Opinion
2014-12-11
The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Israel ESPINAL, Defendant–Appellant.
Robert S. Dean, Center for Appellate Litigation, New York (Marisa K. Cabrera of counsel), for appellant. Cyrus R. Vance, Jr., District Attorney, New York (Emily Farber of counsel), for respondent.
Robert S. Dean, Center for Appellate Litigation, New York (Marisa K. Cabrera of counsel), for appellant. Cyrus R. Vance, Jr., District Attorney, New York (Emily Farber of counsel), for respondent.
GONZALEZ, P.J., TOM, FRIEDMAN, ACOSTA, MOSKOWITZ, JJ.
Judgment, Supreme Court, New York County (Bruce Allen, J.), rendered March 26, 2013, as amended April 25, 2013, convicting defendant, after a jury trial, of attempted burglary in the second degree, and sentencing him, as a persistent violent felony offender, to a term of 12 years to life, unanimously affirmed.
The court properly exercised its discretion in admitting evidence of defendant's prior attempted burglary conviction as probative of his intent ( see e.g. People v. Patterson, 41 A.D.3d 169, 838 N.Y.S.2d 505 [1st Dept.2007], lv. denied9 N.Y.3d 925, 844 N.Y.S.2d 180, 875 N.E.2d 899 [2007] ). The probative value of the evidence outweighed its potential for prejudice. Given the defense theory that defendant did not intend to burglarize an apartment by entering through a window from a fire escape, but rather was trying to find a location to smoke marijuana, the evidence of defendant's prior act of entering an apartment through the fire escape was probative of his intent ( see People v. Alvino, 71 N.Y.2d 233, 242, 525 N.Y.S.2d 7, 519 N.E.2d 808 [1987] ), and the People “were not bound to stop after presenting minimum evidence” (id. at 245, 525 N.Y.S.2d 7, 519 N.E.2d 808). The court minimized the potential prejudice by limiting the amount of evidence that could be introduced and by way of a suitable limiting instruction.
Defendant's sentence, which was the statutory minimum for defendant's conviction, given his persistent violent felony offender status, was not unconstitutionally severe ( see Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 271, 100 S.Ct. 1133, 63 L.Ed.2d 382 [1980]; People v. Broadie, 37 N.Y.2d 100, 110–111, 332 N.E.2d 338, 37 N.Y.2d 100 [1975], cert. denied423 U.S. 950, 96 S.Ct. 372, 46 L.Ed.2d 287 [1975] ).