The court observed that constructive possession of a firearm may be shown where the person has knowledge of the presence of the weapon and exercises immediate and exclusive control over the area where the firearm is found (see, e.g. , People v. McIntyre , 2011 IL App (2d) 100889, 357 Ill.Dec. 207, 962 N.E.2d 1108 ) and, thus, a person may often be in possession of a firearm in one's home even if that firearm is not physically on the person. ¶ 12 Citing People v. Elders , 63 Ill. App. 3d 554, 20 Ill.Dec. 333, 380 N.E.2d 10 (1978), and People v. Cahill , 37 Ill. App. 3d 361, 345 N.E.2d 528 (1976), the circuit court stated that, while possession of a firearm may be constructive, possession of the FOID card itself must be actual and "a person must have a FOID card on their person" whenever in possession of a firearm in order to comply with section 2(a)(1). See Elders , 63 Ill. App. 3d at 559, 20 Ill.Dec. 333, 380 N.E.2d 10 (the possessor of the firearm must "have the card on his person").

¶ 38 Since, then, Lyons had access to the cabinet containing the disks, and defendant did not restrict her access to the contents of the disks, whether by security measures or directives to her, defendant assumed the risk that Lyons would view the disks herself or permit another to do so. Lyons, therefore, had authority to consent to a search of the disks. ¶ 39 Defendant cites People v. Elders, 63 Ill.App.3d 554, 20 Ill.Dec. 333, 380 N.E.2d 10 (1978), which was decided by the Fifth District Appellate Court. In Elders, the defendant's wife went to the police station and reported that the defendant was drunk and had threatened her with a rifle, and that she was afraid for her son whom she had left home alone with the defendant.

Rather, "proof of constructive possession of the gun by [a] defendant is sufficient." Id.; see also People v. Elders, 380 N.E.2d 10, 15 (Ill. App. Ct. 5th Dist. 1978). To establish that a person is in constructive possession of a firearm, the State must prove: "(1) that defendant had knowledge of the presence of the weapon; and (2) that defendant exercised immediate and exclusive control over the area when the weapon was found."

Accord Rodriguez, 497 U.S. at 181, 110 S.Ct. at 2797. See also People v. Elders, 63 Ill. App.3d 554, 20 Ill.Dec. 333, 380 N.E.2d 10, 14 (Ill.App.Ct. 1978) ("It is only where the record affirmatively establishes 'joint occupancy' or 'equal rights to possession' that one spouse's consent to a search is binding against the other.") (emphasis added). Moreover,

Whether an officer reasonably believed that an emergency existed is a question of fact to be determined by the trial court. ( People v. Elders (1978), 63 Ill. App.3d 554, 557.) The trial court is to determine the credibility of the witnesses, the weight given their testimony, and any inferences to be drawn from the evidence.

The purpose — to offer assistance to a citizen possibly imperiled, not to obtain evidence of a crime — justifies such a search. ( People v. Elders (1978), 63 Ill. App.3d 554, 380 N.E.2d 10; People v. Swansey (1978), 62 Ill. App.3d 1015, 379 N.E.2d 1279; People v. Lovitz (1976), 39 Ill. App.3d 624, 350 N.E.2d 276, cert. denied (1977), 434 U.S. 842, 54 L.Ed.2d 107, 98 S.Ct. 141.) As was pointed out in Lovitz, "Generally speaking, the entry and search of a private dwelling without a warrant is constitutionally prohibited except under circumstances where the police are confronted with an emergency which dictates the need for immediate action" ( 39 Ill. App.3d 624, 629, 350 N.E.2d 276, 279), the need for immediate action precluding an opportunity to obtain a search warrant.