Opinion
A164058
12-28-2023
In re E.L., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. v. E.L., Defendant and Appellant. THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent,
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
(Contra Costa County Super. Ct. No. J1601167)
BROWN, P. J.
E.L. pleaded no contest to a count of assault with force likely to produce great bodily injury (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(4)) in exchange for the dismissal of two felony counts of rape of an unconscious person (Pen. Code, § 261, subd. (a)(4)). The juvenile court ordered E.L. to pay $224,355.17 in restitution (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 730.6) for mental health treatment expenses that the victim incurred after the assault. E.L. contends that the juvenile court abused its discretion by failing to find compelling and extraordinary circumstances justifying an order of less than full restitution because of the large award's impact on his mental health. We affirm the restitution order.
All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise stated.
BACKGROUND
In 2017, E.L. became a dependent of the juvenile court under a sustained wardship petition alleging that he committed forcible rape and forcible oral copulation.
In the fall of 2019, E.L., then 17 years old, lived with resource parents. His girlfriend, B.C., then a minor, came over when his resource parents were out of town. The two had consensual sex, after which B.C. drank alcohol, became intoxicated, and fell asleep in E.L.'s room. Once later that night and once the next morning, B.C. awoke to find E.L. having sexual intercourse with her. The second time she awoke to find E.L. having intercourse with her, B.C. was sober, and she pushed E.L. off and left.
In September 2020, the Contra Costa County District Attorney filed a juvenile wardship petition (§ 602) alleging that E.L. had twice committed rape of an unconscious person on or about October 1, 2019 (Pen. Code, § 261, subd. (a)(4)). The petition was subsequently amended to add a count of assault with force likely to produce great bodily injury (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(4)), and E.L. pleaded no contest to the assault count. The court sustained the petition as to the assault count, dismissed the other counts, and set a dispositional hearing.
Before the petition was filed but after the date of the alleged rapes, E.L. turned 18.
Following the contested dispositional hearing, the court adjudged E.L. an indefinite ward of the court pursuant to section 602. The court ordered E.L. to home supervision under the care of guardians for 180 days and required him to participate in sex offender treatment and observe other conditions.
The probation department filed a memo about the requested amount of victim restitution and attached documents it had received from B.C.'s father. He requested restitution for the costs of a psychiatric assessment, an out-of-state therapy program, and a therapeutic out-of-state boarding school.
B.C.'s father. testified at the restitution hearing that B.C. had some mental health issues before she became involved with E.L.
B.C.'s father was aware that B.C. and E.L. had a romantic relationship. Formerly a high-achieving student, B.C. began missing school in the fall of 2019. She started using drugs and alcohol.
B.C.'s father testified that, around August and September of 2019, B.C. displayed a "drastic change" and seemed upset all the time. He overheard her speaking hysterically to E.L. on the phone in September 2019, saying that she wanted to kill herself. A few days later, B.C. told her father that E.L. had raped her. A week later, B.C. cut her wrists deeply and carved into her legs, "Kill yourself" in big letters. That same month, B.C. threatened suicide and was involuntarily admitted to a hospital psychiatric ward, after which she was evaluated and released. Less than a week later, B.C. was readmitted to the hospital for suicidal thoughts and cutting. Then, one night in 2020, B.C. went out with friends, did not come home, and was later found unconscious. She was taken to the hospital, where it was determined that she had almost fatally overdosed on Xanax and alcohol.
B.C.'s parents hired a therapist who treated her through her 2020 hospitalization. That therapist then referred B.C. to another doctor who recommended that B.C. be placed at an out-of-state therapy program.. B.C. remained at the therapy program for several months.
Near the end of her time at the therapy program, B.C.'s therapists told her parents that B.C. was not ready to come home and instead should go directly to another therapeutic program. At the recommendation of B.C.'s therapists, her parents placed B.C. in an out-of-state therapeutic boarding school where she stayed for over a year. After B.C. left the therapeutic boarding school, she had additional therapy.
The defense did not put on any evidence.
At argument, defense counsel argued that B.C. had "significant" mental health needs prior to the assault and urged the court to strike mental health treatment costs not attributable to the assault. Counsel argued that the restitution amount sought was not reasonable. Counsel also asked the court to consider, as an extraordinary and compelling circumstance, the mental health impact of saddling E.L. with a $200,000 restitution order when he was a foster youth with certain mental health issues of his own. Counsel contended that a restitution award exceeding $200,000 was inconsistent with the rehabilitative purpose of restitution and argued E.L. should only have to pay for B.C.'s first out-of-state therapy program.
The prosecutor countered that B.C.'s expenses were reasonable, all services had been recommended by therapists, and a full restitution award would serve the purpose of rehabilitation, especially considering that, at the time E.L. assaulted B.C., he was on probation for forcible rape.
The court found that the evidence established that B.C.'s mental health after the assault began to rapidly decline and the costs claimed were reasonable and attributable to the assault. Despite the fact that the measures B.C.'s family took were costly, the court could "not find that there has been compelling evidence to veer from what appears to be under the circumstances the reasonable cost of the mental health treatment for [B.C.]." The court noted that it was "always sympathetic to the fact that a large amount of restitution is difficult, but that doesn't mean that it's not appropriate," and "under these circumstances I really don't know what less measures they could have taken to take care of [B.C.]." The court concluded, "So I do believe, and I understand this is a substantial amount, but I see no information before me or evidence before me to allow me to legally veer from this amount that seems to be reasonable. They were costs that are documented, and I think that ultimately they are appropriate. And I am setting restitution in the amount of . . . $224,335. That is joint and several with his parents."
