Opinion
C088671
02-14-2020
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. RONNIE LEVON EDWARDS, Defendant and Appellant.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Super. Ct. No. 096902)
Ronnie Levon Edwards appeals from the trial court's order denying his petition for a hearing on conditional release from Coalinga State Hospital. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 6608.) Edwards's appellate counsel filed a brief pursuant to Conservatorship of Ben C. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 529, 544, setting forth the basic facts and procedural history of the case. Edwards thereafter filed a supplemental brief asserting a fundamental miscarriage of justice.
Undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code. --------
Having independently reviewed the record, we conclude a reasonable person would not entertain a strong suspicion that Edwards has so changed that he is not a danger to others and is not likely to engage in sexually violent criminal behavior if discharged. Finding no miscarriage of justice, we will affirm the trial court's order.
BACKGROUND
In 2009, Edwards was committed to the Department of State Hospitals, Coalinga after the trial court found he was a sexually violent predator (SVP). (People v. Edwards (June 7, 2019, C085320) [nonpub. opn.] at p. 1 (Edwards).) Edwards had been convicted of offenses qualifying him for SVP commitment in three separate proceedings between 1974 and 1987. (Id. at p. 2.) In the last instance, Edwards had been convicted of two counts of forcible rape and sentenced to a 38-year state prison term. (Ibid.)
In 2012, Edwards filed a petition for release after the examining psychologist, Dr. Scott J. Van de Putte, found he no longer fit the definition of an SVP. (Edwards, supra, C085320 at pp. 2-3.) The trial court denied the petition based on a prior report by Dr. David S. Wildman, who had concluded Edwards was an SVP, suffered from a diagnosed mental disorder which made him a danger to the health and safety of others, and was likely to engage in violent predatory criminal behavior in the future without adequate supervision and treatment. (Id. at pp. 2-3.) This court reversed and remanded for the trial court to determine whether Edwards established probable cause and, if so, to set the matter for trial. (Ibid.)
On remand, a report prepared by Dr. Larry Wornian found that Edwards was an SVP and posed a danger to the community. (Edwards, supra, C085320 at p. 4.) Edwards did not present any additional evidence. (Ibid.) The trial court found that Edwards failed to establish probable cause and was not entitled to a trial on the matter, an order this court affirmed on appeal. (Ibid.)
When Dr. Douglas R. Korpi subsequently issued a report finding that Edwards was no longer an SVP and recommended unconditional release, Edwards filed a new section 6605 petition. Dr. Wornian prepared another report concluding that Edwards remained an SVP, was still a danger to the community, and recommended against release or a less restrictive commitment. The trial court found that Edwards failed to establish probable cause and denied the petition.
DISCUSSION
Edwards asserts a fundamental miscarriage of justice. However, to the extent he attacks proceedings that occurred before he filed his current petition, our affirmance of the denial of his prior petition precludes any new attack on those proceedings. The judgment in the earlier case became final when the remittitur in the prior appeal was issued on August 8, 2019. (See McClain v. Rush (1989) 216 Cal.App.3d 18, 26 [issuance of remittitur after appeal renders judgment final for all purposes, including collateral estoppel].)
Moreover, to the extent Edwards attacks the trial court's denial of his current petition, our review of the record shows no miscarriage of justice.
The trial court must order a show cause hearing upon receipt of a petition for unconditional discharge. (§§ 6604.9, subd. (f), 6605, subd. (a)(1).) At the show cause hearing, the trial court can consider the petition and any accompanying documentation provided by the medical director, the prosecutor, or the committed person. (Ibid.)
The committed person bears the burden of establishing the probable cause required under section 6605. (People v. Hardacre (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 1392, 1402.) The trial court must determine whether a reasonable person could entertain a strong suspicion that the committed person (1) has a diagnosed mental disorder which has so changed, that (2) he or she is not a danger to the health and safety of others, and (3) is not likely to engage in sexually violent criminal behavior if discharged. (Id. at p. 1400 [probable cause is " ' "a state of facts as would lead a [person] of ordinary caution or prudence to believe and conscientiously entertain a strong suspicion" ' " of the fact to be proved]; see Cooley v. Superior Court (2002) 29 Cal.4th 228, 236, 251-252 (Cooley); People v. Cheek (2001) 25 Cal.4th 894, 897, 899-900.) The trial court must set a trial on the issue if it determines the requisite probable cause exists. (§ 6605, subd. (a)(2).)
The standard of review of the trial court's probable cause determination in SVP proceedings is the same as the standard of review for probable cause determinations in preliminary hearings. (Cooley, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 257.) Mixed questions of law and fact, like probable cause, are examined independently, while findings of fact are examined for substantial evidence. (Ibid.)
The trial court found that Edwards had not established that his condition had sufficiently changed to warrant release, noting in particular that Edwards had failed to engage in treatment since 2015. Dr. Wornian's report explained that Edwards had a diagnosed mental disorder, had decided to discontinue his treatment, and made patently false claims regarding his prior discharge plan. Dr. Wornian concluded Edwards had not received sufficient treatment for his diagnosed mental condition and other dynamic risk factors, and that neither conditional nor unconditional release was appropriate.
The trial court did not credit the report by Dr. Korpi, noting it was virtually the same as Dr. Korpi's previous report.
Having independently reviewed the record, we conclude a reasonable person would not entertain a strong suspicion that Edwards has so changed that he is not a danger to others and is not likely to engage in sexually violent criminal behavior if discharged. There is no miscarriage of justice.
DISPOSITION
The trial court's order is affirmed.
/S/_________
MAURO, J. We concur: /S/_________
ROBIE, Acting P. J. /S/_________
DUARTE, J.