Opinion
07-26-2024
The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Quinton J. EDMONDS, Also Known as Quinton Edmonds, Also Known as Quinten J. Edmonds, Defendant-Appellant.
THE LEGAL AID BUREAU OF BUFFALO, INC., BUFFALO (BHAGYASHREE GUPTE OF COUNSEL), FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLANT. KEVIN T. FINNELL, DISTRICT ATTORNEY, BATAVIA (WILLIAM G. ZICKL OF COUNSEL), FOR RESPONDENT.
Appeal from a judgment of the Genesee County Court (Charles N. Zambito, J.), rendered February 19, 2020. The judgment convicted defendant, upon his plea of guilty, of murder in the second degree.
THE LEGAL AID BUREAU OF BUFFALO, INC., BUFFALO (BHAGYASHREE GUPTE OF COUNSEL), FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
KEVIN T. FINNELL, DISTRICT ATTORNEY, BATAVIA (WILLIAM G. ZICKL OF COUNSEL), FOR RESPONDENT.
PRESENT: SMITH, J.P., BANNISTER, OGDEN, GREENWOOD, AND NOWAK, JJ.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
It is hereby ORDERED that the judgment so appealed from is unanimously affirmed.
Memorandum: Defendant appeals from a judgment convicting him, upon his plea of guilty, of murder in the second degree (Penal Law § 125.25 [1]). We affirm.
As a preliminary matter, to the extent that the pro se notice of appeal states that defendant is appealing from the sentence only, rather than the entire judgment, we exercise our discretion in the interest of justice to treat the appeal as validly taken from the judgment (see CPL 460.10 [6]; People v. Burney, 204 A.D.3d 1473, 1474, 166 N.Y.S.3d 798 [4th Dept. 2022]). [1, 2] Defendant contends that his plea was involuntary because his statements at sentencing negated an essential element of the crime and raised the possibility of an intoxication defense, and County Court failed to conduct a further inquiry to ensure that the plea was voluntary. Although defendant retains the right to appellate review of his challenge to the voluntariness of the plea regardless of the validity of his waiver of the right to appeal (see People v. Thomas, 34 N.Y.3d 545, 566, 122 N.Y.S.3d 226, 144 N.E.3d 970 [2019], cert denied — U.S. —, 140 S.Ct. 2634, 206 L.Ed.2d 512 [2020]), that challenge is not preserved for our review because defendant failed to move to withdraw his guilty plea or to vacate the judgment of conviction (see People v. Cunningham, 213 A.D.3d 1270, 1271, 182 N.Y.S.3d 459 [4th Dept. 2023], lv denied 89 N.Y.8d 1110, 186 N.Y.S.3d 845, 208 N.E.3d 73 [2023]; People v. Tapia, 158 A.D.3d 1079, 1080, 70 N.Y.S.3d 309 [4th Dept. 2018], lv denied 31 N.Y.3d 1088, 79 N.Y.S.3d 110, 103 N.E.3d 1257 [2018]; People v. Wilson, 59 A.D.3d 975, 975, 872 N.Y.S.2d 330 [4th Dept. 2009], lv denied 12 N.Y.3d 861, 881 N.Y.S.2d 673, 909 N.E.2d 596 [2009]). The narrow exception to the preservation rule set forth in (People v. Lopez, 71 N.Y.2d 662, 666, 529 N.Y.S.2d 465, 525 N.E.2d 5 [1988]) does not apply in this case. Defendant said "[n]othing … during the plea colloquy itself" that negated an element of the pleaded-to crime or otherwise called into doubt the voluntariness of his plea (People v. Mobayed, 158 A.D.3d 1221, 1222, 70 N.Y.S.3d 267 [4th Dept. 2018], lv denied 81 N.Y.3d 1015, 78 N.Y.S.3d 285, 102 N.E.8d 1066 [2018]; see .Cunningham, 213 A.D.3d at 1271, 182 N.Y.S.3d 459), and the court therefore had no duty to conduct further inquiry with respect to the plea (see Lopez, 71 N.Y.2d at 666, 529 N.Y.S.2d 465, 525 N.E.2d 5). Contrary to defendant’s assertion, we reiterate that "a trial court has no duty, in the absence of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea, to conduct a further inquiry concerning the plea’s voluntariness ‘based upon comments made by [the] defendant during … sentencing’ " (People v. Brown, 204 A.D.3d 1519, 1519, 167 N.Y.S.3d 293 [4th Dept. 2022], lv denied 38 N.Y.3d 1069, 171 N.Y.S.3d 456, 191 N.E.3d 408 [2022]; see Mobayed, 158 A.D.3d at 1223, 70 N.Y.S.3d 267). We decline to exercise our power to review defendant’s contention as a matter of discretion in the interest of justice (see CPL 470.15 [3] [c]).
