We agree. People v. Dugan (1972), 4 Ill. App.3d 45, 280 N.E.2d 239. Supreme Court Rule 402 governing the acceptance of guilty pleas requires in part:
Citing North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 91 S.Ct. 160, 27 L.Ed.2d 162.People v. Hudson, 7 Ill. App.3d 800, 288 N.E.2d 533; People v. Dugan, 4 Ill. App.3d 45, 280 N.E.2d 239; United States v. Nichols, 142 U.S.App.D.C. 194, 440 F.2d 222; State v. Newton, 87 Wn.2d 363, 552 P.2d 682. In regard to the defendant's contention that he was not accorded the right to effective counsel, this is to be said: It is not at all uncommon for one who finds himself in such trouble as having been found or pleaded guilty to a crime to turn upon and impute fault to one who has previously tried to assist him.
No special method is required to be used by the trial court and the determination of the factual basis may be developed by questioning defendant, or receiving the facts from defense counsel, or a witness, or listening to a summary of available evidence from the prosecutor, or even from a review of a presentence report in court, or by any other means which may seem best for the kind of case involved. People v. Dugan, 4 Ill. App.3d 45, 46, 280 N.E.2d 239. โข 3 In the cause before us, defendant acknowledged that he read the indictment and that he understood that the charge was robbery, which he stated meant "taking some money which didn't belong to me."
There must be substantial compliance with this requirement. ( People v. Dugan, 4 Ill. App.3d 45, 280 N.E.2d 239.) The rule, sensibly, does not lay down a ritual of inquiry as to what and from whom this requirement may be satisfied.
We think that these elements taken together demonstrate an adequate factual basis for the defendant's plea. People v. Dugan, 4 Ill. App.3d 45, 280 N.E.2d 239, and People v. Rollins, 9 Ill. App.3d 1011, 293 N.E.2d 733, cited by the defendant, are distinguishable on the facts and not applicable. In those cases, the Appellate Court stated that there was nothing in the record to indicate that the trial judge made any inquiry or determination as to the factual basis for the plea.
We therefore reverse and remand with instructions to allow defendant to plead anew. People v. Dugan, 4 Ill. App.3d 45, 280 N.E.2d 239. Reverse and remand.
There is a long and comprehensive pre-sentence report which includes a lengthy statement by the appellant which admits many of the facts of the offense. This court has held that the judge may use any portion of the record to find a factual basis for the plea ( People v. Dugan, 4 Ill. App.3d 45, 280 N.E.2d 239), and the Appellate Court for the Second District has held that a factual basis may be found from facts brought out at the hearing in aggravation and mitigation although the plea has already been accepted. ( People v. Warship, 6 Ill. App.3d 461, 285 N.E.2d 224.)
In connection with determining the factual basis for the guilty plea no particular type of inquiry is specified and it has been determined that the court may satisfy itself as to the existence of the factual basis by having a prosecutor state the facts in the presence of defendant, by inquiring of defendant, by having the facts stated by a knowledgeable witness, by examination of a pre-sentence report, or by any other means which seem appropriate for the particular case. (Committee Comments on Rule 402(c), Ill. Rev. Stats. Anno., ch. 110A, ยง 402(c); People v. Dugan, 4 Ill. App.3d 45, 280 N.E.2d 239; People v. Doe, 6 Ill. App.3d 799, 286 N.E.2d 645.) As pointed out in the People v. Doe case, the rule does not require that the court set out the factual basis in detail in the record.
The judge may utilize any appropriate procedure which will assure a record that demonstrates there is a factual basis for the plea. (ABA Standards and Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11, Notes of Advisory Committee on Criminal Rules; People v. Dugan, 4 Ill. App.3d 45, 280 N.E.2d 239; United States v. Nichols (D.C. Cir. 1971), 440 F.2d 222, 223.) The method which should normally first be employed is to ask the defendant if he actually committed the acts with the intent (if any) required as set out in the indictment and as explained by the judge.