Opinion
February 21, 1995
Appeal from the Supreme Court, Queens County (Harbater, J.).
Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.
It is well settled that purposeful racial discrimination by a prosecutor in the exercise of peremptory challenges is prohibited under the New York State and Federal Constitutions (see, People v. Kern, 75 N.Y.2d 638, cert denied 498 U.S. 824; Georgia v McCollum, 505 U.S. 42). Therefore, once a defendant makes a prima facie showing that the prosecutor exercised peremptory challenges on the basis of race, the prosecution is then required to articulate racially neutral reasons for striking the jurors in question (see, Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79; Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352).
Contrary to the defendant's contention, his bare allegation that a number of white males were excluded during the jury-selection process is insufficient to establish, prima facie, a pattern of racially motivated peremptory challenges in the absence of a record demonstrating other facts or circumstances (see, People v. Jenkins, 84 N.Y.2d 1001). As a result, the defendant did not establish a pattern of purposeful exclusion of white males from the jury in order to raise an inference of racial discrimination (see, People v. Childress, 81 N.Y.2d 263; People v. Bolling, 79 N.Y.2d 317, 325). In any event, the prosecutor offered racially neutral explanations for the peremptory challenges that the defense challenged.
The defendant's remaining contentions are unpreserved for appellate review (see, CPL 470.05) or without merit. Miller, J.P., Thompson, Santucci and Joy, JJ., concur.