Opinion
688 KA 13-00748
07-10-2015
The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Donald J. ENGLERT, II, Defendant–Appellant.
Easton Thompson Kasperek Shiffrin LLP, Rochester (Brian Shiffrin of Counsel), for Defendant–Appellant. Sandra Doorley, District Attorney, Rochester (Robert J. Shoemaker of Counsel), for Respondent.
Easton Thompson Kasperek Shiffrin LLP, Rochester (Brian Shiffrin of Counsel), for Defendant–Appellant.
Sandra Doorley, District Attorney, Rochester (Robert J. Shoemaker of Counsel), for Respondent.
PRESENT: SCUDDER, P.J., CARNI, SCONIERS, VALENTINO, and WHALEN, JJ.
Opinion
MEMORANDUM:Defendant appeals from a judgment convicting him upon a jury verdict of course of sexual conduct against a child in the first degree (Penal Law § 130.75[1][a] ). We reject defendant's contention that County Court erred in permitting the People to introduce evidence of his sexual practices and/or proclivities with his former girlfriend. Inasmuch as such evidence was not related to any prior crime or misconduct, we conclude that it did not constitute Molineux evidence (see People v. Cortez, 22 N.Y.3d 1061, 1076–1080, 981 N.Y.S.2d 651, 4 N.E.3d 952 [Abdus–Salaam, J., concurring], cert. denied ––– U.S. ––––, 135 S.Ct. 146, 190 L.Ed.2d 108 ).
Contrary to defendant's contention, the court did not abuse its discretion in permitting the People to elicit testimony from the investigating police officer concerning his training and background in child sexual abuse investigations as well as testimony that provided a general overview of such investigations (see People v. Kozlowski, 11 N.Y.3d 223, 238, 869 N.Y.S.2d 848, 898 N.E.2d 891, rearg. denied 11 N.Y.3d 904, 873 N.Y.S.2d 265, 901 N.E.2d 759, cert. denied 556 U.S. 1282, 129 S.Ct. 2775, 174 L.Ed.2d 272 ). Moreover, inasmuch as the officer's testimony did not contain any statement of the victim, it could not be considered bolstering (see People v. Ludwig, 24 N.Y.3d 221, 230–232, 997 N.Y.S.2d 351, 21 N.E.3d 1012 ). Defendant failed to preserve for our review his contention that the court erred in permitting the testimony of an expert with respect to child sexual abuse accommodation syndrome (CSAAS) (see generally People v. Goupil, 104 A.D.3d 1215, 1216, 960 N.Y.S.2d 814, lv. denied 21 N.Y.3d 943, 968 N.Y.S.2d 5, 990 N.E.2d 139 ), and, in any event, that contention is without merit (see People v. Williams, 20 N.Y.3d 579, 583–584, 964 N.Y.S.2d 483, 987 N.E.2d 260 ; People v. Spicola, 16 N.Y.3d 441, 465, 922 N.Y.S.2d 846, 947 N.E.2d 620, cert. denied ––– U.S. ––––, 132 S.Ct. 400, 181 L.Ed.2d 257 ; People v. Black, 124 A.D.3d 1365, 1366–1367, 1 N.Y.S.3d 676 ). We likewise reject defendant's contention that the testimony of the nurse-practitioner “improperly bolstered the perceived credibility” of the victim. The testimony was well within the type of expert testimony that is accepted by the courts in New York (see Spicola, 16 N.Y.3d at 465, 922 N.Y.S.2d 846, 947 N.E.2d 620 ), and did not constitute bolstering (see Ludwig, 24 N.Y.3d at 230–232, 997 N.Y.S.2d 351 ). Contrary to the further contention of defendant, “[t]he failure of defense counsel to obtain the testimony of an expert does not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel because defendant has not shown that ‘such testimony was available, that it would have assisted the jury in its determination or that [defendant] was prejudiced by its absence’ ” (People v. Brandi E., 38 A.D.3d 1218, 1219, 834 N.Y.S.2d 895, lv. denied 9 N.Y.3d 863, 840 N.Y.S.2d 893, 872 N.E.2d 1199 ; see People v. Aikey, 94 A.D.3d 1485, 1487, 943 N.Y.S.2d 702, lv. denied 19 N.Y.3d 956, 950 N.Y.S.2d 108, 973 N.E.2d 206 ). Insofar as defendant contends that defense counsel was ineffective in failing to object to the testimony of the People's CSAAS expert, we note that the law is well settled that such testimony is permitted (see Spicola, 16 N.Y.3d at 465, 922 N.Y.S.2d 846, 947 N.E.2d 620 ; see also People v. Karst, 166 A.D.2d 920, 921, 560 N.Y.S.2d 577, lv. denied 76 N.Y.2d 987, 563 N.Y.S.2d 776, 565 N.E.2d 525 ), and defense counsel thus had no legitimate basis to object (see People v. Wallace, 60 A.D.3d 1268, 1270–1271, 875 N.Y.S.2d 353, lv. denied 12 N.Y.3d 922, 884 N.Y.S.2d 703, 912 N.E.2d 1084 ).
Viewing the evidence in light of the elements of the crime as charged to the jury (see People v. Danielson, 9 N.Y.3d 342, 349, 849 N.Y.S.2d 480, 880 N.E.2d 1 ), we reject defendant's contention that the verdict is against the weight of the evidence (see generally People v. Bleakley, 69 N.Y.2d 490, 495, 515 N.Y.S.2d 761, 508 N.E.2d 672 ).
It is hereby ORDERED that the judgment so appealed from is unanimously affirmed.