections as the reason for the stop but instead that defendant had failed to use his turn signal.
From behind defendant’s stopped car, which was from five to 10 feet away from him, Officer Anaya could see the passenger, Bravo, moving suspiciously in that he was leaning or bending over forward in his seat toward the car’s floorboard as if trying to conceal something. In the officer’s experience, people who are trying to conceal something in a car will “quite often” move in this way. As Officer Anaya walked toward defendant’s car on the driver’s side, he could see the passenger pushing or holding what appeared to be a bag under the seat with his feet. The passenger was wearing dark, baggy clothing, including loose jeans. Defendant was also wearing baggy clothing. Based on the time of night, the darkness, the baggy, loose clothing worn by both defendant and his passenger, and the passenger’s suspicious movements, Officer Anaya was not only suspicious but concerned that the passenger was concealing either a weapon or something else at his feet.
When Officer Anaya contacted defendant at the side of his car, defendant was calm and had his hands on the steering wheel. Defendant made a comment to the effect that he felt he was being harassed and that he had been similarly treated by police in the past. Officer Anaya asked him for his driver’s license and registration and asked both defendant and his passenger if either were on parole or probation. Defendant provided his papers and said he was not on probation or parole. The passenger replied that he was not on parole but may be on probation and Officer Anaya then asked him for his identification as well. In response, the passenger initially made movements as if he were going to reach for a wallet or identification in his back pocket but then said that he didn’t have identification and might have left it at home.
Officer Anaya returned to his car. By that time, the three other officers who were nearby, having previously responded to the domestic disturbance, had arrived at the scene. Officer Anaya relayed to them his safety concern and told them that he had seen the passenger engage in suspicious movements by initially bending over towards the floorboard and then moving his feet as if concealing something with them. The officers then collectively decided to have both defendant and his passenger get out of the car.
At some point during the stop, Officer Anaya ran a check on both defendant and Bravo but it is not clear in the record just when.
Officer Anaya returned to defendant’s car and asked him to get out of the car. Defendant complied. The officer then asked if he could pat defendant down for weapons and defendant consented. After finding none, Officer Anaya directed defendant to sit down on the curb. The officer then went to the other side of the car, asked Bravo to get out, and told him that he thought he was hiding something on the floor. The officer also asked Bravo why he was nervous and acting suspiciously. When the passenger opened the door to get out of the car, Officer Anaya saw two containers, which, although he could not confirm it, “looked like alcoholic beverages,” i.e., “beer,” in a bag on the floor. He conducted a pat down of the passenger for weapons and felt what seemed to be an identification card in his back pocket. The passenger said that the card belonged to his brother and the officer had him get it out. The identification card indeed belonged to the Bravo’s brother, who was over 21 years old. The passenger did not himself appear to be over 21, and he confirmed that he was not when the officer asked him his age. Bravo, then viewed by the officer as a minor likely in possession of alcohol, was escorted to a police car and Officer Anaya retrieved the bag, which held closed containers of beer, from the floor near or under the passenger’s seat.
Defendant denied that he initially complied.
Defendant denied that he consented to the patdown.
When Officer Anaya went to look under the passenger seat to see if there was any more alcohol there, he noticed a police scanner and a beanie in the car’s center console. “And where the center console and the floor [met], [he] noticed that the [driver’s side] floor panel was raised slightly upward, and it was loose” whereas the passenger floor panel was secured. With his flashlight, the officer could see a sun visor behind the raised floorboard and he “thought there was a gun in there or something shiny.” He then asked defendant if he owned any guns, if there were any guns registered to him, and whether there were any guns in the car, to which defendant answered no. Officer Anaya told the other officers what he had seen and Officer Alfred asked defendant, “Why would you have a gun in the car?” Defendant replied that he had a daughter, that either he or his daughter had been shot at, and that he needed a gun for protection. Defendant’s response confirmed Officer Anaya’s suspicion that there was a gun under the raised floorboard, which was accessible and within reach from the passenger’s side of the car. The officer went over to the driver’s side of the car, removed the floorboard, and retrieved the loaded nine-millimeter gun.
