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In re E.D.

COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
Aug 13, 2018
H045063 (Cal. Ct. App. Aug. 13, 2018)

Opinion

H045063

08-13-2018

In re E.D., A Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. E.D., Defendant and Appellant.


NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Santa Clara County Super. Ct. No. JV119091)

E.D. appeals from an order disclosing documents from his juvenile case file in response to the prosecution's petition under Welfare and Institutions Code section 827. The prosecution anticipates that E.D. may be called as a witness to testify in a separate criminal matter. To satisfy its constitutional discovery obligations under Brady v. Maryland (1963) 373 U.S. 83 (Brady), the prosecution intends to disclose the requested documents to the defense in that matter in the event they might be used to impeach E.D.'s credibility.

E.D. contends the trial court abused its discretion by ordering disclosure because the prosecution did not put forth any valid justifications for disclosure. We conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion. We will affirm the judgment.

I. BACKGROUND

In July 2017, as part of its criminal prosecution in People v. Michael Jiosa (Super. Ct. Santa Clara County, No. C1509715), the district attorney petitioned for the disclosure of 35 documents from E.D.'s juvenile case file under Welfare and Institutions Code section 827. Jiosa was charged with second degree robbery and three misdemeanors. E.D. was proffered as a witness who may be called to provide testimony about "a portion of the defendant's felonious conduct."

The requested documents included four juvenile wardship petitions filed between March 1999 and December 2002; numerous police reports documenting the alleged conduct; five minute orders memorializing the proceedings; and seven probation reports compiled in the course of the proceedings. Taken together, the petitions alleged conduct which, if committed by an adult, would constitute seven counts of vandalism in the amount of less than $400 (former Pen. Code § 594, subd. (b)(4)); conspiracy to commit vandalism; three counts of misdemeanor battery (§§ 242, 243 subd. (a)); felony hit and run resulting in injury (Veh. Code, § 20001, subds. (a), (b)); misdemeanor hit and run resulting in property damage (Veh. Code, § 20002, subd. (a)); and driving without a license (Veh. Code, § 12500, subd. (a)). All four petitions were sustained, but a petition alleging battery was dismissed following E.D.'s successful completion of probation. E.D. was 13 to 16 years old during the relevant period. He is now 32 years old.

Subsequent undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code. --------

The prosecution argued that Brady obligated it to provide the requested documents to Jiosa for his defense because the information could be used to impeach E.D. in the event he is called to testify against Jiosa. The prosecution characterized the documents as "evidence of moral turpitude, evidence that can be argued to be moral turpitude, or evidence that the defense may use to establish a defense, or negate an element of a charged crime." In response, E.D. filed written objections to the disclosure of any documents. E.D. argued that the conduct was too remote in time to be relevant, and that most of the charged offenses did not constitute crimes of moral turpitude, making them inadmissible for impeachment purposes.

The juvenile court granted the request for disclosure as to most documents but denied disclosure of several police reports, minute orders, probation reports, and a probation order. The court also issued a protective order limiting the use of the documents to the case of People v. Michael Jiosa, and limiting disclosure "to necessary persons in that case only, pursuant to statutory and constitutional discovery obligations, which may be subject to any additional orders made by the trial court."

E.D. timely appealed.

II. DISCUSSION

E.D. contends the juvenile court abused its discretion by ordering disclosure because the requested documents were not subject to disclosure under any theory put forth by the prosecution in its request. E.D. points out that some of the charged conduct would not constitute crimes of moral turpitude, and he argues that other documents are not admissible under the Evidence Code. He disputes the prosecution's claim that disclosure is required by Brady.

The Attorney General contends the disclosure order was not an abuse of discretion, and he argues that only the court in which Jiosa will be tried can rule on the admissibility of the challenged evidence. The Attorney General further contends disclosure is required under Brady and its progeny.

For the reasons below, we conclude the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion by ordering disclosure of the relevant documents.

A. Legal Standards

The juvenile court is vested with authority to determine what documents may be disclosed when a petitioner files a request for disclosure of records under section 827. "Welfare and Institutions Code section 827, subdivision (a) permits juvenile court records to be inspected by certain specified persons and 'any other person who may be designated by court order of the judge of the juvenile court upon filing a petition therefor.' " (In re Keisha T. (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 220.) The court is required to balance ". . . the interests of the child and other parties to the juvenile court proceedings, the interests of the petitioner, and the interests of the public." (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.552(d)(4).) "The court may permit disclosure of juvenile case files only insofar as is necessary, and only if petitioner shows by a preponderance of the evidence that the records requested are necessary and have substantial relevance to the legitimate need of the petitioner." (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.552(d)(6).) "A juvenile court has broad and exclusive authority to determine whether, and to what extent, to grant access to confidential juvenile records." (R.S. v. Superior Court (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 1049, 1055.) "We review the court's decision for abuse of discretion." (Ibid.) That standard is well known: " 'The appropriate test for abuse of discretion is whether the trial court exceeded the bounds of reason. When two or more inferences can reasonably be deduced from the facts, the reviewing court has no authority to substitute its decision for that of the trial court.' " (Walker v. Superior Court (1991) 53 Cal.3d 257, 272 (Walker).)

