Opinion
4-22-0341
09-15-2022
In re D.T. Jr., a Minor v. D.T., Respondent-Appellant. The People of the State of Illinois, Petitioner-Appellee,
This Order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
Appeal from the Circuit Court of Peoria County No. 17JA255 Honorable Derek G. Asbury, Judge Presiding.
ZENOFF, JUSTICE delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Turner and Steigmann concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
ZENOFF, JUSTICE
¶ 1 Held: The order terminating the respondent's parental rights was affirmed where the finding of unfitness was not against the manifest weight of the evidence.
¶ 2 Respondent, D.T., appeals an order terminating his parental rights to his son, D.T. Jr. The minor's mother, Jasmine B., is not a party to this appeal. Respondent argues that the court's finding of parental unfitness was against the manifest weight of the evidence. We affirm.
¶ 3 I. BACKGROUND
¶ 4 On September 6, 2017, the State filed a two-count abuse and neglect petition. In count I, the State alleged that the minor was abused for the following reasons:
"[O]n or about August 18, 2017, Julius Wilson and/or Jasmine [B.], a parent and a paramour of the minor's parent[,] inflicted upon such minor physical injury, by other than accidental means, in that on August 19, 2017, said minor, age 3, was
taken to the hospital and found to have bruising to his face and ear, an abrasion under his nose, a broken blood vessel in the eye and loop marks on his arms and legs[,] and such injuries could not have occurred absent abuse and/or neglect on the part of the mother and/or her paramour, Julius Wilson."
In count II, the State alleged that the minor was neglected in that his environment was injurious to his welfare. The State re-alleged that the minor was taken to the hospital on August 19, 2017, and sustained the injuries described above. The State also alleged that Jasmine gave conflicting statements to the police. The State further alleged that Jasmine, Wilson, and respondent all had criminal histories. The petition listed respondent as the father but indicated that his residence was unknown, other than that he was in Chicago.
¶ 5 Respondent was not present for the shelter care hearing on September 7, 2017. The court granted temporary custody of the minor to the Illinois Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS).
¶ 6 The State served respondent with notice of the action by publication. Respondent did not appear in court. On October 23, 2017, the court found respondent to be in default. Respondent did not attend the adjudicatory hearing on December 18, 2017. On that date, the court determined that the minor was both abused and neglected and that Wilson inflicted the abuse. Respondent did not attend the dispositional hearing on January 22, 2018. On that date, the court made the minor a ward of the court and transferred guardianship to DCFS. The court found that Jasmine was unfit because of her drug use and because she did not take appropriate care when the minor was abused. The court did not make a finding as to whether respondent was unfit. The dispositional order indicates that respondent would have no contact with the minor so long as he remained a "putative" father. The court directed respondent to "establish paternity if he so chooses."
¶ 7 Between April 2018 and June 2021, the court held numerous permanency review hearings, primarily to evaluate Jasmine's efforts toward the minor's return. During this time, respondent never appeared in court, participated in services, or submitted to an integrated assessment. Throughout most of the case, caseworkers did not know respondent's location.
¶ 8 From reports submitted to the court, it appears that respondent communicated with a caseworker a few times in June 2019. Specifically, around that time, caseworker Alexa Cusac learned of a potential address for respondent and sent him a letter. Respondent then called Cusac and said he was in prison when the case came into care and that he "just got off house arrest." Respondent expressed interest in visiting the minor. Cusac told respondent that before he could do so, he would have to appear in court, as he had been defaulted and was only a "putative" father. Respondent told Cusac that he would attend the next permanency review hearing, but he did not do so.
¶ 9 The agency handling the case then lost contact with respondent and was unable to locate him. In August 2019, on the State's motion, the court ruled that respondent was the minor's father, as respondent had signed a voluntary acknowledgment of paternity in May 2014. On November 18, 2019, the court entered new adjudication and dispositional orders pertaining to respondent. The adjudication order indicated that respondent was in default and that the minor was neglected. In the dispositional order, the court found that respondent was unfit because he was unwilling to care for, protect, train, or discipline the minor. The court ordered that the minor would remain a ward of the court and his guardianship would remain with DCFS. The court ordered respondent to complete numerous tasks. Respondent never completed any of them.
