Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County No. PA059717, Ronald S. Coen, Judge.
Deborah Blanchard, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Pamela C. Hamanaka, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Susan D. Martynec and Robert M. Snider, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
TURNER, P. J.
I. INTRODUCTION
Defendant, Ray Eggum, appeals from a judgment of conviction, following a jury trial, of felony unlawful driving or taking of a vehicle in violation of Vehicle Code section 10851, subdivision (a). He was also found to have served five prior prison terms within the meaning of Penal Code section 667.5, subdivision (b). We affirm the judgment.
II. BACKGROUND
We view the evidence in a light most favorable to the judgment. (Jackson v. Virginia (1979) 443 U.S. 307, 319; People v. Elliot (2005) 37 Cal.4th 453, 466; Taylor v. Stainer (9th Cir. 1994) 31 F.3d 907, 908-909.) At approximately 2:20 a.m. on August 6, 2007, Officer Michael Wilkin was patrolling the area around California State University at Northridge. Defendant drove by traveling at approximately 65 miles per hour in a 40 mile per hour zone. Officer Wilkin effected a traffic stop of the blue Nissan Pathfinder bearing a Nevada license plate. Defendant was unable to produce a driver’s license, vehicle registration, or proof of insurance. There was a small black travel bag in the center console area. The bag was open, unzipped. The bag contained: credit card, bank account, and other identifying information as to several individuals; two small wallets; a silver dollar; a checkbook from Washington Mutual in the name of Rossi and Rossi; three checks not in defendant’s name; two credit cards in the name of Michelle Crosby; a Washington Mutual gold debit card in the name of Gregory Harker; a check written on the account of Guardian Prepaid Legal, payable to Richard Douglas Sheppard, and containing a California driver’s license number, a social security number, and a date of birth; a form in Melissa Chapman’s name; a form in Gregory E. Davis’s name; a piece of paper with a PayPal password number written on it; a computer printout; a memory disk; and another memory card or a zip drive. The bag also contained a MasterCard in defendant’s name. Defendant admitted the bag was his.
There was no key in the ignition. Defendant did not have a key to the Nissan. Defendant said he had used a master lock key to operate the ignition. A master lock key is not used to operate vehicles. The key was very loose in the ignition. There was a small flathead screwdriver in the open center console area. The ignition could also be operated with the screwdriver. There was damage to the ignition, including pry marks, and to the steering column. The plastic area around the steering column was “flopping around” and it made a rattling noise when the Nissan was operated. The ignition had been forced. There was also damage to the interior of the car including broken plastic pieces. The rear side door panels had been torn off, the carpet was ripped up, and the stereo system and compact disc player were missing. The Nissan had been stolen in California. The Nevada plates belonged to a different car.
Chris Sposato testified on defendant’s behalf. Mr. Sposato was present when someone named “Tony” loaned the Nissan to defendant. Mr. Sposato, the person only identified as Tony, and defendant had been smoking speed together. Thereafter, the person only identified as Tony gave the Nissan to defendant. The person only identified as Tony said he had gotten the Nissan from someone who owed him money. Tony gave defendant a key. When Tony gave the Nissan to defendant, it had a California license plate on it.
Defendant was convicted by a jury and sentenced to eight years in state prison. Defendant received the high term of three years for the violation of Vehicle Code section 10851, subdivision (a). In addition, defendant received five consecutive years because he had served five prior prison terms within the meaning of Penal Code section 667.5, subdivision (b). (All further statutory references are to the Penal Code except where otherwise noted.) Defendant was ordered to pay: a $200 restitution fine (§ 1202.4, subd. (b)); a $200 parole revocation fine (§ 1202.45); and a $20 court security fee. (§ 1465.8, subd. (a)(1).) He received credit for 206 days in presentence custody plus 102 days of conduct credit for a total presentence custody credit of 308 days. Following a restitution hearing, defendant was ordered to pay the victim $1,435.