Officer Anaya arrested defendant and read him his Miranda rights. According to Officer Anaya, within a few but up to five minutes from the initial stop, the officers had decided to get both defendant and his passenger out of the car. And “at least 10 to 15 minutes” had passed from the initial stop to the point at which both defendants were out of the car. The total stop lasted “[m]aybe 20, 25 minutes.” According to defendant, from 10 to 15 minutes had passed from the initial stop until he was arrested. The officer did not cite defendant for the traffic violation for which he was initially stopped, as in view of defendant’s arrest, it had become “obsolete.” But he “did cut [Bravo] a ticket,” which we understand to have been a citation for being a minor in possession of alcohol.
II. Procedural Background
Defendant was charged by information with carrying a loaded firearm in a vehicle in violation of section 12031, subdivision (a)(1) (count 1); having a concealed firearm in a vehicle in violation of section 12025, subdivision (a)(1) (count 2); and street terrorism within the meaning of section 186.22, subdivision (a) (count 3) (later amended to a misdemeanor charge). In connection with count 1, the information also pleaded special allegations concerning unlawful possession of a firearm within the meaning of section 12031, subdivision (a)(2)(D); prior conviction for assault within the meaning of section 12031, subdivision (a)(2)(E); defendant not being the registered owner of a firearm in his possession within the meaning of section 12031, subdivision (a)(2)(F); and commission of the offense for the benefit of criminal street gang within the meaning of section 186.22, subdivision (b)(1). In connection with count 2, the information further alleged enhancements for unlawfully carrying a concealed weapon within the meaning of section 12025, subdivision (b)(4) and prior conviction of assault with a deadly weapon within the meaning of section 12025, subdivision (b)(5), as well as special allegations for defendant not being the registered owner of a firearm within the meaning of section 12025, subdivision (b)(6) and commission of the offense for the benefit of a criminal street gang within the meaning of section 186.22, subdivision (b)(1).
Defendant was bound over after a preliminary hearing. He moved to suppress evidence under section 1538.5 on the ground that the evidence obtained from the stop was the product of an illegal detention, and an illegal search of his car, and an illegal arrest in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The trial court denied the motion, specifically rejecting defendant’s factual theory that Officer Anaya had made the initial stop pretextually and further finding that the officer was justified under the circumstances in detaining defendant and his passenger and in conducting a search of the car incident to the passenger’s arrest.
Defendant waived his rights and conditionally pleaded guilty to count 1, carrying a loaded firearm in a vehicle, and admitted the special allegation under section 12031, subdivision (a)(2)(F) that he was not the registered owner of the firearm in the vehicle. He also pleaded guilty to the misdemeanor count 3. On the parties’ stipulation, the court found a factual basis for the plea on the preliminary hearing transcript. After a full probation report so recommending, sentence was suspended and defendant was placed on three years formal probation subject to conditions, including serving 180 days in the county jail with credit for time served. Defendant timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
I. Standard of Review
“An appellate court’s review of a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress is governed by well-settled principles. [Citations.] [¶] In ruling on such a motion, the trial court (1) finds the historical facts, (2) selects the applicable rule of law, and (3) applies the latter to the former to determine whether the rule of law as applied to the established facts is or is not violated. [Citations.] ‘The [trial] court’s resolution of each of these inquiries is, of course, subject to appellate review.’ [Citations.] [¶] The court’s resolution of the first inquiry, which involves questions of fact, is reviewed under the deferential substantial-evidence standard. [Citations.] Its decision on the second, which is a pure question of law, is scrutinized under the standard of independent review. [Citations.] Finally, its ruling on the third, which is a mixed fact-law question that is however predominantly one of law,... is also subject to independent review.” (People v. Williams (1988) 45 Cal.3d 1268, 1301; see also People v. Ayala (2000) 23 Cal.4th 225, 255; People v. Hoyos (2007) 41 Cal.4th 872, 891.) All presumptions favor the trial court’s exercise of its power to judge the credibility of witnesses, resolve any conflicts in the testimony, weigh the evidence, and draw factual inferences, “ ‘and the trial court’s findings on such matters, whether express or implied, must be upheld if they are supported by substantial evidence.’ ” (People v. Leyba (1981) 29 Cal.3d 591, 596-597, quoting People v. Lawler, supra, 9 Cal.3d at p. 160.)
Based upon its factual findings, the trial court has the duty to determine whether “the search was unreasonable within the meaning of the Constitution.” (People v. Lawler, supra, 9 Cal.3d at p. 160.) This issue is a question of law. Therefore, we must measure the facts, as found by the trial court, against the constitutional standard of reasonableness for the search and/or seizure. (Ibid.; People v. Leyba, supra, 29 Cal.3d at p. 597.)