¶ 10 On June 25, 2021, the State filed a petition to terminate parental rights. The State alleged that respondent was unfit in that he failed to maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern, or responsibility as to the minor's welfare. See 750 ILCS 50/1(D)(b) (West 2020).
¶ 11 As respondent had never attended court and had not maintained contact with the agency handling the case, the State did not know respondent's location. When Jasmine was arraigned on the petition to terminate parental rights, she said that respondent was incarcerated in the Cook County Jail. Jasmine was correct. Thereafter, the court directed jail personnel to ensure respondent's attendance at court proceedings. The court also appointed counsel for respondent.
¶ 12 On January 26, 2022, the court held a hearing on parental fitness. Respondent was still incarcerated at the Cook County Jail, and he attended the proceedings virtually. His counsel, however, appeared in person.
¶ 13 Sarah Picken, who had been the family's caseworker since July 2020, testified for the State. She confirmed that respondent never participated in services, did not regularly visit with the minor, did not inquire about the minor's welfare, and was not part of the minor's life at all. Picken testified that her agency made efforts to engage respondent. Asked whether respondent responded to those efforts, Picken testified that respondent "called and left a message." According to Picken, "[o]ne time [she] returned the call and did not hear from him again." Picken did not specify when those phone calls occurred.
¶ 14 Respondent testified that he been incarcerated in Cook County for the last six months. During that time, he had not been able to have any visits with the minor. However, respondent acknowledged that he had not requested visits. Respondent further testified that he lived at a halfway house during 2018 or 2019, during which time money was deducted from his paycheck as child support. Asked by his counsel what else he had done to show his care, concern, or responsibility toward the minor, respondent testified that he had "little to no knowledge" about the minor's whereabouts. Respondent added that he "reached out a number of times" but he had not "received calls back." He did not specify to whom he had reached out. Respondent testified that he received two of "her" letters when he was "staying at a certain place." Respondent did not specify who the "her" he referred to was. Respondent testified that he then moved and received no additional letters about the case until he was incarcerated.
¶ 15 Respondent questioned whether he was the minor's father, and he wanted the court to order a DNA test. Respondent testified that he "previously requested a DNA test," but he did not specify to whom he directed that request. According to respondent, "[a]t the beginning" Jasmine told him that "a DNA test was performed on somebody else" and respondent was not the father. That "stopped [respondent's] concerns," and he thus fell "into the background" in the case. Respondent testified that his family told him he should "reach out and try to get a test done on [himself] despite what [Jasmine] was telling [him]." Respondent claimed that he had "done that" and "reached out," but he "never received a call back" (respondent did not specify who he tried to contact).
¶ 16 On cross-examination, the State asked respondent whether he signed a voluntary acknowledgement of paternity regarding the minor in May 2014. Respondent said he did not remember signing one. As rebuttal evidence, without objection from respondent, the court took judicial notice of respondent's voluntary acknowledgement of paternity.
¶ 17 The court found respondent unfit. The matter proceeded to a hearing regarding the minor's best interests. Respondent raises no issue on appeal regarding the minor's best interests, so we will not detail the evidence presented at that hearing. The trial court terminated respondent's parental rights, finding it to be in the minor's best interests. Respondent timely appealed.
¶ 18 Upon reviewing the record, we identified a problem with the trial court's findings at the fitness hearing. Specifically, it appeared that when the court ruled on fitness, it confused respondent with Detre Thompson, who is the father of Jasmine's other child. (The court held a joint fitness hearing in the half-siblings' cases, then continued both cases for ruling. When the matters returned for ruling, Detre was unable to attend court. That day, when ruling on parental unfitness in the case at bar, the court confused respondent with Detre). Accordingly, on August 12, 2022, we remanded the case for the limited purpose of directing the trial court to make "an express finding, and a factual basis supporting such finding, as to whether [respondent] maintained a reasonable degree of interest, concern or responsibility as to his son's welfare." See In re B'Yata I., 2013 IL App (2d) 130558, ¶ 41 (ordering a limited remand where the trial court's findings did not allow for meaningful appellate review).