III. DISCUSSION
Vehicle Code section 10851, subdivision (a) provides in part, “Any person who drives or takes a vehicle not his or her own, without the consent of the owner thereof, and with intent either to permanently or temporarily deprive the owner thereof of his or her title to or possession of the vehicle, whether with or without intent to steal the vehicle... is guilty of a public offense.” (See People v. Moon (2005) 37 Cal.4th 1, 26; People v. Barrick (1982) 33 Cal.3d 115, 134.) Vehicle Code section 10851, subdivision (a), requires that the driving or taking be done with the specific intent to deprive the owner of title or possession of the vehicle, permanently or temporarily. (People v. Moon, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 26; People v. Barrick, supra, 33 Cal.3d at p. 134.) Defendant contends the trial court abused its discretion under Evidence Code sections 352 and 1101, subdivision (b) in admitting into evidence the contents of the travel bag. Prior to trial, defense counsel brought a motion in limine to exclude as prejudicial the evidence that checks, credit cards, and similar items in numerous other person’s names were found in the Nissan defendant had been driving. The prosecutor argued the items were found “strewn about the vehicle” and the evidence was relevant to show defendant’s: intent; lack of mistake in driving around in a stolen vehicle; and his knowledge the Nissan was stolen. The trial court agreed the evidence was relevant to show knowledge the vehicle was not legitimately obtained. The trial court ruled: “[I] will allow these items with a limiting instruction that the sole purposes of these items is not to show the defendant has a disposition to commit crime or that he is charged with any other crime, but to show his knowledge relating to the vehicle, and I will give such a limiting instruction. [¶]... And by the way, counsel, remind me if I forget to give the limiting instruction.”
Trial courts have broad discretion concerning the admission of evidence. (People v. Anderson (2001) 25 Cal.4th 543, 591; People v. Smithey (1999) 20 Cal.4th 936, 973-974.) The California Supreme Court has repeatedly held: “As with all relevant evidence... the trial court retains discretion to admit or exclude evidence.... [Citations.] A trial court’s exercise of discretion in admitting or excluding evidence is reviewable for abuse [citation] and will not be disturbed except on a showing the trial court exercised its discretion in an arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd manner that resulted in a manifest miscarriage of justice [citation].” (People v. Rodriguez (1999) 20 Cal.4th 1, 9-10; People v. Minifie (1996) 13 Cal.4th 1055, 1070; People v. Rodrigues (1994) 8 Cal.4th 1060, 1124-1125; People v. Cudjo (1993) 6 Cal.4th 585, 609.)
Defendant contends that because the items were not in plain sight—as the trial court had believed when it ruled on the in limine motion—the evidence should have been excluded. Defendant argues the trial court’s in limine ruling was based on a misperception of the evidence. But defense counsel never raised that argument in the trial court. Defense counsel never asked the trial court to reconsider its ruling given the evidence at trial that the items were in a travel bag and not strewn about the Nissan. Nor did defense counsel request a limiting instruction or remind the trial court it had intended to give such an instruction. Under these circumstances, the argument was not preserved for appeal. (Evid. Code, § 353; People v. Gurule (2002) 28 Cal.4th 557, 626; People v. Medina (1995) 11 Cal.4th 694, 753; In re Michael L. (1985) 39 Cal.3d 81, 87-88; People v. Collie (1981) 30 Cal.3d 43, 49.)
Moreover, any error in admitting the evidence was harmless under any standard. (Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24; People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836.) There was overwhelming evidence of defendant’s guilt. (People v. Doolin (2009) 45 Cal.4th 390, 439; People v. Riggs (2008) 44 Cal.4th 248, 300-301; People v. Prince (2007) 40 Cal.4th 1179.) It was 2:20 a.m. Defendant was driving the Nissan with a forced ignition switch, a loose and rattling steering column, obvious damage to the interior, including torn door panels and carpeting, and a missing stereo system. He did not have a key to the Nissan Pathfinder. Defendant had replaced the California license plate with a Nevada plate. Defendant did not have a driver’s license, proof of insurance, or vehicle registration documents. There was no registration in the glove compartment, elsewhere in the Nissan, or on defendant’s person. The individual identified only as Tony, who allegedly loaned the Nissan to defendant, did not testify at trial.
IV. DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
We concur: ARMSTRONG, J., KRIEGLER, J.