Under the California Constitution, article I, section 28, subdivision (d), the reasonableness of the search or seizure is measured against federal constitutional standards. (People v. Woods (1999) 21 Cal.4th 668, 674.) Only evidence that is the product of an unreasonable search and seizure in violation of federal standards will be suppressed. (In re Lance W. (1985) 37 Cal.3d 873, 890.)
II. The Motion to Suppress Was Properly Denied
A. The Initial Stop Was Justified
Defendant contends that there was no basis for the initial traffic stop and that it was pretextual because Officer Anaya’s testimony concerning his observation of defendant’s traffic violation is not credible, i.e., there is not substantial evidence that a traffic violation ever occurred. Defendant cites in support of this contention that the officer did not issue a citation for the violation, that he referenced an incorrect Vehicle Code section in the police report, and that the officers had already had an opportunity to question defendant while he was waiting for his food at Jack-in-the Box. But the trial court specifically rejected that Officer Anaya had pulled defendant over on a pretext, despite defendant’s testimony that no traffic violation had occurred. And we are bound by this factual determination.
The Fourth Amendment guarantees the right to be free of unreasonable searches and seizures by law enforcement personnel. (U.S. Const., 4th Amend.; Terry v. Ohio (1968) 392 U.S. 1, 8-9 (Terry). “[A]n officer may, consistent[ly] with the Fourth Amendment, conduct a brief investigatory stop when the officer has a reasonable, articulable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot. [Citation.] While ‘reasonable suspicion is a less demanding standard than probable cause and requires a showing considerably less than preponderance of the evidence, the Fourth Amendment requires at least a minimal level of objective justification for making the stop. [Citation.] The officer must be able to articulate more than an ‘inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or “hunch” ’ of criminal activity.” (Illinois v. Wardlow (2000) 528 U.S. 119, 123-124.)
But as recently observed by the United States Supreme Court, there is a lawful investigatory stop whenever it is lawful for police to detain an automobile and its occupants pending inquiry into a vehicular violation. (Arizona v. Johnson (2009) __U.S. __, __[129 S.Ct. 781, 784].) Police need not have, in addition, cause to believe that any occupant of the car is involved in criminal activity. (Ibid.) All that is required to support the initial stop is the officer’s reasonable suspicion that a violation of traffic laws has occurred. (Delaware v. Prouse (1979) 440 U.S. 648, 663; People v. Wells (2006) 38 Cal.4th 1078, 1082-1083 [officer may stop and detain motorist on reasonable suspicion that motorist has violated the law]; In re H.M. (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 136, 142.)
Based on Officer Anaya’s testimony that was accepted by the trial court, the officer observed that defendant drove his car as he exited Jack-in-the-Box onto the street right in front of an oncoming car without yielding to that car—an apparent violation of Vehicle Code section 21804. This justified Officer Anaya pulling defendant over and initiating a traffic stop. (People v. Superior Court (Brown) (1980) 111 Cal.App.3d 948, 951 [officer has right and duty to detain where he witnesses a traffic violation]; In re H.M., supra, 167 Cal.App.4th at p. 142.)
It is of no moment that the officer did not ultimately cite defendant for that violation. Even if it is good practice, the officer was not under a constitutional obligation to inform defendant of the basis for the stop, let alone issue him a citation. (Devenpeck v. Alford (2004) 543 U.S. 146, 155.) And as observed by respondent, the issuance of a citation cannot be required to justify a traffic stop, as a citation is a form of non-custodial arrest based on probable cause, a higher standard than the reasonable suspicion required to stop and detain.
Nor does it matter that Officer Anaya mistakenly referenced the wrong Vehicle Code section in the police report as the basis for the stop. Even if the officer had subjectively but erroneously believed that defendant had committed a particular traffic violation by his action when in fact, the action constituted a different violation, this would not vitiate the officer’s reasonable suspicion that a violation had occurred—the justifiable basis for the stop. And an officer’s subjective reasoning for making an arrest “need not be the criminal offense as to which the known facts provide probable cause.” (Devenpeck v. Alford, supra, 543 U.S. at p. 153.) For Fourth Amendment purposes, the officer’s action is not invalidated by his subjectively mistaken state of mind as long as the circumstances, viewed objectively, justified the action. (Ibid.; Whren v. United States (1996) 517 U.S. 806,812-813.) This legal principle applicable to determine the existence of probable cause to make an arrest, which again requires more than the reasonable suspicion sufficient to justify a stop, is equally applicable here. Accordingly, Officer Anaya having observed the car in front of him suddenly braking to avoid hitting defendant’s car as it pulled onto the street, the officer had reasonable suspicion that defendant had committed a traffic violation.
