Opinion
15479, 1134/12, 3352/12
06-18-2015
The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Ralph EDWARDS, Defendant–Appellant.
Robert S. Dean, Center for Appellate Litigation, New York (Bruce D. Austern of counsel), for appellant. Cyrus R. Vance, Jr., District Attorney, New York (Alan Gadlin of counsel), for respondent.
Robert S. Dean, Center for Appellate Litigation, New York (Bruce D. Austern of counsel), for appellant.
Cyrus R. Vance, Jr., District Attorney, New York (Alan Gadlin of counsel), for respondent.
GONZALEZ, P.J., TOM, FRIEDMAN, KAPNICK, JJ.
Opinion Judgment, Supreme Court, New York County (Rena K. Uviller, J.), rendered March 6, 2013, convicting defendant, after a jury trial, of aggravated vehicular assault, assault in the second degree, criminal possession of a controlled substance in the seventh degree and resisting arrest, and sentencing him to an aggregate term of 7 to 15 years, unanimously affirmed.After appropriate warnings by the court, defendant abandoned his request to proceed pro se, and there was no violation of his right to represent himself (see People v. Ramos, 35 A.D.3d 247, 825 N.Y.S.2d 222 [1st Dept.2006], lv. denied 8 N.Y.3d 924, 834 N.Y.S.2d 514, 866 N.E.2d 460 [2007] ). As jury selection was about to begin, defendant made a request for substitution of counsel, which the court denied. When defendant then asked if he could go pro se, the court inquired of defendant as to his experience and education, and warned him of the disadvantages of self-representation, including the fact that an attorney would be more capable than a layperson of understanding the issues, cross-examining witnesses and dealing with evidence. The court ended the discussion by telling defendant to think about his choice over the weekend. Defendant never raised the issue again or expressed any further dissatisfaction with his attorney.
The record fails to support defendant's contention that the court improperly frightened or coerced him into foregoing his right of self-representation. Instead, the court acted appropriately when it “warned defendant forcefully” of the risks of proceeding pro se (People v. Vivenzio, 62 N.Y.2d 775, 776, 477 N.Y.S.2d 318, 465 N.E.2d 1254 [1984] ; see also People v. Latimer, 220 A.D.2d 223, 632 N.Y.S.2d 12 [1st Dept.1995], lv. denied 87 N.Y.2d 923, 641 N.Y.S.2d 605, 664 N.E.2d 516 [1996] ).
The court properly exercised its discretion when, rather than ruling immediately on the pro se request, it offered defendant time to think it over. By doing so, the court was exercising caution to ensure that any waiver by defendant of his right to counsel was knowing, intelligent and voluntary (see e.g. People v. Moore, 126 A.D.3d 561, 3 N.Y.S.3d 575 [1st Dept.2015] ).