Opinion
2015–12036 Ind.No. 1064/12
02-20-2019
The PEOPLE, etc., Respondent, v. Derrin DYSON, Appellant.
Paul Skip Laisure, New York, N.Y. (Jenin Younes of counsel), for appellant. Eric Gonzalez, District Attorney, Brooklyn, N.Y. (Leonard Joblove, Anthea H. Bruffee, and Clifford Chance LLP [Tara McGrath ], of counsel), for respondent.
Paul Skip Laisure, New York, N.Y. (Jenin Younes of counsel), for appellant.
Eric Gonzalez, District Attorney, Brooklyn, N.Y. (Leonard Joblove, Anthea H. Bruffee, and Clifford Chance LLP [Tara McGrath ], of counsel), for respondent.
REINALDO E. RIVERA, J.P., CHERYL E. CHAMBERS, JEFFREY A. COHEN, BETSY BARROS, JJ.
DECISION & ORDERAppeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Albert Tomei, J.), rendered November 12, 2015, convicting him of criminal sexual act in the first degree, sexual abuse in the first degree, burglary in the first degree (two counts), robbery in the first degree (four counts), robbery in the second degree (two counts), criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree (two counts), unlawful imprisonment in the first degree (two counts), and criminal possession of stolen property in the fifth degree (two counts), after a nonjury trial, and imposing sentence.
ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed.
The defendant was convicted of various crimes based upon his participation in an armed home-invasion robbery and sexual assault that occurred in an occupied residence of an apartment building in Brooklyn.
Contrary to the defendant's contention, the Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in admitting evidence of two other burglaries to which the defendant pleaded guilty, since those crimes tended to show that the defendant employed a " ‘unique, unusual, or distinctive modus operandi ’ " which was relevant to proving his identity as the perpetrator of the crime charged ( People v. Wright, 121 A.D.3d 924, 926, 994 N.Y.S.2d 396, quoting People v. Mateo, 93 N.Y.2d 327, 332, 690 N.Y.S.2d 527, 712 N.E.2d 692 ). Where, as here, "there is a proper nonpropensity purpose, the decision whether to admit evidence of [a] defendant's prior bad acts rests upon the trial court's discretionary balancing of probative value and unfair prejudice" ( People v. Dorm, 12 N.Y.3d 16, 19, 874 N.Y.S.2d 866, 903 N.E.2d 263 ). Given that this was a nonjury trial in which the court is presumed to have considered only competent evidence in reaching its verdict ( People v. Lomaglio, 124 A.D.3d 1414, 1416, 1 N.Y.S.3d 713 ; People v. Kozlow, 46 A.D.3d 913, 915, 851 N.Y.S.2d 577 ; People v. Sims, 127 A.D.2d 805, 511 N.Y.S.2d 935 ), and the express limited purpose for which the court admitted such evidence, there was no risk that the evidence would be improperly used to show criminal propensity (see People v. Arafet, 13 N.Y.3d 460, 464–465, 892 N.Y.S.2d 812, 920 N.E.2d 919 ).
We agree with the defendant that the Supreme Court should not have admitted, over the defendant's objection, the testimony of the People's DNA expert, as such testimony violated the defendant's right to confrontation (see U.S. Const Sixth Amend). In order to satisfy the Confrontation Clause where the People seek to introduce testimonial DNA evidence, "an analyst who witnessed, performed or supervised the generation of defendant's DNA profile, or who used his or her independent analysis on the raw data, as opposed to a testifying analyst functioning as a conduit for the conclusions of others, must be available to testify" ( People v. John, 27 N.Y.3d 294, 315, 33 N.Y.S.3d 88, 52 N.E.3d 1114 ; People v. Austin, 30 N.Y.3d 98, 104, 64 N.Y.S.3d 650, 86 N.E.3d 542 ). Although the People's expert testified that he conducted a "technical review" of the reports prepared by another criminalist whom he supervises, he did not establish that such review entailed using his own independent analysis on the raw data (see People v. Austin, 30 N.Y.3d at 104–105, 64 N.Y.S.3d 650, 86 N.E.3d 542 ; People v. John, 27 N.Y.3d at 315, 33 N.Y.S.3d 88, 52 N.E.3d 1114 ).
Even so, the error in admitting the testimonial DNA evidence was harmless since the proof of the defendant's guilt, without reference to the erroneously admitted DNA evidence, was overwhelming and there was no reasonable possibility that the Supreme Court would have acquitted the defendant had it not been for the error (see People v. Crimmins, 36 N.Y.2d 230, 237, 367 N.Y.S.2d 213, 326 N.E.2d 787 ; People v. Murdock, 163 A.D.3d 590, 591, 76 N.Y.S.3d 417 ; People v. Jacob, 117 A.D.3d 1079, 1080, 986 N.Y.S.2d 561 ; People v. Witherspoon, 116 A.D.3d 800, 801, 982 N.Y.S.2d 923 ). An accomplice testified regarding the defendant's participation in the charged crimes. The defendant posted incriminating material on the Internet, and a watch belonging to one of the complainants was found in the defendant's home. Additionally, an employee of a local bodega testified that, on the date the crimes were committed, the defendant along with other individuals attempted to sell him laptops and electronics that were stolen from the victims.
RIVERA, J.P., CHAMBERS, COHEN and BARROS, JJ., concur.