We observe that the cited section, Vehicle Code section 21802, subdivision (a), is numerically near to the applicable section, Vehicle Code section 21804. And the two sections both concern the failure to yield though in different situations.
Finally, that the officers previously had the opportunity to briefly question defendant while he waited for his food at Jack-in-the-Box is irrelevant to the question whether Officer Anaya entertained reasonable suspicion that defendant later committed a traffic violation so as to justify the stop. What occurred earlier simply does not bear on this question.
The trial court having accepted Officer Anaya’s testimony that he witnessed defendant commit a traffic violation, we conclude that the officer had reasonable suspicion that a violation had occurred and was therefore justified in stopping and detaining defendant. His doing so accordingly did not violate defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights.
B. The Stop Was Not of Undue Duration
Relying on People v. McGaughran (1979) 25 Cal.3d 577 (McGaughran), defendant contends that even if Officer Anaya was justified in pulling him over for a traffic violation, the detention exceeded permissible duration when it lasted both beyond the point when the officers asked defendant and Bravo to get out of the car (after approximately five minutes) and then beyond the later point when both men had been patsearched and were determined to be unarmed—all of which happened within perhaps more than 10 but something less than 15 minutes by all accounts.
Under McGaughran, a traffic stop exceeds constitutional limits when it extends beyond what is reasonably necessary under the circumstances to effectuate the purpose of the stop. But “[i]mplicit in the McGaughran analysis is a recognition that the circumstances of each traffic detention are unique and that the reasonableness of each detention period must be judged on its particular circumstances.” (Williams v. SuperiorCourt (1985) 168 Cal.App.3d 349, 358.) There is no set time limit for a detention and the test is “whether the police diligently pursued a means of investigation reasonably designed to confirm or dispel their suspicions quickly.” (People v. Russell (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 96, 101.) Moreover, circumstances that develop during a detention may provide reasonable suspicion to prolong it. (Id. at p. 102 [if additional cause to detain develops after the initial stop, additional time to investigate is allowed]; People v. Warren (1984) 152 Cal.App.3d 991, 995-997; People v. Suennen (1980) 114 Cal.App.3d 192, 200-201.)
In Pennsylvania v. Mimms (1977) 434 U.S. 106, 111, footnote 6, the high court held that “once a motor vehicle has been lawfully detained for a traffic violation, the police officers may order the driver to get out of the vehicle without violating the Fourth Amendment’s proscription of unreasonable searches and seizures.” The government’s “legitimate and weighty” interest in officer safety outweighs the “de minimus” additional intrusion of requiring a driver, already lawfully stopped, to exit the vehicle. (Id. at pp. 110-111.) Citing Terry, the court in Mimms further held that a driver, once outside the stopped vehicle, may be patted down for weapons if the officer reasonably concludes that the driver “might be armed and presently dangerous.” (Id. at p. 112.) In Maryland v. Wilson (1997) 519 U.S. 408, 415, the court extended this principle to passengers of a vehicle, concluding that “an officer making a traffic stop may order passengers to get out of the car pending completion of the stop.” (Fn. omitted.)
As recently confirmed in Arizona v. Johnson, “officers who conduct ‘routine traffic stop[s]’ may ‘perform a “patdown” of a driver and any passengers upon reasonable suspicion that they may be armed and dangerous.’ [Citation.]” (Arizona v. Johnson, supra, __ U.S. at p. __ [129 S.Ct. at p. 787]; Terry, supra, 392 U.S. at p. 24.) “The sole justification of the search... is the protection of the police officer and others nearby, and it must therefore be confined in scope to an intrusion reasonably designed to discover guns, knives, clubs, or other hidden instruments for the assault of the police officer.” (Terry, supra, 392 U.S. at p. 29.) “The officer need not be absolutely certain that the individual is armed; the issue is whether a reasonably prudent [person] in the circumstances would be warranted in the belief that his [or her] safety or that of others was in danger.” (Id. at p. 27.) And the detention is not converted into an unlawful seizure by pursuit of matters unrelated to the initial traffic stop so long as the stop is not thereby “measurably extend[ed].” (Arizona v. Johnson, supra, __ U.S. at p. __ [129 S.Ct. at p. 788], citing Muehler v. Mena (2005) 544 U.S. 93, 100-101.) The guiding principle, as in all cases arising under the Fourth Amendment, is “the reasonableness in all the circumstances of the particular governmental invasion of a citizen’s personal security.” (Terry, supra, 392 U.S. at p. 19.)
