Opinion
Docket No. CR-00391-23/NY
08-01-2023
The People of the State of New York, v. Tyquan Doyle, Defendant.
Maria Profeta, Esq. For the People of the State of New York Assistant District Attorney William Szilagyi New York County Defender Services
Unpublished Opinion
Maria Profeta, Esq. For the People of the State of New York Assistant District Attorney
William Szilagyi New York County Defender Services
JOHN ZHUO WANG NYC CRIMINAL COURT JUDGE
Defendant Tyquan Doyle is charged with Attempted Assault in the 3rd Degree as a Hate Crime and related charges for an incident that occurred on February 2, 2023, in New York County. The underlying information - eventually superseded by a Prosecutor's Information - alleges that, while on a northern-bound E train at 5th Avenue and West 53rd Street, Doyle struck complainant about the face with "an open palm, knocking off her glasses, and causing redness to her face and substantial pain." The information also states that "while the defendant repeatedly pointed a finger in her face," Doyle told complainant, "fucking Asian, [C]orona, I could fuck you up because you are not Bruce Lee and Jackie Chan, you an Asian bitch, and Asians should be put into their place otherwise you won't know what you are."
As relevant here, at arraignment, the People served identification notice pursuant to CPL § 710.30 (b). A week later, The People served statement notice under CPL § 710.30 (a) for two statements made to "Police Officer Justin Segot and all other NYPD members present." The second noticed statement is a 3-page transcription of multiple statements made by Doyle to law enforcement as recorded in body camera footage that was later turned over during discovery. The People also followed up by serving an Automatic Discovery Form (ADF) indicating that they intended to call one witness who identified Doyle at a police-arranged point out at the time, date, and place of the occurrence.
Afterward, Doyle moved to suppress the noticed statements as involuntary and the noticed identification as unconstitutionally unreliable. The People served a response to the defense's motion arguing that Doyle was not entitled to a Wade hearing because "the identification of the defendant in this case was not the result of a police-arranged procedure."
On May 30, 2023, the Court (Syed, J.) granted the motion to the extent of ordering a Huntley/Wade/Dunaway hearing. Two weeks later, the People served an "Addendum to Automatic Discovery Form and CPL 710.30 Notice" listing as additional witnesses three, nonpolice individuals, including complainant, pursuant to CPL § 245.20 (1) (c).
On July 6, 2023, and July 10, 2023, this Court held the above hearings. After oral summations by both sides at the end of the hearings, this Court directed both sides to submit caselaw citations in support of their arguments. Upon consideration of the caselaw authority, arguments, and evidence adduced at the hearings, this Court makes the following findings of fact and conclusions of law.
Findings of Fact
It is undisputed that on February 2, 2023, at about 10:00 p.m., near the subway platform located at 5th Avenue and 53rd Street in New York County, Doyle and a woman had an interaction while on a northbound N train.
At the time of the incident, two police officers, Police Officers Riospacheco and Frey, were in the rear car of the same train as Doyle. Officer Risopacheco credibly testified at the hearing that, after their train had pulled into the station located at 5th Avenue and 53rd Street, it remained at the platform with the doors open for five minutes. Officer Risopacheco credibly recalled that the conductor then sought police assistance through the train's public intercom. Both officers then exited the train and walked up the platform.
The People admitted into evidence as Exhibit 1 video footage from Officer Risopacheco's body camera during their encounter with Doyle. The footage shows numerous individuals in an open doorway closest to the conductor's car and Doyle exiting the same doorway onto the platform toward the direction of the conductor's window. Officer Risopacheco's body camera then pans from the conductor toward an Asian-American woman who points to Doyle in front of Officer Frey. The footage also shows several other individuals also point or nod in the direction of Doyle.
A series of interactions takes place. Doyle begins walking back toward with the woman, who is next to Officer Frey and who states, "he slapped me in the face." Doyle then walks to the wall of the platform opposite the train and sits down without prompting. Officer Risopacheco then asks, "So, what happened?" Doyle initially ignores Officer Rispacheco's inquiry but continues to engage with Officer Frey, who motions to Doyle with a "stop" hand signal saying, "please." Doyle then asks Officer Risopacheco if he is being detained, who responds, "you are not being detained," but then immediately states, "right now, you are being detained. We got to get some information."
While Officer Frey continues speaking with the woman and another individual, Doyle continues - unprompted - to deny loudly that he touched the woman. At this point, Officer Frey yells to Doyle "Stop talking!" and that "I'm getting her story here and I'm going to get your story. Stop talking. You are not making yourself look good here." Doyle then says, "well, get my story." Officer Risopacheco then asks, "what's your story?" Doyle immediately recounts his version of the events including gesturing toward the woman while stating, "Chinese? Corona. Chinese? Corona." Doyle continues to make a number of nonincriminating statements - largely, to the effect that he wants to go home and "didn't touch nobody" - before additional NYPD officers arrive on scene. Doyle is then handcuffed but proceeds to speak to Officer Frey and an unidentified police officer for approximately seven minutes until he is escorted out of the subway station by the several officers.
