Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Santa Clara County Super.Ct.No. CC577645
Duffy, J.
On December 12, 2006, Gary Russell Elerick, the defendant herein, pleaded no contest to second degree robbery (Pen. Code, §§ 211, 212.5, subd. (c)) and admitted a number of prior convictions pursuant to the three strikes law (id., §§ 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12) and serious felony law (id., § 667, subd. (a)). On March 7, 2007, judgment was entered and defendant was sentenced to 28 years to life imprisonment consecutive to a 25-year term. The court granted defendant’s request for a certificate of probable cause (id., § 1237.5).
Counsel for defendant has filed an opening brief that states the case and facts but raises no issues. We notified defendant of his right to submit written argument on his own behalf. Defendant has filed a supplemental letter brief in which he raises three ineffective assistance of counsel claims. We have reviewed the entire record pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436. We will affirm the judgment, but note that defendant may proceed by way of petition for writ of habeas corpus on his ineffective assistance of counsel claims.
FACTS
We derive the facts from the probation report and other papers in the clerk’s transcript. On December 31, 2004, defendant robbed a bank in San Jose. He showed a teller what appeared to be a handgun and was handed a quantity of money. A picture taken of defendant during the robbery enabled police to identify him and he was arrested by the Brookings, Oregon, police, and extradited to California.
DISCUSSION
As noted, in his supplemental letter brief, filed August 17, 2007, defendant raises three claims that we discern to be claims of ineffective assistance of counsel.
A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel in violation of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution entails deficient performance under an objective standard of professional reasonableness and prejudice under a test of reasonable probability of an adverse effect on the outcome. (Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 687-688, 694.) The Strickland standards also apply under article I, section 15 of the California Constitution. (E.g., People v. Waidla (2000) 22 Cal.4th 690, 718.)
Defendant attached to his letter brief a purported letter from trial counsel to him, dated January 18, 2007, that refers to a letter by defendant on January 17, 2007, to the trial court. The purported letter from counsel advised defendant that counsel would not file a motion to withdraw his plea. In his letter brief, defendant states that in his letter to the court “I explained clearly that I wanted to pull my guilty plea back and plead not guilty and continue on to trial. Instead of acting on my letter [the court] gave my letter to my attorney.” “On a letter dated January 18, 2007 from my attorney . . . she stated that she refused to file the motion to pull my plea.”
Defendant does not identify any place in the record that might show that counsel or the court acted or failed to act in response to any letter he may have sent. Nor have we found any such portion of the record. Accordingly, we cannot address defendant’s claim on direct appeal. “An appeal is ‘limited to the four corners of the [underlying] record on appeal . . . .’ ” (People v. Waidla, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 703, fn. 1.) Defendant must proceed by way of petition for writ of habeas corpus. A “habeas corpus petition is not confined to the record on appeal.” (Ibid.)
Next, defendant asserts that counsel never advised him about consequences relating to sentence credits. Again, however, he does not identify where in the record this matter might have been considered, nor have we discovered any such portion of the record. This claim, too, must be presented in a habeas corpus petition.
Next, defendant claims that counsel did not present the results of a psychiatric examination in a hearing to strike his prior convictions in the interest of justice (Pen. Code, § 1385). This record, however, does not afford a sufficient basis for us to be able to assess his claim. “If the record ‘sheds no light on why counsel acted or failed to act in the manner challenged,’ an appellate claim of ineffective assistance of counsel must be rejected ‘unless counsel was asked for an explanation and failed to provide one, or unless there simply could be no satisfactory explanation.’ ” (People v. Ledesma (2006) 39 Cal.4th 641, 746.) Defendant’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim must be presented in a habeas corpus petition if he chooses to file such a petition. (See People v. Mendoza Tello (1997) 15 Cal.4th 264, 266-267.)
Finally, our own review of the whole record before us discloses no other arguable issue on appeal.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
WE CONCUR. Mihara, Acting P. J., McAdams, J.