E.L. filed a timely notice of appeal.
The restitution order is appealable as a postjudgment order. (§ 800, subd. (a); In re Julian O. (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 847, 852.)
DISCUSSION
"In 1982, by initiative measure, the voters passed Proposition 8 giving all crime victims the constitutional right to receive restitution from the offender who was convicted of committing a crime against them. (Cal. Const., art. I, § 28, subd. (b).) The Legislature implemented this section by amending the restitution statutes applicable to adult offenders [citation] and section 730.6, which is the parallel provision applicable to juvenile offenders." (In re Anthony M. (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 1010, 1016, fn. omitted.) "The purpose of an order for victim restitution is threefold, to rehabilitate the defendant, deter future delinquent behavior, and make the victim whole by compensating him for his economic losses." (Id. at p. 1017.)" 'A victim's restitution right is to be broadly and liberally construed.'" (In re Johnny M. (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 1128, 1132.)
In relevant part, section 730.6 provides: "(a)(1) It is the intent of the Legislature that a victim of conduct for which a minor is found to be a person described in Section 602 who incurs any economic loss as a result of the minor's conduct shall receive restitution directly from that minor. [¶] (2) Upon a minor being found to be a person described in Section 602, . . . the court shall order the minor to pay . . . [¶] . . . [¶] [r]estitution to the victim or victims, if any, in accordance with subdivision (h)." (§ 730.6, subd. (a)(1)-(2).) Section 730.6, subdivision (h) states, "Restitution . . . shall be imposed in the amount of the losses, as determined.... The court shall order full restitution unless it finds compelling and extraordinary reasons for not doing so, and states them on the record. A minor's inability to pay shall not be considered a compelling or extraordinary reason not to impose a restitution order, nor shall inability to pay be a consideration in determining the amount of the restitution order. A restitution order . . . shall be of a dollar amount sufficient to fully reimburse the victim or victims for all determined economic losses incurred as the result of the minor's conduct for which the minor was found to be a person described in Section 602 ...." The cost of mental health services provided to the victim as the result of the minor's conduct is recoverable under section 730.6. (In re M.W. (2008) 169 Cal.App.4th 1, 6-7.)
This court reviews the restitution order for abuse of discretion. (In re Anthony M., supra, 156 Cal.App.4th at p. 1016.) A trial court abuses its discretion when it acts "contrary to law," fails to" 'use a rational method that could reasonably be said to make the victim whole,'" or makes an arbitrary or capricious order. (Ibid.)
E.L. claims that the restitution order here should be reversed because of the particular toll the large award would take on his mental health. He states, "Trial counsel argued, citing a meta-study review about the harmful impact of debt on physical and mental health," E.L., who has a history of mental health issues and trauma, "faces a greater toll on his mental health as a consequence of the extremely high debt burden." Because of this alleged mental health toll, E.L. contends that the award was in effect punitive and impeded his rehabilitation. As set forth post, we disagree.
The Attorney General argues that E.L. forfeited any contention that the award was punitive. E.L. responds that his objection below that an order for full restitution would impair his mental health and inhibit rehabilitation preserved his appellate argument that the court's order "should be modified because its particular impact on E.L.'s mental health was substantially punitive rather than rehabilitative in effect." E.L.'s appellate claim rests on the premise that court abused its discretion in failing to find that the particular impact of the restitution award on his mental health constituted a compelling and extraordinary reason to reduce victim restitution. (See § 730.6, subd. (h).) Because we disagree with the substance of E.L.'s claim, we need not address the forfeiture argument.
The record supports the trial court's conclusion that B.C.'s family spent $224,355.17 on mental health services, and E.L. does not contend otherwise. E.L. also concedes on appeal that the cost of the victim's mental health services is recoverable under section 730.6, and he does not challenge the juvenile court's finding that he caused this economic loss. There is thus an unchallenged factual and rational basis for the restitution amount ordered.
We are not persuaded by E.L.'s argument that the order must be reversed because of the alleged particular toll the high debt would take on his mental health. "A minor's inability to pay shall not be considered a compelling or extraordinary reason not to impose a restitution order" (§ 730.6, subd. (h)), so the trial court did not abuse its discretion with the award even in the face of a meta-study concluding that debt can have negative impacts on mental health. And although the record shows that E.L. experienced some mental health issues, E.L. did not point to any evidence specifically showing that this award would have a particular impact on his mental health. Moreover, the juvenile court heard counsel's arguments with respect to the award amount and E.L.'s circumstances, including his background, his mental health, and his commission of the assault while on probation. The court considered the arguments and evidence before it and concluded that full restitution was appropriate, impliedly finding that the evidence did not show "compelling and extraordinary circumstances" that would justify a reduction in the restitution amount. We cannot find that the trial court's conclusion was arbitrary or capricious. E.L. has not established any abuse of discretion.
DISPOSITION
The juvenile court's restitution order is affirmed.
WE CONCUR: STREETER, J. GOLDMAN, J.