¶ 19 In response to our directive, the trial court made detailed findings regarding respondent's fitness. The court deemed both Picken and respondent credible. The court recalled that Picken's testimony established respondent did not show any interest in the minor. Respondent did not contradict Picken, though respondent "provided some additional context and perhaps reasoning why he didn't show any interest." With respect to respondent's vague references to "reaching out" to somebody, the court believed respondent was referring to Jasmine. The court noted, however, that respondent then contradicted himself by testifying that Jasmine sent him letters.
¶ 20 The court determined "respondent knew he was the legal father by virtue of the [voluntary acknowledgement of paternity]." Moreover, any doubts as to paternity did not give respondent "a free pass to ignore the child and his needs." Although respondent said he paid some child support, the court noted that this was garnished from paychecks. In the court's view, respondent "showed zero interest, concern, or responsibility to the welfare of his child." Accordingly, the court found that the State proved respondent's unfitness by clear and convincing evidence.
¶ 21 We gave respondent the opportunity to file a supplemental brief in light of the court's findings on limited remand. Respondent elected to stand on his original brief.
¶ 22 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 23 Involuntary termination of parental rights under the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (705 ILCS 405/1-1 et seq. (West 2020)) is a two-step process. In re J.H., 2020 IL App (4th) 200150, ¶ 67. The State must first prove by clear and convincing evidence that the parent is unfit under any single ground listed in section 1(D) of the Adoption Act (750 ILCS 50/1(D) (West 2020)). J.H., 2020 IL App (4th) 200150, ¶ 67. If the parent is unfit, the matter proceeds to a second hearing, at which the State must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that it is in the best interests of the minor to terminate parental rights. J.H., 2020 IL App (4th) 200150, ¶ 67. We will not disturb a finding of unfitness unless it is against the manifest weight of the evidence. J.H., 2020 IL App (4th) 200150, ¶ 68. "A finding is against the manifest weight of the evidence only if the evidence 'clearly' calls for the opposite finding [citation], such that 'no reasonable person' could arrive at the circuit court's finding on the basis of the evidence in the record." J.H., 2020 IL App (4th) 200150, ¶ 68 (quoting In re Daphnie E., 368 Ill.App.3d 1052, 1072 (2006) and Prater v. J.C. Penney Life Insurance Co., 155 Ill.App.3d 696, 701 (1987)).
¶ 24 Section 1(D)(b) of the Adoption Act provides that a parent is unfit if he or she fails to "maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern or responsibility as to the child's welfare." 750 ILCS 50/1(D)(b) (West 2020). This subsection "contains no state of mind requirement, nor does it carve out an exception for faultless failure." In re M.I., 2016 IL 120232, ¶ 26. Nevertheless, we still must consider the parent's circumstances in evaluating the reasonableness of the parent's interest, concern, or responsibility. M.I., 2016 IL 120232, ¶ 27. In J.H., we explained:
"In deciding whether a parent's interest in, concern for, and responsibility toward the child's welfare have been reasonable in degree, the circuit court should consider the parent's efforts to visit the child and to otherwise maintain contact with the child, as well as the parent's inquiries into the child's welfare. [Citation.] The court should consider such efforts in the circumstances in which they were made, taking into account any obstacles to visiting the child. [Citation.] If circumstances make personal visitation impractical, the court should consider the extent to which the parent showed reasonable interest, concern, and responsibility by other means, such as letters, telephone calls, and gifts to the child, 'taking into account the frequency and nature of those contacts.'" J.H., 2020 IL App (4th) 200150, ¶ 72 (quoting Daphnie E., 368 Ill.App.3d at 1064).