The People also called Police Officer Justin Segot, who credibly testified as to the above circumstances of Doyle's arrest as well as to statements made by Doyle and the woman on the platform. The People admitted as People's Exhibit 4 the bodycam footage of Officer Segot. That footage shows Doyle making additional statements and asking about the reason for his arrest without prompting. Doyle also states at some point, "I am drunk and I am tired, and I want to go home." On two occasions, Officers Frey and Segot respond to Doyle's multiple questions that witnesses saw him slap a woman and that he would be charged with 3rd degree assault. The footage ends with Doyle in a holding cell repeatedly denying that he touched "that bitch" and with three officers in the cell trying to calm him down so he can comply with the arrest procedure of searching his person. It is undisputed that Doyle was not mirandized prior to any of these challenged statements.
Lastly, the People called Officer Leeds, who testified that he only processed Doyle's arrest. Officer Leeds also testified that, during booking, Doyle stated, "why was [I] being arrested" and had a phone conversation with the complainant in which she described Doyle getting "erratic," placing his foot on her boyfriend's luggage, and slapping her on the side of her face. On cross-examination, Leeds recalled that he scribbled some notes down when speaking to the complainant but that he did not know what he did with them. The People assert that they were previously unaware that Leeds had taken such notes during his conversation with the complainant and stipulated that they would not call him at the trial.
Arguments
At summation, the People assert that they have met their burden of proof at the Huntley/Dunaway hearing by proving beyond a reasonable doubt that Doyle's pre-mirandized statements were spontaneous or voluntary. They also contend that, despite their ADF containing one witness who identified Doyle at a police-arranged point out, the credible proof adduced shows that the identification of Doyle was not unconstitutionally impermissible. Thus, the People contend that the motions to suppress Doyle's statements and identification as previously noticed should be denied.
While Doyle did not attack the credibility of the police officer witnesses called at the hearing, he argued that the pre-mirandized statements should be suppressed as they were the result of custodial interrogation under Huntley. With respect to the Wade issue, Doyle makes two arguments. First, the People fail to sustain their burden of proof that the identification was not unduly suggestive. Second, the People must be precluded from calling more than one identification witness as they should not be permitted to change the theory of identification from a police-arranged point out to a nonpolice-arranged point out. Allowing the People to shift the identification procedure or to call the identification witness that "suits their theory best," according to Doyle, violates the purpose of the notice requirement under CPL § 710.30 (b). Lastly, Defendant moves to dismiss all charges under Rosario based on Officer Leeds' testimony of his lost notes and to suppress any statement made to him by Doyle.
Conclusions of Law
Huntley/Dunaway
A defendant may challenge the voluntariness of a statement (CPL 60.45; 710.20; People v Huntley, 15 N.Y.2d 72 [1965] citing Jackson v Denno, 378 U.S. 368 [1964]). At a Huntley hearing, the People must prove the voluntariness of defendant's statement beyond a reasonable doubt (Huntley, at 72). Where the People assert that a statement by a defendant made to law enforcement was spontaneous, the operative test is "whether the defendant's statement can be said to have been triggered by police conduct which should reasonably have been anticipated to evoke a declaration from the defendant" (People v Lynes, 49 N.Y.2d 286 [1980]).
In Lynes, the Court of Appeals held that inculpatory statements made by the defendant to a detective prior to being mirandized were voluntarily and spontaneously made. There, after his arraignment on an unrelated matter, the defendant was notified of an active warrant and inquired with the detective escorting him to his cell as "what the warrant was about." The detective replied, "You should know, they are looking for you." Rejecting the defendant's contention that the detective's statement was designed to elicit some further reply by defendant, the Lynes court found that the detective "could have just as well intended to discourage further colloquy by indicating he was not in a position to add anything to what the defendant himself already knew" (Lynes, at 299).
While law enforcement cannot engage in interrogation or its functional equivalent when the right to counsel attaches, this rule does not require the police to take affirmative steps, by gag or otherwise, to prevent a talkative person in custody from making an incriminating statement (People v Rivers, 56 N.Y.2d 476 [1982] [declining to disturb finding of voluntariness where the pre- mirandized defendant made incriminating remarks after a detective explained to him his culpability as an accomplice if he were involved in the crime]). Likewise, where the defendant's persistently questioned the officer about the charges and evidence against him, brief responses to those questions do not constitute the functional equivalent of interrogation (People v Norma, 77 A.D.3d 497 [1st Dept, 2010]; see e.g. People v Wilson, 279 A.D.2d 381, 382 [2001] [finding detective's declarative statement "[y]ou're in a lot of trouble" not reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response). Nor do innocuous statements designed to calm a defendant down while in custody render spontaneous statements the product of interrogation or its functional equivalent (People v Daniels, 6 A.D.3d 245, 246 [1st Dept, 2004]). Another consideration in determining voluntariness is whether the police officers to whom the statements were made actively discouraged the defendant from speaking further (People v Brown, 121 A.D.2d 967, 968-69 [1st 1986]).
