The court observed that constructive possession of a firearm may be shown where the person has knowledge of the presence of the weapon and exercises immediate and exclusive control over the area where the firearm is found (see, e.g. , People v. McIntyre , 2011 IL App (2d) 100889, 357 Ill.Dec. 207, 962 N.E.2d 1108 ) and, thus, a person may often be in possession of a firearm in one's home even if that firearm is not physically on the person. ¶ 12 Citing People v. Elders , 63 Ill. App. 3d 554, 20 Ill.Dec. 333, 380 N.E.2d 10 (1978), and People v. Cahill , 37 Ill. App. 3d 361, 345 N.E.2d 528 (1976), the circuit court stated that, while possession of a firearm may be constructive, possession of the FOID card itself must be actual and "a person must have a FOID card on their person" whenever in possession of a firearm in order to comply with section 2(a)(1). See Elders , 63 Ill. App. 3d at 559, 20 Ill.Dec. 333, 380 N.E.2d 10 (the possessor of the firearm must "have the card on his person").

¶ 38 Since, then, Lyons had access to the cabinet containing the disks, and defendant did not restrict her access to the contents of the disks, whether by security measures or directives to her, defendant assumed the risk that Lyons would view the disks herself or permit another to do so. Lyons, therefore, had authority to consent to a search of the disks. ¶ 39 Defendant cites People v. Elders, 63 Ill.App.3d 554, 20 Ill.Dec. 333, 380 N.E.2d 10 (1978), which was decided by the Fifth District Appellate Court. In Elders, the defendant's wife went to the police station and reported that the defendant was drunk and had threatened her with a rifle, and that she was afraid for her son whom she had left home alone with the defendant.

The State notes that, because Officer Brenza earlier asked defendant whether he had any identification and defendant replied that he did not, it was reasonable to infer that defendant did not possess a FOID card. Defendant responds that Brenza did not know whether defendant possessed a FOID card, that the State argued below that the discovery of the ammunition warranted Terry-type questioning to ask defendant if he had a card, not probable cause to arrest, and that Brenza admitted that at the time he arrested defendant for the outstanding warrant it was also to see if he had a FOID card. • 6 A person commits the offense of failing to possess a State FOID card when he possesses a firearm or firearm ammunition without having a FOID card in his immediate possession. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 38, par. 83-2; People v. Elders (1978), 63 Ill. App.3d 554, 559, 380 N.E.2d 10; see People v. Lofton (1977), 69 Ill.2d 67, 72, 370 N.E.2d 517.) The mere ownership of a card by a person in possession of a firearm or firearm ammunition is not sufficient compliance with the statute; he must then also have the card on his person.

Rather, "proof of constructive possession of the gun by [a] defendant is sufficient." Id.; see also People v. Elders, 380 N.E.2d 10, 15 (Ill. App. Ct. 5th Dist. 1978). To establish that a person is in constructive possession of a firearm, the State must prove: "(1) that defendant had knowledge of the presence of the weapon; and (2) that defendant exercised immediate and exclusive control over the area when the weapon was found."

Additionally, in the event a defendant testifies, the State should ask the defendant both whether he was issued a FOID card and whether he had it on his person at the time of arrest. See People v. Elders, 63 Ill.App.3d 554, 559 (1978) ("The mere ownership of a card by a person in possession of a firearm or firearm ammunition is not sufficient [compliance with the statute;] he must then also have the card on his person"). While not a perfect solution, these practices may decrease the incidence of defendants taking advantage of the system.

Accord Rodriguez, 497 U.S. at 181, 110 S.Ct. at 2797. See also People v. Elders, 63 Ill. App.3d 554, 20 Ill.Dec. 333, 380 N.E.2d 10, 14 (Ill.App.Ct. 1978) ("It is only where the record affirmatively establishes 'joint occupancy' or 'equal rights to possession' that one spouse's consent to a search is binding against the other.") (emphasis added). Moreover,

Here, the police officers, having already arrested defendant and found the two children, went into defendant's bedroom, a place they had no lawful right to be, and searched for and found the shotgun before defendant asked to go into his bedroom and get dressed. This was an unlawful search, for it was not conducted incident to arrest ( People v. Hansen (1980), 90 Ill. App.3d 407, 413 N.E.2d 103), it was not based on exigent circumstances ( People v. Elders (1978), 63 Ill. App.3d 554, 380 N.E.2d 10), and the shotgun was not found in plain view. ( People v. Testa (1984), 125 Ill. App.3d 1039, 466 N.E.2d 1126.) Therefore, we believe a timely motion would have been granted.

Whether an officer reasonably believed that an emergency existed is a question of fact to be determined by the trial court. ( People v. Elders (1978), 63 Ill. App.3d 554, 557.) The trial court is to determine the credibility of the witnesses, the weight given their testimony, and any inferences to be drawn from the evidence.

In People v. Bochniak (1981), 93 Ill. App.3d 575, 417 N.E.2d 722, cert. denied (1982), 455 U.S. 938, 71 L.Ed.2d 648, 102 S.Ct. 1427, the defendant's mother owned the garage she rented to defendant and retained a key to it, but did not use the garage herself. In People v. Elders (1978), 63 Ill. App.3d 554, 380 N.E.2d 10, the defendant's wife purportedly gave consent to a search of her husband's car. Defendant cites People v. Ford (1980), 83 Ill. App.3d 57, 403 N.E.2d 512, for the general principle that in order to have authority to grant consent there must be mutual use of the property and joint control and access for most purposes.

The purpose — to offer assistance to a citizen possibly imperiled, not to obtain evidence of a crime — justifies such a search. ( People v. Elders (1978), 63 Ill. App.3d 554, 380 N.E.2d 10; People v. Swansey (1978), 62 Ill. App.3d 1015, 379 N.E.2d 1279; People v. Lovitz (1976), 39 Ill. App.3d 624, 350 N.E.2d 276, cert. denied (1977), 434 U.S. 842, 54 L.Ed.2d 107, 98 S.Ct. 141.) As was pointed out in Lovitz, "Generally speaking, the entry and search of a private dwelling without a warrant is constitutionally prohibited except under circumstances where the police are confronted with an emergency which dictates the need for immediate action" ( 39 Ill. App.3d 624, 629, 350 N.E.2d 276, 279), the need for immediate action precluding an opportunity to obtain a search warrant.