Opinion
No. 344541
05-07-2019
PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. William Dawun EDWARDS, Defendant-Appellant.
Dana Nessel, Attorney General, Fadwa A. Hammoud, Solicitor General, Michael J. Sepic, Prosecuting Attorney, and Patricia T. Ceresa, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for the people. Berrien County Public Defender (by Christopher Renna) for defendant.
Dana Nessel, Attorney General, Fadwa A. Hammoud, Solicitor General, Michael J. Sepic, Prosecuting Attorney, and Patricia T. Ceresa, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for the people.
Berrien County Public Defender (by Christopher Renna) for defendant.
Before: Meter, P.J., and Sawyer and Cameron, JJ.
Cameron, J. In this interlocutory appeal in this homicide case, defendant challenges the trial court’s pretrial orders denying his motions to admit evidence of the decedent’s specific acts of violence against defendant and against third persons and to exclude evidence of defendant’s daughter’s allegation of criminal sexual conduct by defendant. We reverse the trial court’s ruling regarding evidence of the decedent’s specific acts of violence against defendant, vacate the trial court’s ruling regarding evidence of the decedent’s specific acts of violence against third persons, and affirm the trial court’s other evidentiary ruling involving the allegation of criminal sexual conduct.
Defendant lived with the decedent, Novena Mathis, a woman with whom defendant had two children in common. On January 7, 2018, just after midnight, their daughter and her two children moved into the decedent’s home. When the daughter arrived, defendant became angry, gathered his belongings, and asked the decedent to give him a ride. The decedent told the daughter that she would be back shortly, but that was the last time the daughter saw the decedent alive.
Family members reported the decedent missing, and the police later found her body in her car in a parking lot. Her purse, which held a small hatchet, was retrieved from the car. Detectives investigated and interviewed defendant. Defendant told the detectives that he and the decedent stopped the car in a parking lot and argued over the decedent’s decision to allow their daughter to move into the home. Defendant admitted to the detectives that his daughter had accused him of criminal sexual conduct years earlier and that he had been forced to move out because he could not live in the same house with her. Defendant admitted that his daughter’s move into the home made him angry and caused him to get into the argument with the decedent. He also explained that their argument escalated and that when the decedent reached for her purse, defendant pulled out a gun and shot her. Defendant told the detectives that he knew that the decedent had a hatchet in her purse and that he thought she intended to use it on him. Defendant claims that he killed the decedent in self-defense. Defendant moved in limine for the admission of evidence of an incident that occurred during an argument that defendant had with the decedent on December 7, 2017, in which the decedent attacked him with a hatchet and severely injured him, resulting in his hospitalization. Defendant also moved for admission of specific acts of violence and aggression by the decedent against third persons about which he had knowledge. The trial court ruled inadmissible the specific acts of violence and aggression by the decedent. Instead, the trial court held that only evidence of the decedent’s reputation for violence was admissible—a much more restrictive ruling.
Defendant argues that the trial court erred by denying the admission of all specific-acts evidence because such evidence had relevance to defendant’s claim of self-defense. We partly agree. We review for an abuse of discretion a trial court’s decision to admit or exclude evidence. People v. Dobek , 274 Mich. App. 58, 93, 732 N.W.2d 546 (2007). We review de novo a trial court’s interpretation of the Michigan Rules of Evidence. Id . A trial court has abused its discretion if its decision falls outside the range of reasonable and principled outcomes. People v. Babcock , 469 Mich. 247, 269, 666 N.W.2d 231 (2003).
The admissibility of character evidence is governed by MRE 404 and MRE 405. MRE 404 provides in relevant part:
(a) Character evidence generally. Evidence of a person’s character or a trait of character is not admissible for the purpose of proving action in conformity therewith on a particular occasion, except:
(1) Character of accused. Evidence of a pertinent trait of character offered by an accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the same; or if evidence of a trait of character of the alleged victim of the crime is offered by the accused and admitted under subdivision (a)(2) ...;
(2) Character of alleged victim of homicide. When self-defense is an issue in a charge of homicide, evidence of a trait of character for aggression of the alleged victim of the crime offered by an accused ....
MRE 405 provides the methods of proving character:
(a) Reputation or opinion . In all cases in which evidence of character or a trait of character of a person is admissible, proof may be made by testimony as to reputation or by testimony in the form of an opinion. On cross-examination, inquiry is allowable into reports of relevant specific instances of conduct.
(b) Specific instances of conduct . In cases in which character or a trait of character of a person is an essential element of a charge, claim, or defense, proof may also be made of specific instances of that person’s conduct.