¶ 25 Here, the evidence showed that respondent made no effort to involve himself in the minor's life during the 4½ years this case was pending. Although respondent's sporadic incarceration might have posed an obstacle to regular visitation had respondent requested it, there were long stretches when caseworkers could not even locate respondent. Respondent does not challenge the reasonableness of the caseworkers' efforts to locate him. Respondent testified that he paid child support at one point, but that was garnished from his paychecks. Clearly, respondent failed to maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern, or responsibility as to the minor's welfare. Respondent does not dispute this.
¶ 26 Nevertheless, respondent argues that he was "thwarted" by both Jasmine and caseworkers. Respondent asserts that (1) Jasmine told him that a DNA test had shown he was not the minor's father and (2) caseworkers did not return his calls or "set[ ] him up with a DNA test." Respondent further submits that it was a mitigating circumstance that he was dealing with his own challenges, such as being incarcerated or living in a halfway house.
¶ 27 These arguments do not justify reversing the termination order. When a parent faces an impediment to demonstrating interest, concern, or responsibility toward his or her child, the question becomes whether such "circumstances provide a valid excuse." M.I., 2016 IL 120232, ¶ 29. Here, respondent has identified no valid excuse. Assuming as true that Jasmine told respondent "[a]t the beginning" that he was not the minor's father, respondent signed a voluntary acknowledgment of paternity shortly after the minor was born. Additionally, with minimal effort, such as by talking to a caseworker or attending court proceedings, respondent could have confirmed whether he had been ruled out as the father of the child who bore his name and for whom he signed a voluntary acknowledgment of paternity. Respondent instead chose to ignore the proceedings for years, and he made no effort to establish a relationship with the minor. Under these circumstances, respondent cannot rely on any misstatements from Jasmine as an excuse. See In re A.S.B., 293 Ill.App.3d 836, 844 (1997) (stating where the respondent made no effort to show interest, concern, or responsibility toward his newborn child, it was not an excuse that the child's mother and her family told the respondent that he was not the father).
¶ 28 Respondent further mentions that caseworkers did not return his calls and did not facilitate a DNA test for him. We note that respondent's testimony was not entirely clear on these points. Respondent said that he "reached out a number of times" and that he had not "received calls back," but he did not specify whether he was referring to Jasmine or a caseworker. The trial court interpreted respondent as referring to Jasmine. Respondent never explicitly testified that he asked caseworkers for a DNA test. Aside from the ambiguities in respondent's testimony, Picken testified that she returned one call from respondent and then never heard from him again. The court deemed Picken credible and found that respondent did not contradict her testimony. Against this backdrop, the record does not support respondent's argument that the agency thwarted his ability to demonstrate a reasonable degree of care, interest, or responsibility toward the minor. See In re T.D., 268 Ill.App.3d 239, 247-48 (1994) (stating although DCFS was "inexcusably clumsy" in handling the case and did not keep the respondent apprised of the service plans, the respondent's "complete failure to reach out to his children or to inform DCFS of his interest in their well-being" defeated his argument that he demonstrated reasonable concern for the children).
¶ 29 Finally, respondent is correct that he had personal challenges to deal with, such as being incarcerated or living in a halfway house. Many parents involved in juvenile court proceedings face similar challenges. The law accounts for this by allowing alternative means for demonstrating a reasonable degree of interest, concern, or responsibility. For example, if circumstances make visitation impractical, letters or phone calls with the minor might suffice. M.I., 2016 IL 120232, ¶ 36. Here, respondent showed no desire to be a part of either the minor's life or these proceedings. The record more than adequately supported the court's finding that respondent failed to demonstrate a reasonable degree of interest, concern, or responsibility as to the minor's welfare.
¶ 30 Accordingly, we hold that the trial court's finding that respondent was unfit was not against the manifest weight of the evidence.
¶ 31 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 32 For the reasons stated, we affirm the trial court's judgment.
¶ 33 Affirmed.