Here, in our view, Officer Anaya was justified under the circumstances in having defendant and his passenger get out of the car and then patsearching them. These circumstances included that Officer Anaya had observed Bravo’s suspicious movements that led him, in his experience, to suspect that Bravo was attempting to conceal something, possibly a weapon. And the officer subsequently observed Bravo’s feet holding something under his seat. These observations were coupled with the time of night, the darkness, the loose, baggy clothing worn by both defendant and Bravo, and Officer Anaya’s knowledge from his and Officer Alfred’s previous encounter with defendant in the Jack-in-the-Box parking lot that defendant had some form of gang ties. Because Officer Anaya was justified in ordering defendant and Bravo out of the car and patsearching them for weapons, it follows that the permissible duration of the initial stop was extended for an amount of time sufficient to allow the officers to conduct these activities. Indeed, both defendant and his passenger could have been ordered out of the car even without further justification for officer safety. (People v. Vibanco (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 1, 9-13 and cases cited there.) Accordingly, the brief amount of time by which these actions might have extended the duration of the stop did not violate defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights.
After Officer Anaya had completed the patsearches and found no weapons, he was justified in searching the passenger compartment of the car. By that point, the officer had seen what he reasonably believed were containers of alcohol in a bag on the floor of the passenger side of the car, which Bravo had previously attempted to conceal under his seat. Defendant himself admitted that the top of the containers were visible. Bravo appeared to be underage and confirmed to the officer that although he had no identification with him, he was under 21. When asked about the identification that Officer Anaya felt in his back pocket during the patdown, Bravo said that it belonged to his older brother. And the officer did not himself retrieve the identification card from Bravo’s pocket; instead he asked Bravo to take it out and Bravo complied. These facts and circumstances furnished probable cause for the officer to arrest Bravo as a minor in possession of alcohol—a crime for which he was placed in a patrol car and cited. Officer Anaya at that point was justified in retrieving the bag on the floor of the car with containers visibly protruding from it and in looking further inside the car to determine the presence of more alcohol. (Arizona v. Gant (2009) __ U.S. __, __ [129 S.Ct. 1710, 1714, 1719, 1721] [circumstances unique to automobile context justify search incident to arrest when it is reasonable to believe evidence of the offense of arrest might be found in vehicle]; Thornton v. United States (2004) 541 U.S. 615, 632, (conc. opn. of Scalia, J.); New York v. Belton (1981) 453 U.S. 454, 460; Chimel v. California (1969) 395 U.S. 752, 763.)
We reject defendant’s contention that the record does not support an arrest of Bravo such that there could be an authorized search incident to that arrest. Police had probable cause to arrest him, he was placed in a patrol car, and cited. The arrest need not take place before the search incident to it. (Rawlings v. Kentucky (1980) 448 U.S. 98, 111; People v. Limon (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 524, 538 [officer with probable cause to arrest can search incident to arrest before making arrest].)
Because we conclude that the bag and the immediate area within Bravo’s reach inside the car were properly searched incident to arrest, we need not resolve the issue whether the bag could also be searched as having been in plain view under Arizona v. Hicks (1987) 480 U.S. 321 or whether the car and containers therein could be searched under the automobile exception to the warrant clause per United States v. Ross (1982) 456 U.S. 798, 820-821.
