Opinion
C043117.
10-20-2003
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. OPHELIA EDEN, Defendant and Appellant.
Ophelia Eden (defendant) appeals after she was adjudged incompetent to stand trial. She argues the court erroneously failed to allow her to be heard on the question of her competency, and that the subsequent adjudication of incompetency was unsupported by substantial evidence. These contentions are unpersuasive. We shall therefore affirm the judgment.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Defendant was charged with misdemeanor trespassing (§ 602, subd. (l)) by complaint filed on October 4, 2002 (the first complaint). On November 1, 2002, a second complaint was filed, charging defendant with second-degree robbery (§§ 211, 212.5, subd. (c)), false imprisonment with force (§§ 236, 237, subd. (a)), two counts of battery (§ 242), trespassing (§ 602, subd. (j)), and resisting a peace officer (§ 148, subd. (a)(1)) (the second complaint).
At defendants arraignment, counsel appearing on her behalf declared a doubt as to defendants competency. The court suspended criminal proceedings and referred the matter to Dr. Deborah Schmidt, a licensed psychologist, to evaluate the issue of defendants competence to stand trial.
Dr. Schmidt met with defendant at the Yolo County Jail on December 2, 2002. Dr. Schmidt was unable to administer any psychological tests because Plexiglas separated her from defendant, and they had to use a telephone to communicate. According to Dr. Schmidts report, defendant stated her birth name was Lisa Marie Espinosa, but that she went by the name Ophelia Eden. Defendant stated she had been hospitalized for psychiatric disorders at least four times since 1990. Defendant related that she initiated one of these hospitalizations in 1998 because a lot of her "`teacher friends went into a psychiatric hospital once a year for a `tune-up." Defendant also had been prescribed various medications to alleviate her mental problems, but that they did not help her. Defendant admitted being addicted to men and food. She stated she was "`voluntarily homeless" so she could save money to attend veterinary school.
Regarding the charges in the first complaint, defendant stated she was arrested on campus of the University of California, Davis, at 3:00 a.m. on September 17, 2002, while she was trying to telephone her mother, who lived on the East Coast. According to defendant, the arrest "triggered" her so she began acting uncontrollably.
Regarding the charges in the second complaint, defendant claimed she was assaulted by a "carnivorous woman" at the office of Chad Carlock, an attorney in Davis. According to defendant, she had hired Carlock to cash her monthly Social Security checks, but that Carlock did not pay her, despite repeated visits to his office. She stated Carlocks office was "`crawling with girls," and that she took an employee list and tried to give it to Carlock in order to let him know that "`those people loved him so he would not have to call homosexual chat lines." Police were apparently called and defendant resisted arrest.
Dr. Schmidt contacted defendants mother, who resided in Connecticut. The mother stated defendant had been diagnosed with bipolar disorder, borderline personality disorder, and depression, and that she had undergone several hospitalizations. The mother stated defendant had been committed to a hospital for 30 days in 2001 because she was living in the town hall and had pitched a tent in front of the library. Defendant did not stay the 30 days; she walked out and rode by bus to Davis.
Dr. Schmidts report stated: "The results of the present psychological evaluation suggest that [defendant] is likely suffering from a psychotic disorder, most likely Schizophrenia, Undifferentiated Type. [Defendant] displayed evidence of delusional thinking during the evaluation and reported that she has been hospitalized for psychiatric reasons multiple times in the past because of her psychiatric symptoms. [Defendant] reported that she has been diagnosed with complex Posttraumatic Stress Disorder because of childhood abuse, and indicated that she is `triggered easily and panics in certain situations. [Defendant]s affect is very blunted, she had difficulty explaining the sequence of events leading up to her being arrested, and it was difficult to determine whether what she was saying was accurate at any given point in time. She indicated that she was hospitalized for psychiatric reasons in the past because of various misunderstandings. . . .
"Given [defendant]s current psychiatric symptoms, the present results suggest that she is not competent to stand trial on the present charges. She does clearly understand the charges against her, Court procedures, and the roles of various judicial participants, and her intellectual abilities appear to be in the average to above average range. The present results suggest, however, that her delusional thinking directly impacts her ability to assist her attorney in preparing a rational defense in her case."
Defendant submitted the issue of competency based on Dr. Schmidts report, and the court found she was not competent to stand trial and committed her to a state hospital. Defendant appealed. (People v. Fields (1965) 62 Cal.2d 538 [commitment order appealable].)
DISCUSSION
Request to Be Heard on Competency
Defendant initially contends the court erred by refusing to allow her to be heard on the question of her competency at her arraignment hearing.
Defendants argument is premised on the following colloquy, which occurred after counsel appearing for defendant declared a doubt as to defendants competency.
"THE COURT: All right. Ill suspend criminal proceedings in both matters then.
"[Prosecutor]: Has the Public Defender actually been appointed?
"THE COURT: Ill appoint[] the Public Defender.
"DEFENDANT: Your Honor, before you appoint the Public Defender, may I say something?
"THE COURT: I would suggest you say it to your attorney privately because anything you say, shes going to take down and, if the District Attorney can use it against you, she will. So Id suggest you ask it to your attorney.
"DEFENDANT: Your Honor, Im perfectly sane and Id like to request—your Honor, Im perfectly sane and Id like to request that I represent myself. And I understand that there are two felony charges against me and I still would like to represent myself if I could.