[3] Contrary to defendant’s further contention and the People’s incorrect concession (see People v. Berrios, 28 N.Y.2d 361, 366-367, 321 N.Y.S.2d 884, 270 N.E.2d 709 [1971]; People v. Morrison, 179 A.D.3d 1454, 1455, 114 N.Y.S.3d 917 [4th Dept. 2020], lv denied 35 N.Y.3d 972, 125 N.Y.S.3d 5, 148 N.E.8d 469 [2020]), the record establishes that defendant knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waived his right to appeal (see People v. Giles, 219 A.D.3d 1706, 1706-1707, 197 N.Y.S.3d 778 [4th Dept. 2023], lv denied 40 N.Y.3d 1089, 200 N.Y.S.3d 771, 223 N.E.3d 1247 [2023]; Morrison, 179 A.D.3d at 1455, 114 N.Y.S.3d 917; see generally Thomas, 34 N.Y.3d at 559-564, 122 N.Y.S.3d 226, 144 N.E.3d 970; People v. Lopez, 6 N.Y.3d 248, 256, 811 N.Y.S.2d 628, 844 N.E.2d 1145 [2006]).
We note at the outset that the court used the appropriate model colloquy with respect to the waiver of the right to appeal (see NY Model Colloquies, Waiver of Right to Appeal; see generally Thomas, 34 N.Y.3d at 567, 122 N.Y.S.3d 226, 144 N.E.3d 970; Giles, 219 A.D.3d at 1706, 197 N.Y.S.3d 778; People v. Osgood, 210 A.D.3d 1426, 1427, 176 N.Y.S.3d 518 [4th Dept. 2022], lv denied 39 N.Y.3d 1079, 184 N.Y.S.3d 299, 204 N.E.3d 1080 [2023]). Contrary to defendant’s assertion, the court "made clear that the waiver of the right to appeal was a condition of [the] plea, not a consequence thereof, and the record reflects that defendant understood that the waiver of the right to appeal was ‘separate and distinct from those rights automatically forfeited upon a plea of guilty’" (People v. Graham, 77 A.D.3d 1439, 1439, 908 N.Y.S.2d 490 [4th Dept. 2010], lv denied 15 N.Y.3d 920, 913 N.Y.S.2d 647, 939 N.E.2d 813 [2010], quoting Lopez, 6 N.Y.3d at 256, 811 N.Y.S.2d 623, 844 N.E.2d 1145; see Giles, 219 A.D.3d at 1706, 197 N.Y.S.3d 778). Contrary to defendant’s additional assertion, the court did not mischaracterize the appeal waiver as "an absolute bar to the taking of a first-tier direct appeal" (Thomas, 34 N.Y.3d at 558, 122 N.Y.S.3d 226, 144 N.E.3d 970; see e.g. People v. Wilson, 217 A.D.3d 1561, 1562, 192 N.Y.S.3d 367 [4th Dept. 2023], lv denied 40 N.Y.3d 1000, 197 N.Y.S.3d 110, 219 N.E.3d 871 [2023]; People v. Cromie, 187 A.D.3d 1659, 1659, 133 N.Y.S.3d 167 [4th Dept. 2020], lv denied 36 N.Y.3d 971, 138 N.Y.S.3d 488, 162 N.E.3d 717 [2020]). Instead, the court appropriately followed the model colloquy by explaining that defendant retained the right to take an appeal, but that his conviction and sentence "would normally be final" because he was giving up the right to appellate review of "most … claims of error," including the severity of the sentence, except for "a number of limited claims" that would survive the appeal waiver, such as the voluntariness of the plea, the validity of the appeal waiver, the legality of the sentence, the jurisdiction of the court, defendant’s competency to stand trial, and the constitutional right to a speedy trial (see Thomas, 34 N.Y.3d at 567, 122 N.Y.S.3d 