In People v. Harris , 458 Mich. 310, 314-317, 583 N.W.2d 680 (1998), a homicide case, the Michigan Supreme Court held that evidence of the violent character of the decedent in the form of reputation evidence is admissible, even if unknown to the defendant, to show the decedent’s probable aggression and act of violence at the time the decedent was killed. Our Supreme Court explained, however, that reputation evidence could not be used to prove the defendant’s state of mind unless the defendant knew about the decedent’s character at the time:
[W]here a defendant charged with murder asserts that he killed in self-defense, his state of mind at the time of the act is material because it is an important element in determining his justification
for his belief in an impending attack by the deceased. The reputation of the deceased for a violent or turbulent disposition is a circumstance that would cause such a belief. However, unlike evidence tending to show that the victim was the aggressor, the deceased’s violent reputation must be known to the defendant if he is to use it to show that he acted in self-defense. Reputation in the neighborhood where both live is sufficient with nothing more. The strength of the deceased as well as his habitual carrying of weapons or his possession of them at the time of the affray, if known to the defendant, should be considered as properly affecting his apprehensions. The purpose of this evidence is to show the defendant’s state of mind; therefore, it is obvious that the victim’s character, as affecting the defendant’s apprehensions, must have become known to him, otherwise it is irrelevant. [ Id . at 316-317, 583 N.W.2d 680 (quotation marks and citations omitted).]
Our Supreme Court also distinguished character evidence used in relation to an ultimate issue in a case from character evidence used as circumstantial evidence of an act. Id . at 317, 583 N.W.2d 680. The Supreme Court explained that in cases "[w]here character is ‘in issue,’ the character of a person may be an element of the ... defense." Id . at 318, 583 N.W.2d 680. In such cases, " [MRE] 405 allows specific instances of violence to be admitted...." Id . at 319, 583 N.W.2d 680. The Harris Court cited this Court’s decision in People v. Cooper , 73 Mich. App. 660, 252 N.W.2d 564 (1977), for the well-settled law that specific acts of aggression by the decedent are admissible to establish a defendant’s reasonable apprehension of harm.
In cases where the decedent’s character was not an essential element and "in issue," our Supreme Court clarified that the general rule applied, and the decedent’s character "may not be shown by specific instances of conduct...." Harris , 458 Mich. at 319, 583 N.W.2d 680. Our Supreme Court explained:
As a general rule, the character of the victim may not be shown by specific instances of conduct unless those instances are independently admissible to show some matter apart from character as circumstantial evidence of the conduct of the victim on a particular occasion.
"[W]hen character is not an essential element, it may be shown only by reputation or opinion evidence. ... Hence, construed literally, Rule 405 does not permit a defendant to use specific instances to show that the victim was the aggressor since the aggressive character of the victim is not an essential element of the defense of self-defense since the aggressive character of the victim is introduced as circumstantial evidence to show that the victim committed the first or primary act of aggression against the defendant, which is to say that the defense of self-defense in this situation makes an act of the victim, rather than a trait of the victim’s character, the material issue." [ Id . (citation omitted; alteration in original).]
Therefore, the rule enunciated in Harris is twofold. First, evidence of a victim’s aggressive character is admissible in the form of reputation evidence, even if the defendant does not have knowledge of the decedent’s character, to show that the decedent was the probable aggressor. With that said, evidence of the decedent’s reputation that is not known to the defendant is inadmissible to prove an essential element of self-defense, e.g., a reasonable apprehension of harm. Second, evidence of the decedent’s specific acts of violence is admissible only to prove an essential element of self-defense, such as a reasonable apprehension of harm.
In this case, defendant sought the admission of evidence that fell within the category of specific-acts evidence discussed and distinguished in Harris , i.e., specific-acts evidence used to show an essential element of self-defense. Application of the analysis articulated in Harris to the facts of this case establishes that the trial court erred because it failed to differentiate between the evidentiary nuances set forth in Harris .
Defendant sought the admission of evidence of the decedent’s specific act of violence committed against him personally: the decedent’s alleged December 2017 assault with the hatchet that resulted in defendant’s hospitalization. Defendant sought admission of this specific-acts evidence to establish an element of his claim of self-defense—that he had a reasonable apprehension of harm from the decedent because he knew she carried a hatchet in her purse and had recently injured him with it. Defendant claimed that the decedent’s recent attack caused him to fear imminent harm when the decedent reached for her purse just before he shot her.