The totality of the credible evidence - as corroborated by body camera footage admitted into evidence at the hearing - shows that Doyle's statements were voluntary and spontaneous. Whether they be deemed incriminating or not, Doyle's frequent assertions as to what transpired was unprompted by any questioning. On the contrary, Doyle voiced on multiple occasions his desire to "tell his story." As Doyle grew increasingly agitated on the platform, the credible proof shows that the replies by Officers Risopecheco, Frey, Segot, and the unidentified officer were designed to calm Doyle down. At best, their declarations were brief, innocuous statements as to what they were told by witnesses and, later, what Doyle was arrested for - the very questions that he repeatedly posed to the officers. In sum, this Court finds that the People have established beyond a reasonable doubt of Doyle's statements in the People's most recent CPL 710.30 (a) notice were made voluntarily.
Defense counsel urges this Court to interpret the open-ended questions and brief descriptive statements by the officers as tantamount to custodial interrogation. This argument is rejected as none of the caselaw posited by him is factually analogous. However, to the extent that Doyle moves to suppress the unnoticed statements made by Doyle to Officer Leeds, the People stipulated that they would not call Officer Leeds at the trial, thus, this portion of the motion is denied as moot.
Accordingly, Doyle's motion to suppress the statements noticed by the People pursuant to CPL 730.10 (a) is DENIED.
Wade/Dunaway
Turning to Wade hearing, this Court begins by addressing the merits of the Defense's argument that the People are precluded from changing the legal theory of identification or number of witnesses previously noticed at arraignment pursuant to CPL 710.30 (b). In People v Collins (60 N.Y.2d 214, 219 [1983]), the Court of Appeals ruled that "the primary purpose of the [CPL 710.30 (b)] notice requirement is to implement the constitutional guarantees by alerting the defendant to the possibility that evidence identifying him as the person who committed the crime may be constitutionally tainted and subject to a motion to suppress" (italics added). A defendant may generally challenge suggestive procedures pursuant to CPL 710.30, which New York's legislature enacted in response to the problem of suggestive and misleading pretrial identification procedures, and in recognition of the importance of testing the reliability of identification testimony before trial" (People v Marshall, 26 N.Y.3d 495, 503 [2015] internal citations added and quotations omitted]).
In other words, "[t]he statutory mandate is plain and the procedure simple: the People serve notice, the defendant moves to suppress and the court holds a Wade hearing to consider the suppression motion (People v Boyer, 6 N.Y.3d 427, 431 [2006]) - the purpose of which is "to test identification testimony for taint arising from official suggestion during police-arranged confrontations between a defendant and an eyewitness" (People v Dixon, 85 N.Y.2d 218, 222 [1995]). The People bear the initial burden to establish a lack of any undue suggestiveness, but the defendant "bears the ultimate burden of proving that the procedure was unduly suggestive" (People v Marshall, 26 N.Y.3d at 506).
Given the near-automatic entitlement a defendant has to a Wade hearing to "test" the identification testimony for taint by law enforcement, this Court rejects Doyle's contention that the People are somehow bound by either the theory of identification or number of witnesses in the 710.30 (b) notice that they initially served upon Defense counsel at arraignment. Indeed, as the above caselaw indicates, the entire purpose of CPL 710.30 (b) was to alert Doyle of the possibility that a witness who identified the perpetrator could have been unconstitutionally infirm. To bind the People to the initial theory of identification under CPL 710.30 (b) deprives them of the opportunity to fully and properly investigate the matter.
Turning to the merits of the hearing, it is clear from Officer Rispacheco's bodycam footage that the identification of Doyle by complainant and others at the time that Doyle was questioned by police officers was not police-arranged. Rather, the entirely unprompted point-out of Doyle by the complainant and others was nearly simultaneous to the moment Officer Risopacheco and his partner arrived at the scene. Defense counsel does not assert that the identification was in response to questions asked of these individuals. Indeed, it was Doyle who, after stepping out of the train car and was not yet detained, returned to confront complainant. As such, the People have established that the identification was not unduly suggestive, and Doyle fails to sustain his ultimate burden of proving otherwise (see People v Marshall, 26 N.Y.3d 495, 506 [2015]).
Accordingly, the motion to suppress identification by witness(es) as noticed by the People pursuant to CPL 710.30 (b) is DENIED.
Rosario
Having raised a Rosario violation at this hearing, this Court respectfully defers the appropriate remedy, if any, to the trial judge.
This constitutes the decision and order of the Court.