Summary
In People v Eagan, 46 Mich. App. 377; 208 N.W.2d 219 (1973), this Court held that it was error to simply advise a defendant at a guilty plea that he had a right to trial, without informing him that such a trial would be by jury or the court without a jury.
Summary of this case from People v. GibbonsOpinion
Docket No. 12991.
Decided April 24, 1973.
Appeal from Kalamazoo, Lucien F. Sweet, J. Submitted Division 3 March 16, 1973, at Detroit. (Docket No. 12991.) Decided April 24, 1973.
Robert Eagan was convicted, on his plea of guilty, of breaking and entering. Defendant appeals. Reversed and remanded.
Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General, Robert A. Derengoski, Solicitor General, Donald A. Burge, Prosecuting Attorney, and Stephen M. Wheeler, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for the people. John P. Doerr, for defendant on appeal.
Defendant appeals his plea-based conviction of breaking and entering, MCLA 750.110; MSA 28.305. In accepting the plea the trial judge informed the defendant, a 17-year-old, that if he did not plead guilty he would have the right to a trial; however, the trial judge failed to inform the defendant that he had a right to a trial by jury or by the court without a jury. This was error. People v. Jaworski, 387 Mich. 21 (1972).
It cannot be said that defendants in criminal trials could be presumed to know of a right to trial by jury or by the court without a jury. A knowing, understanding, and voluntary waiver requires the right to be unequivocally explained. Where it is not done, the law presumes no waiver from a silent record. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238; 89 S Ct 1709; 23 L Ed 2d 274 (1969).
That the right to trial and right to trial by jury are substantially different, no one could argue. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145; 88 S Ct 1444; 20 L Ed 2d 491 (1968). This is precisely the reason we reverse.
Reversed and remanded.
All concurred.