To prove that he acted in self-defense, defendant had to present evidence that he had a reasonable belief that he had to use deadly force to prevent his own death or to prevent great bodily harm to himself. Cooper , 73 Mich. App. at 663-664, 252 N.W.2d 564. As explained in Harris , under MRE 405(b), the specific-acts evidence of the decedent’s violent assault placed the decedent’s character in issue. This evidence, if admitted, would directly affect defendant’s ability to prove that he acted in self-defense on the basis of his reasonable apprehension of imminent bodily injury or death. Unlike the defendant in Harris , who did not have direct knowledge of specific acts of aggression and who sought the admission of evidence of the decedent’s general reputation to establish that the decedent probably acted aggressively at the time he was killed, defendant’s evidence in this case is directly relevant to an ultimate issue in his defense. Accordingly, the trial court abused its discretion by excluding this admissible specific-acts evidence.
Defendant also sought the admission of evidence of specific acts of violence and aggression by the decedent against third persons years before the incident. He filed a motion in limine to admit seven separate assaults that the decedent reportedly perpetrated on members of her family and on defendant’s ex-girlfriend. The alleged prior assaults ranged from relatively minor harassment that resulted in the issuance of a PPO 18 years ago to more recent physical assaults. During the motion hearing, defense counsel asserted that defendant was personally aware of these prior assaults and further argued that these assaults were admissible at trial to support defendant’s claim that he honestly and reasonably believed that he was in imminent danger of being attacked and severely injured by the decedent. Depending on the nature and timing of the prior assaults, defendant may very well have presented a recognized basis to admit specific-acts evidence under MRE 405(b). However, the trial court misconstrued defendant’s legal argument and denied defendant’s motion to admit the evidence without any individualized analysis. In summarily denying defendant’s motion to admit the evidence, the trial court seems to have concluded that defendant believed that he was entitled to introduce specific acts of conduct to prove the decedent’s reputation for violence. If that were the case, the trial court’s exclusion of specific-acts evidence would be on solid legal ground. MRE 405(a). But, as previously stated, defendant’s theory of admission was to support his assertion that he honestly and reasonably believed that his use of force was necessary to prevent his own death or bodily injury. Therefore, the trial court was required to examine each allegation and then determine its admissibility. The trial court did not engage in any such examination. Instead, as the following excerpt from the motion hearing reveals, the trial court was uncertain about our Supreme Court’s decision in Harris , and as a result, the trial court never specifically addressed the admissibility of each specific act on the merits:
Personal protection order.
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[Defense Counsel ]: I think the caselaw is that, specific acts of aggression are admissible to the extent that [defendant] is aware of them at the time that the shooting happens, because those speak to his honest—his reasonableness of—the reasonableness of his belief that the other person would act violently.
The Court : You think that’s what People v. Harris says?
[Defense Counsel ]: That’s exactly what I think People v. Harris says.
The Court : Really? Where—Where is that? Where do they say that?
After additional discussion about the holding of Harris , the trial court issued its ruling: "So, I am granting [defendant’s] motion in part, as to the reputation evidence only, denied as to the evidence of specific acts, or evidence of violence, based on the holding in People v. Harris." Thus, the trial court, by misconstruing defendant’s argument, concluded that under Harris , a defendant cannot introduce specific acts of violence as reputation evidence. While this is certainly true under Harris , defendant was not in this instance requesting the use of reputation evidence. Defendant sought the admission of specific acts of violence by the decedent that he knew about at the time of the shooting to show his reasonable apprehension of harm. See Harris , 458 Mich. at 319, 583 N.W.2d 680 (relying on People v. Farrell , 137 Mich. 127, 100 N.W. 264 (1904), for the proposition "that specific acts may not be shown to establish that the victim was the aggressor," but specific acts "may be shown to establish reasonable apprehension of harm").
We order the trial court on remand to engage in a full evidentiary analysis as to each of the decedent’s specific acts of violence against third persons to determine its admissibility. Importantly, while the evidence defendant seeks to admit may be admissible under MRE 404(a) and MRE 405(b), the trial court never reached the question of relevancy and undue prejudice. Under MRE 401, relevant evidence is "evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence." On remand, the trial court should first determine whether any of the decedent’s violent acts against third persons are relevant to the self-defense claim. The trial court should then determine whether the evidence is admissible under MRE 403. Under MRE 403, relevant evidence may be excluded if the danger of unfair prejudice substantially outweighs its probative value. In determining unfair prejudice, courts may consider a number of factors as enunciated in People v. Watkins , 491 Mich. 450, 487-488, 818 N.W.2d 296 (2012), such as whether the specific-acts evidence is temporally remote and has a causal connection.
