• 1 It is well established in Illinois that a defendant may not repeatedly relitigate a pretrial motion to suppress. ( People v. Hopkins (1972), 52 Ill.2d 1, 284 N.E.2d 283; People v. Armstrong (1973), 56 Ill.2d 159, 306 N.E.2d 14; People v. Holland (1974), 56 Ill.2d 318, 307 N.E.2d 380; People v. Durruty (1974), 18 Ill. App.3d 335, 309 N.E.2d 802; People v. Attaway (1976), 41 Ill. App.3d 837, 354 N.E.2d 448, appeal denied (1976), 64 Ill.2d 596; People v. Grant (1976), 38 Ill. App.3d 62, 347 N.E.2d 244; People v. Henderson (1976), 36 Ill. App.3d 355, 344 N.E.2d 239, appeal denied (1970), 43 Ill.2d 398.) The issue may only be relitigated if there is additional evidence or peculiar circumstances warranting the reconsideration ( People v. Armstrong (1973), 56 Ill.2d 159, 306 N.E.2d 14; People v. Durruty (1974), 18 Ill. App.3d 335, 309 N.E.2d 802; People v. Grant (1976), 38 Ill. App.3d 62, 347 N.E.2d 244; People v. Henderson (1976), 36 Ill. App.3d 355, 344 N.E.2d 239, appeal denied (1970), 43 Ill.2d 398), or a reason for not presenting relevant evidence at the prior hearing must be asserted. ( People v. Attaway (1976), 41 Ill. App.3d 837, 354 N.E.2d 448, appeal denied (1976), 64 Ill.2d 596.

The State's first contention on appeal is that the trial court erred when it reconsidered the pretrial denial of defendant's motions to quash arrest and suppress evidence. It relies upon the general rule that, in the absence of additional evidence or exceptional circumstances, collateral estoppel bars the relitigation of an order sustaining or denying a pretrial motion to suppress evidence, citing several cases which so hold. ( E.g., People v. Holland (1974), 56 Ill.2d 318, 307 N.E.2d 380; People v. Hopkins (1972), 52 Ill.2d 1, 284 N.E.2d 283; People v. Armstrong (1973), 56 Ill.2d 159, 306 N.E.2d 14; People v. Eckmann (1978), 60 Ill. App.3d 300, 376 N.E.2d 751; People v. Durruty (1974), 18 Ill. App.3d 335, 309 N.E.2d 802.) The State maintains that defendant presented no further evidence to the trial court and there existed no extraordinary circumstances which would impel the trial court to reconsider defendant's motions.

(Citations.) The issue may only be relitigated if there is additional evidence or peculiar circumstances warranting the reconsideration ( People v. Armstrong (1973), 56 Ill.2d 159, 306 N.E.2d 14, People v. Durruty (1974), 18 Ill. App.3d 335, 309 N.E.2d 802, People v. Grant (1976), 38 Ill. App.3d 62, 347 N.E.2d 244, People v. Henderson (1976), 36 Ill. App.3d 355, 344 N.E.2d 239, appeal denied (1970), 43 Ill.2d 398), or a reason for not presenting relevant evidence at the prior hearing must be asserted. ( People v. Attaway (1976), 41 Ill. App.3d 837, 354 N.E.2d 448, appeal denied (1976), 64 Ill.2d 596.)

It is proper for a trial judge, in order to give to the defendant the opportunity to present new evidence or demonstrate other changed circumstances, to hear a motion to suppress even though a prior motion to suppress has been denied by a preliminary hearing judge. ( People v. Durruty (1974), 18 Ill. App.3d 335, 337, 309 N.E.2d 802, 803-04.) However, where the substance of defendant's subsequent motion to suppress evidence or to quash his arrest is the same as his prior motion already determined at a preliminary hearing before a different judge, and defendant makes no offer of proof as to new evidence or exceptional circumstances, the denial of a hearing on the subsequent motion is proper.