SULLIVAN, J.P., NARDELLI, RUBIN, ANDRIAS, FRIEDMAN, JJ. Nothing in defendant's plea allocution cast doubt on his guilt (see, People v. Toxey, 86 N.Y.2d 725; People v. Emmanuel, 179 A.D.2d 356,lv denied 79 N.Y.2d 947), and we find the plea to be intelligently and voluntarily made. Were we to treat defendant's comments at sentencing as a motion to withdraw his plea on grounds of innocence and duress, we would find that the court properly denied the motion without a hearing because defendant's claims were conclusory and contradicted by the record of the plea.
Appeal from the Supreme Court, New York County (Leslie Crocker Snyder, J.). The record shows that the terms of the plea bargain were clearly stated, and that defendant, with the advice of counsel, repeatedly answered that he understood it. The People recommended, and defendant received, the promised sentence following the required allocution at the plea (see, People v Emanuel, 179 A.D.2d 356; People v. Jenkins, 176 A.D.2d 597). Defendant's argument that there should have been a hearing to determine the extent of his cooperation is unpreserved, and, in any event, is without merit, there being no evidence that the information he provided was of any use (compare, People v Pistone, 143 A.D.2d 852). Nor does the record support defendant's contention that the court was deprived of the benefit of presentence report. Rather, defendant was liberally permitted to correct any alleged inaccuracies therein.
; People v. Harris, 251 AD2d 79 (1st Dept. 1998) ("factual allocution did not cast significant doubt on his guilt . . . and his exculpatory statements made other than during the plea allocution itself are irrelevant"), lv. denied, 92 NY2d 925 (1998); People v. Galvan, 197 AD2d 394, 394-95 (1st Dept. 1993) ("[A]fter the prosecutor recited the underlying facts, . . . defendant admitted the truth of those allegations."); People v. Emanuel, 179 AD2d 356, 356-57 (1st Dept. 1992) ("The fact that defendant, earlier in the plea, had made vague statements . . . does not invalidate the plea accepted on the basis of his subsequent acknowledgment of guilt."), lv. denied, 79 NY2d 947 (1992). Here, after Defendant's stated that she was pleading guilty to Grand Larceny in the Third Degree because she was, in fact, guilty of that crime, the People noted that they were prepared to prove at trial, and indeed had been proving at trial, that Defendant stole Housing Authority benefits in excess of three thousand dollars.
[b]ased upon the expanded allocution, the court accepted the plea, concluding that defendant's behavior clearly evinced an intent to cause serious physical injury . . . and that there was no viable justification defense."). Likewise, in People v. Emanuel, 179 AD2d 356, 356-57 (1st Dept. 1992), lv. denied, 79 NY2d 947 (1992), the First Department explained that: The fact that defendant, earlier in the plea, had made vague statements suggesting that the encounter was consensual a claim defendant apparently voluntarily abandoned without any evidence of coercion by the court or prosecutor does not invalidate the plea accepted on the basis of his subsequent acknowledgment of guilt.