Defendant’s contention that the detention was unduly prolonged after the frisks produced no weapon rests on the assumption that the situation was not evolving from the moment of the initial traffic stop. This assumption is incorrect. Initially, Officer Anaya saw Bravo making gestures as if to conceal something under the seat and then holding an object under the seat with his feet. Then, when Bravo, who was under 21 years old, got out of the car, the officer saw what he reasonably believed were alcohol containers in a bag on the floor of the passenger side of the car. Even though the patdowns produced no weapon, the officer could legitimately inquire of Bravo about the identification card felt in his pocket during the frisk and could ask him to retrieve the card without unduly prolonging the detention. (People v. Vibanco, supra, 151 Cal.App.4th at pp. 13-14.) Finally, with probable cause to arrest Bravo for being a minor in possession of alcohol, and incident thereto, Officer Anaya could proceed to search the area of the vehicle within reach of the passenger’s control for evidence of the offense, which included the bag of alcohol containers on the floor of the car.
All of these evolving circumstances reasonably justified prolonging the detention. (People v. Russell, supra, 81 Cal.App.4th at p. 102; People v. Warren, supra, 152 Cal.App.3d at pp. 995-997; People v. Suennen, supra, 114 Cal.App.3d at pp. 200-201.) And, in any event, the detention was not unreasonably and measurably extended by the incremental inquiries associated with ordering defendant and Bravo out of the car, patsearching them, and retrieving first the identification card in Bravo’s pocket and then the bag of beer from the floor of the car; defendant was ordered out of the car within five minutes and he was later arrested after about 15, meaning these activities consumed something less than 10 minutes. Once a valid traffic stop is made and police order the occupants out of the car, the succeeding detention “may continue at least as long as reasonably necessary for the officer to complete the activity the... order contemplates.” (People v. Hoyos, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 894.) Nothing beyond that occurred here.
C. The Search of the Bag and the Vehicle Floorboard Were Valid
Apart from contending that the detention was of undue duration, defendant also challenges as unconstitutional Officer Anaya’s search of the bag containing the beer and then his subsequent search under the driver’s side floorboard where he found the gun. We have already concluded that the search of the bag was lawful as incident to Bravo’s arrest. And with probable cause to arrest Bravo, particularly coupled with knowledge that Bravo had been attempting to conceal alcohol in the car, Officer Anaya could lawfully conduct a search of the passenger compartment of the vehicle and any containers therein because it was “ ‘reasonable to believe evidence relevant to the crime of arrest might be found’ ” there. (Arizona v. Gant, supra, __ U.S. at p. __ [129 S.Ct. a p. 1713].)
The officer was therefore justified in not only looking under the passenger seat, from where he observed the raised floorboard on the driver’s side and could see what he thought was a gun or “something shiny” underneath, but also underneath the floorboard where the gun was found. Officer Anaya did not immediately search under the floorboard but instead questioned defendant about whether there was a gun in the car. Despite his response that there was not, defendant nevertheless confirmed the officer’s reasonable suspicion that a gun was indeed under the floorboard when he said in response to Officer Alfred’s question about why he needed a gun that he did so for “protection.” With that, Officer Anaya could also conduct a protective search under the floorboard for a weapon under Michigan v. Long (1983) 463 U.S. 1032, 1049, which “permits an officer to search a vehicle’s passenger compartment when he has reasonable suspicion that an individual, whether or not the arrestee, is ‘dangerous’ and might access the vehicle to ‘gain immediate control of weapons.’ ” (Arizona v. Gant, supra, __ U.S. at p. __ [129 S.Ct. at p. 1721].)
In view of our conclusion, we need not also address whether Officer Anaya’s reasonable suspicion that a gun was under the floorboard amounted to probable cause to believe the vehicle contained evidence of criminal activity thus permitting a search of any area of the vehicle in which evidence might be found under United States v. Ross, supra, 456 U.S. at pages 820-821.
In sum, defendant’s contentions notwithstanding, Officer Anaya validly conducted a search of the bag containing alcohol and then proceeded to validly search under the floorboard, where he retrieved defendant’s loaded gun.
III. Conclusions
Having analyzed defendant’s contentions, we conclude that his Fourth Amendment rights were not violated. Officer Anaya had reasonable suspicion that defendant had committed a traffic violation so as to initiate a stop; the officer lawfully ordered him and his passenger out of the car; the officer also had reasonable suspicion that defendant or his passenger were armed and dangerous so as to justify a patsearch for weapons; the officer conducted a valid search incident to Bravo’s arrest; the vehicle was also validly searched out of safety concerns encountered during the arrest; and the stop was not of undue duration under the circumstances. Because no evidence against defendant was obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment, his motion to suppress was properly denied.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
WE CONCUR: Mihara, Acting P.J., McAdams, J.