"THE COURT: All right. You met with counsel, and she has expressed a doubt as to your competency. Before I resolve that issue, I cannot allow you to represent yourself. I have to make sure youre competent to do so. Thats why we will appoint a psychiatrist to interview you. Lets appoint Dr. Schmidt."
Relying on People v. Harris (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 984 (Harris), defendant argues the court should have allowed her to address the court on the issue of her competency once she voiced her objections to the proceedings. In Harris, the defendant was excluded from the competency hearing at which his attorney proceeded to prove the defendants incompetence. On the propriety of this procedure, the Harris court wrote: "We would agree with appellant that, at a minimum, when defense counsel seeks to prove defendants incompetence over his or her objection, and the defendant expresses the desire to testify that he or she is competent, counsel should permit defendant to so testify, unless the court separately determines that the defendant is incompetent to do so." (Id. at pp. 993-994.)
The People respond that Harris is inapt because defendants statements at arraignment amounted to no more than a request that she be allowed to represent herself, rather than a request to address the court on the issue of her competency. The People also note defendant voiced no objection at the subsequent competency hearing, where her counsel submitted the matter on the basis of Dr. Schmidts report.
Defendant replies that her request must be construed broadly and, so construed, was in effect a request to be heard on the issue of her competency. Defendant does not address her subsequent silence at the competency hearing.
We believe the Peoples position is in accord with the record. Defendants statements were made in response to the courts decision to appoint counsel rather than adjudicate competency. While it is true that defendant stated she was sane, she made this statement in support of a request to represent herself. If there were any doubt defendants request was directed to self-representation rather than competency, it was clarified at the competency hearing, at which defendant submitted the competency issue on the basis of Dr. Schmidts report without objection. Defendant had not demonstrated a reluctance to speak during her previous court appearances, and from her silence the court could reasonably infer that no further inquiry on the issue of competency was necessary.
Sufficiency of the Evidence
Defendants remaining contention is that the evidence is insufficient to establish her incompetence to stand trial. She proposes that Dr. Schmidts repeated use of the word "suggest" in her report undermines her conclusions, particularly since Dr. Schmidts conclusions were based on her own lay opinion of the facts and defendants credibility.
Section 1367, subdivision (a) provides that "[a] person cannot be tried or adjudged to punishment while that person is mentally incompetent." A defendant is mentally incompetent "if, as a result of mental disorder or developmental disability, the defendant is unable to understand the nature of the criminal proceedings or to assist counsel in the conduct of a defense in a rational manner." (Ibid.)
"It shall be presumed that the defendant is mentally competent unless it is proved by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant is mentally incompetent." (§ 1369, subd. (f).) "Substantial evidence is evidence that raises a reasonable doubt about the defendants competence to stand trial. [Citations.]" (People v. Frye (1998) 18 Cal.4th 894, 951-952.) On appeal, we determine whether the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict supports the trial courts finding on the issue of competence. (People v. Stanley (1995) 10 Cal.4th 764, 811.) The finding of the trial court cannot be disturbed if there is any substantial evidence in the record to support the finding. (People v. Campbell (1976) 63 Cal.App.3d 599, 608.)
We consider first defendants argument that the evidence is insufficient because Dr. Schmidts report was based on her own perceptions of defendants credibility (a determination reserved to the trier of fact), rather than objective measures of competency, such as would be produced by standardized tests and assessments.
We would agree with defendant that Dr. Schmidts report would have been stronger had it included the results of standardized psychological tests supporting Dr. Schmidts conclusions. The absence of such results was not due to a conscious decision on Dr. Schmidts part (which would cast doubt on her methodology), but resulted from jail conditions preventing administration of such tests. The absence of such results, however, did not undermine Dr. Schmidts conclusions, which were based on defendants psychiatric history (related by defendant and her mother) which demonstrated extensive and long-standing psychiatric difficulties. Defendant had been hospitalized for psychiatric treatment on several occasions over the span of her adult life; she had been prescribed psychotropic medications; and by defendants own admission these medications had not alleviated her difficulties. As recently as 2001, defendant had been committed to a psychiatric hospital in Connecticut based on her bizarre living arrangements. Rather than complete treatment, defendant left the hospital and traveled by bus to Davis, California. These facts, coupled with defendants disjointed accounts of the circumstances leading to her arrests, were such as would lead any competent mental health professional to question seriously defendants ability to assist counsel in the preparation of a rational defense to the charges.
Given the absence of psychological test results, it is not surprising that Dr. Schmidt would hedge her conclusions with the use of the word "suggest" to introduce her conclusions that defendant was suffering from schizophrenia and was not competent to stand trial. The principal definition of the word "suggest" is: "to put (as an idea, proposition, or impulse) into the mind . . . ." (Websters 3d New Internat. Dict. (1971) p. 2286.)
The facts related to defendants psychiatric history and the present offenses put into Dr. Schmidts mind the idea that defendant was suffering from a psychiatric disorder that prevented her from rationally assisting defense counsel, and she wrote a report so stating. From this report the superior court concluded defendant was not competent to stand trial. Our inquiry is directed to ascertaining whether substantial evidence supports the superior courts conclusion. Based on the undisputed facts we have summarized from Dr. Schmidts report, we conclude substantial evidence supports the superior courts conclusion that defendant was not competent to stand trial.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
We concur: NICHOLSON, J., KOLKEY, J. --------------- Notes: Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.