Moreover, in Purrazzo, the court recognized that a self-defense instruction is proper even though the defendant testifies that the killing was accidental, as long as there is some evidence from which the jury could find that the killing resulted from preceding threats or provocation. 95 Ill. App.3d at 895, 420 N.E.2d at 468. Again exemplifying "false conflict," evidence of self-defense was absent in People v. Dzambazovic (1978), 61 Ill. App.3d 703, 377 N.E.2d 1077, appeal denied (1978), 71 Ill.2d 619, which was another case of allegedly accidental shooting. The opinion upheld the trial court's refusal to give a self-defense instruction because "the evidence presented by the defendant did not raise the issue of self-defense."
The court therefore concluded that the Purrazzo defendant was indeed relying on an accident theory and had failed to show that he was engaged in any intentional self-defensive acts when the shots, which indisputably hit his wife, were fired. In People v. Dzambazovic (1978), 61 Ill. App.3d 703, 377 N.E.2d 1077, the defendant testified that the victim produced a gun and threatened to kill him and herself if the defendant drove to meet her boyfriend; he struggled with the victim for the gun; the gun went off accidentally while the victim was holding it; and he did not shoot her with an intent to kill her. The Robinson court said that no self-defense justifying an instruction thereon was shown in Dzambazovic.
The court therefore concluded that the Purrazzo defendant was indeed relying on an accident theory and had failed to show that he was engaged in any intentional self-defensive acts when the shots, which indisputably hit his wife, were fired. In People v. Dzambazovic (1978), 61 Ill. App.3d 703, 377 N.E.2d 1077, the defendant testified that the victim produced a gun and threatened to kill him and herself if the defendant drove to meet her boyfriend; he struggled with the victim for the gun; the gun went off accidentally while the victim was holding it; he did not shoot her with an intent to kill her. The Robinson court said that no self-defense justifying an instruction thereon was shown in Dzambazovic.
Defendant argues that evidence concerning a defendant's use of narcotics is inadmissible in a prosecution for an offense that does not involve narcotics. (See People v. Dzambazovic (1978), 61 Ill. App.3d 703, 377 N.E.2d 1077.) Defendant urges that the facts presented in this case warrant reversal under People v. Novak (1965), 63 Ill. App.2d 433, 211 N.E.2d 554. In Novak, a reference to narcotics was made during direct examination of defendant.
Several panels of the appellate court have refused to allow a jury to be charged with self-defense instructions where the evidence demonstrates that the homicide was an accident. See, e.g., People v. Holloway (1985), 131 Ill. App.3d 290, 310-11; People v. Purrazzo (1981), 95 Ill. App.3d 886, 895; People v. Dzambazovic (1978), 61 Ill. App.3d 703, 716-18. The decision in People v. Robinson (1987), 163 Ill. App.3d 754, reviewed these decisions in an effort to reconcile the apparent split.
We find that Sandra has waived the issue. (See People v. Dzambazovic (1978), 61 Ill. App.3d 703, 713.) A party waives an objection where a ruling is not requested after the trial court fails to make one.
Such an error may be considered harmless where the evidence as a whole shows that the accused is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. People v. Pittman (1984), 126 Ill. App.3d 586, 590, 467 N.E.2d 918, 922, citing People v. Nicholson (1978), 61 Ill. App.3d 621, 629, 377 N.E.2d 1063, 1070; People v. Dzambazovic (1978), 61 Ill. App.3d 703, 716, 377 N.E.2d 1077, 1086. • 12 In the case at bar, the admission of most, if not all, of these items constituted error.
Moreover, the defendant himself testified that the killing was an accident. This court has held that it was proper to refuse self-defense instructions in cases where a gun went off accidentally while the defendant and the deceased struggled for it. People v. Purrazzo (1981), 95 Ill. App.3d 886, 420 N.E.2d 461, cert. denied (1982), 455 U.S. 948, 71 L.Ed.2d 661, 102 S.Ct. 1448; People v. Dzambazovic (1978), 61 Ill. App.3d 703, 377 N.E.2d 1077. The only evidence presented at trial which can be considered as tending to show an intent to kill was Maurice's alleged statement to Ivy that he killed Debra in a fight; but this contradicts another statement he made to Ivy in respect to Debra's death, and, as noted, he also testified that Debra died by accident.
Self-defense relates to knowingly and intentionally using force to deter another; for it to be present defendant must have fired the gun intentionally and, where an accident is claimed, self-defense is out of the case. People v. Dzambazovic (1978), 61 Ill. App.3d 703, 717, 377 N.E.2d 1077, appeal denied (1978), 71 Ill.2d 619. The unspecified evidence of the victim's propensity for violence was properly excluded by the trial court as such evidence, if it existed, may be shown only where defendant has raised the theory of self-defense.
We are aware of cases which have taken a view different from that espoused herein. ( Cf. People v. Chatman (1982), 110 Ill. App.3d 19, 441 N.E.2d 1292; People v. Purrazzo (1981), 95 Ill. App.3d 886, 420 N.E.2d 461, cert. denied (1982), 455 U.S. 948, 71 L.Ed.2d 661, 102 S.Ct. 1448; People v. Dzambazovic (1978), 61 Ill. App.3d 703, 377 N.E.2d 1077.) However, we believe that, based on the record before us and the authorities relied upon above, defendant should have been given a self-defense instruction, and it was reversible error for the trial court not to do so.