226, 144 N.E.3d 970; People v. Jackson, 198 A.D.3d 1317, 1318, 154 N.Y.S.3d 731 [4th Dept. 2021], lv denied 37 N.Y.3d 1096, 156 N.Y.S.3d 790, 178 N.E.3d 437 [2021]). Contrary to defendant’s related assertion, his "waiver [of the right to appeal] is not invalid on the ground that the court did not specifically inform [him during the oral colloquy] that his general waiver of the right to appeal encompassed the court’s suppression ruling[]" (People v. Babagana, 176 A.D.3d 1627, 1627, 107 N.Y.S.3d 915 [4th Dept. 2019], lv denied 34 N.Y.3d 1075, 116 N.Y.S.3d 143, 139 N.E.3d 801 [2019] [internal quotation marks omitted]; see People v. Kemp, 94 N.Y.2d 831, 833, 703 N.Y.S.2d 59, 724 N.E.2d 754 [1999]; People v. Johnson, 183 A.D.3d 1256, 1256, 121 N.Y.S.3d 713 [4th Dept. 2020], lv denied 35 N.Y.3d 1046, 127 N.Y.S.3d 818, 151 N.E.3d 499 [2020]).
Additionally, the court’s oral colloquy was supplemented by a detailed written waiver that, among other things, accurately explained the rights waived and retained as a result of the waiver and, in doing so, used the phrase "waiver of the right to raise issues on appeal," thereby employing language that "more precisely" reflected that the waiver merely represented "a narrowing of the issues for appellate review" (Thomas, 34 N.Y.3d at 559, 122 N.Y.S.3d 226, 144 N.E.3d 970). The written waiver specifically informed defendant that he was waiving appellate review of the court’s suppression ruling about witness identifications of him (see People v. Williams, 36 N.Y.2d 829, 830, 370 N.Y.S.2d 904, 331 N.E.2d 684 [1975], cert denied 423 U.S. 873, 96 S.Ct. 141, 46 L.Ed.2d 104 [1975]; People v. Correa, 149 A.D.2d 909, 909, 540 N.Y.S.2d 45 [4th Dept. 1989]). Contrary to defendant’s assertion, the record establishes that the court "ascertained that defendant had reviewed the written waiver with his attorney, that he understood it, and that he had no questions for his attorney or the court" with respect to it (People v. Johnson, 125 A.D.3d 1419, 1420, 3 N.Y.S.3d 225 [4th Dept. 2015], lv denied 26 N.Y.3d 1089, 23 N.Y.S.3d 646, 44 N.E.3d 944 [2015]; see People v. Gebreyesus, 1S3 A.D.3d 1365, 1366, 19 N.Y.S.3d 460 [4th Dept. 2015], lv denied 27 N.Y.3d 997, 38 N.Y.S.3d 107, 59 N.E.3d 1219 [2016]; cf. People v. Bradshaw, 18 N.Y.3d 257, 262, 938 N.Y.S.2d 254, 961 N.E.2d 645 [2011]; see generally People v. Ramos, 7 N.Y.3d 737, 738, 819 N.Y.S.2d 853, 853 N.E.2d 222 [2006]).
In light of the foregoing, we conclude that "all the relevant circumstances reveal a knowing and voluntary waiver" (Thomas, 34 N.Y.3d at 563, 122 N.Y.S.3d 226, 144 N.E.3d 970; see Wilson, 217 A.D.3d at 1562, 192 N.Y.S.3d 367). Defendant’s valid waiver of the right to appeal encompasses his challenges to the court’s suppression ruling (see People v. Sanders, 25 N.Y.3d 337, 342, 12 N.Y.S.3d 593, 34 N.E.3d 344 [2015]; Kemp, 94 N.Y.2d at 833, 703 N.Y.S.2d 59, 724 N.E.2d 754) and to the severity of his sentence (see Lopez, 6 N.Y.3d at 255-256, 811 N.Y.S.2d 623, 844 N.E.2d 1145).