The prosecution's obligation of disclosure under Brady may in turn require that the state file a petition for disclosure of pertinent records under section 827. "To comply with Brady constitutional due process requirements, the prosecution must disclose exculpatory and impeachment evidence that is favorable to the accused and material on the issue of guilt or punishment." (J.E. v. Superior Court (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 1329, 1334 [citing People v. Salazar (2005) 35 Cal.4th 1031, 1042].) "Disclosure may be required even when the evidence is subject to a state privacy privilege, as is the case with confidential juvenile records. [Citations.] The Brady disclosure requirement applies to juvenile delinquency proceedings as well as criminal proceedings. [Citation.]" (Ibid.)

B. Issuance of The Disclosure Order Was Not an Abuse of Discretion

E.D. challenges the disclosure order on the grounds that the documents would not be admissible under any of the theories put forth by the prosecution below, which relied on the Evidence Code among other things. E.D. does not dispute that some of the charged conduct would constitute crimes of moral turpitude—e.g., vandalism, conspiracy to commit vandalism, and hit and run resulting in injury—but he points out that battery is not a crime of moral turpitude, and he argues that the other offenses were remote in time.

As the Attorney General points out, however, the standard for disclosure is not admissibility under the Evidence Code. The applicable standard is whether the requested documents "are necessary and have substantial relevance to the legitimate need of the petitioner." (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.552(d)(6), italics added.) " 'Relevant evidence' means evidence, including evidence relevant to the credibility of a witness or hearsay declarant, having any tendency in reason to prove or disprove any disputed fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action." (Evid. Code, § 210.) This standard does not require the prosecution to show the documents would be admissible. The requested documents are necessary and substantially relevant because they bear on E.D.'s credibility as a witness and would thereby have a "tendency in reason" to disprove any testimony he may offer in support of the prosecution. It is true that the relevant conduct is remote in time, but the juvenile court has broad discretion to balance this factor against the petitioner's need for the documents. (R.S. v. Superior Court, supra, 172 Cal.App.4th at p. 1055.) And although E.D. asserts there is "no indication that he engaged in any criminal misconduct" as an adult, and his attorney asserts that he "seemed to have learned his lesson and became a productive member of society," the record provides no basis for assessing this claim.

Furthermore, the "legitimate need" for the requested documents derives from the prosecution's Brady obligations. This need hinges in turn on the favorable nature of the evidence to Jiosa insofar as it could be used for impeachment in the event E.D. testifies. The prosecution's duty to disclose such evidence depends on whether it is "material" to the defense, and it includes impeachment evidence as well as purely exculpatory evidence. (United States v. Bagley (1985) 473 U.S. 667, 676 (Bagley); United States v. Agurs (1976) 427 U.S. 97, 107.) Evidence is material if there is "a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different." (Bagley, at p. 682.) "A 'reasonable probability' is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome." (Ibid.) The juvenile court, in citing the prosecution's "constitutional discovery obligations," implicitly found the pertinent documents material to Jiosa's defense. In other words, the court implicitly found the documents material because there is a reasonable probability they may result in a different outcome in that criminal matter. This determination did not "exceed[] the bounds of reason," so we have "no authority to substitute [our] decision for that of the trial court." (Walker, supra, 53 Cal.3d at p. 272.)

We note that Jiosa certainly had a strong interest in the disclosure of the information obtained through the juvenile court's order, and that the prosecution's efforts to comply with its Brady obligation should be applauded. Rather than reversing the juvenile court's order, we believe that the decision regarding the appropriate use and admissibility of the information disclosed under the juvenile court's order should be left to the sound discretion of the court presiding over Jiosa's criminal trial.

We perceive no abuse of discretion in the juvenile court's issuance of the disclosure order under section 827. Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment.

III. DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed.

/s/_________

Greenwood, P.J. WE CONCUR: /s/_________
Bamattre-Manoukian, J. /s/_________
Grover, J.


Summaries of

In re E.D.

COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
Aug 13, 2018
H045063 (Cal. Ct. App. Aug. 13, 2018)
Case details for

In re E.D.

Case Details

Full title:In re E.D., A Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. THE PEOPLE…

Court:COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

Date published: Aug 13, 2018

Citations

H045063 (Cal. Ct. App. Aug. 13, 2018)