Defendant also argues that the trial court erred by not excluding evidence of his alleged criminal sexual conduct against his daughter as inadmissible other-acts evidence under MRE 404(b). We disagree.
Other-acts evidence is governed by MRE 404(b)(1), which provides:
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, scheme, plan, or system in doing an act, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident when the same is material, whether such other crimes, wrongs, or acts are contemporaneous with, or prior or subsequent to the conduct at issue in the case.
In Dobek , 274 Mich. App. at 85-86, 732 N.W.2d 546, this Court considered the admissibility of other-acts evidence and stated:
Evidence of other acts may be admitted under MRE 404(b)(1) if (1) the evidence is offered for a proper purpose, i.e., "something other than a character to conduct theory," (2) the evidence is relevant under MRE 402, as enforced by [MRE] 104(b), "to an issue or fact of consequence at trial," and (3) the probative value of the evidence is not substantially outweighed by its potential for undue or unfair prejudice under MRE 403. People v. VanderVliet , 444 Mich. 52, 74-75, 508 N.W.2d 114 (1993), amended 445 Mich. 1205, 520 N.W.2d 338 (1994), citing and quoting Huddleston v. United States , 485 U.S. 681, 687, 691-692, 108 S. Ct. 1496, 99 L.Ed. 2d 771 (1988). With respect to the first two VanderVliet requirements, our Supreme Court in People v. Knox , 469 Mich. 502, 509-510, 674 N.W.2d 366 (2004), reviewing the law regarding MRE 404(b), stated:
In People v. Crawford , 458 Mich. 376, 385, 582 N.W.2d 785 (1998), this Court explained that the prosecution bears the initial burden of establishing the relevance of the evidence to prove a fact within one of the exceptions to the general exclusionary rule of MRE 404(b). "Relevance is a relationship between the evidence and a material fact at issue that must be demonstrated by reasonable inferences that make a material fact at issue more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence." Crawford , supra at 387 . Where the only relevance of the proposed evidence is to show the defendant’s character or the defendant’s propensity to commit the crime, the evidence must be excluded.
This Court explained that the proponent of the other-acts evidence must recite one of the purposes stated in MRE 404(b) and articulate how the evidence relates to the recited purpose. Dobek , 274 Mich. App. at 85, 732 N.W.2d 546.
In this case, the prosecution gave the trial court a reason to allow the admission of the evidence of defendant’s sexual assault of his daughter when she was five years old. The prosecution explained to the trial court that the alleged sexual-assault evidence had nothing to do with defendant’s propensity to commit the charged offenses but that the evidence’s admission would establish that defendant had a motive for killing the decedent. The prosecution explained that: (1) on the day of the incident, the daughter moved into the decedent’s home where defendant resided; (2) defendant became angry at the decedent for allowing the daughter to move into the home because the daughter previously alleged that defendant had sexually assaulted her and because he could not live in the same home with the daughter because of her previous allegations against him; and (3) defendant directed his anger at the decedent and killed her out of anger over the situation. The record establishes that the prosecution recited one of the proper purposes stated under MRE 404(b) and explained how the evidence related to the recited purpose. The record supports the prosecution’s explanation for admission. A detective testified at defendant’s preliminary examination that defendant told him that his argument with the decedent centered on the daughter’s moving into the house in light of the sexual-assault allegations she had made against defendant. Defendant told the detective that his argument with the decedent escalated to the point where defendant pulled out a gun and shot the decedent. Therefore, the prosecution proposed admission of this evidence to prove defendant’s motive for the homicide, which is an acceptable purpose.
Relevant evidence "may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury...." MRE 403. Under MRE 403, the trial court had to consider whether, although relevant, unfair prejudice substantially outweighed this evidence’s probative value. The record reflects that the trial court applied the MRE 403 test and concluded that the evidence went to the issue of motive and could establish the fact that defendant became angry and that his anger was highly probative regarding the circumstances that led to the offense. The trial court further concluded that the anticipated testimony had significant probative value and stated that defendant could counter the evidence to balance any prejudicial effect. The admission of the evidence, like all inculpatory evidence, likely would be prejudicial to defendant, but the evidence’s probative value respecting his motive for the shooting—an issue about which defendant and the prosecution disagreed vehemently—is not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by ruling that evidence of the sexual assault would be admissible at trial.
Reversed in part, vacated in part, affirmed in part, and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. We do not retain jurisdiction.
Meter, P.J., concurred with Cameron, J.
Sawyer, J. (concurring).
I concur in the result only.