People v. Dowd

4 Citing cases

  1. United States ex Rel. Sluder v. Brantley

    454 F.2d 1266 (7th Cir. 1972)   Cited 26 times
    Holding that the severity of a sentence, which otherwise falls within limits set by Illinois law, is not sufficient ground for relief in federal habeas corpus proceedings

    And it is not claimed that this court may, in the absence of constitutional claims made against state sentences, review them as such. Nor is it claimed by Sluder that the sentence imposed is outside the minimum-maximum limits for burglary in the Illinois indeterminate sentencing scheme. And Illinois law provides that upon revocation the probationer may be sentenced for a term not to exceed the maximum penalty for the underlying offense. People v. Dowd, 27 Ill. App.2d 429, 170 N.E.2d 179 (1961). With the above considerations in mind, we hold that the district court did not err in dismissing Sluder's habeas petition.

  2. The People v. Sims

    32 Ill. 2d 591 (Ill. 1965)   Cited 29 times
    In Sims the defendant had his probation revoked for the violation of a statute which was later declared unconstitutional and the supreme court found that it would be improper to deny a defendant probation for activity which was not criminal.

    The State contends that defendant waived his right to review the conviction when he accepted probation. We disagree. Although, historically, the attitude was that a defendant who accepted probation waived his right to appeal, (See e.g., People v. Dowd, 27 Ill. App.2d 429; People v. Collis, 344 Ill. App. 539; People v. Mangos, 306 Ill. App. 379; United States v. Lecato, 29 F.2d 694,) we have never directly passed on this point. In view of the policy expressed in the Code in allowing a defendant to appeal after being admitted to probation, and the persuasive reasoning of the Supreme Court in Korematsu v. United States, 319 U.S. 432, 87 L.ed. 1497, 63 S.Ct. 1124, where it was said that a "judgment is final for the purpose of appeal `when it terminates the litigation * * * on the merits' and `leaves nothing to be done but to enforce by execution what has been determined'," (citing Berman v. United States, 302 U.S. 212, 213, 82 L.ed. 204, 205, 58 S.Ct. 166) we hold that the defendant is not precluded from appealing his conviction because he was admitted to probation.

  3. People v. Vysther

    199 N.E.2d 668 (Ill. App. Ct. 1964)   Cited 4 times
    Holding that information on charging documents alleging false personation of a police officer under section 32—5 was sufficient

    A person who falsely represents himself to be an attorney authorized to practice law or a public officer or a public employee shall be fined not to exceed $500 or imprisoned in a penal institution other than the penitentiary not to exceed 6 months, or both. (Ill Rev Stats 1961, c 38 § 32-5.)[1] We have taken with the case a motion by the State to dismiss the writ of error on the ground that a defendant who requests and accepts probation is deemed to have admitted the regularity of the proceeding and waived all right to a review of his conviction, citing People v. Dowd, 27 Ill. App.2d 429, 170 N.E.2d 179; People v. Mayfield, 414 Ill. 146, 111 N.E.2d 164; People v. Martin, 350 Ill. App. 196, 112 N.E.2d 526; and People v. Collis, 344 Ill. App. 539, 101 N.E.2d 739. We question the efficacy of this rule to cure a defect or supply an otherwise fatal omission in the basic charging document involving the very jurisdiction of the trial court.

  4. People v. Gary

    195 N.E.2d 437 (Ill. App. Ct. 1963)   Cited 1 times

    The people seek to dispose of the case under the rule that the defendant may not attack on writ of error an order of probation which he sought and received in the trial court. People v. Holzapple, 9 Ill.2d 22, 136 N.E.2d 793; People v. Penn, 302 Ill. 488, 135 N.E. 92; People v. Dowd, 27 Ill. App.2d 429, 170 N.E.2d 179; People v. Mangos, 306 Ill. App. 379, 28 N.E.2d 816. The court in People v. Penn, 302 Ill. 488, 496, 135 N.E. 92, explained the rule and pointed out its inapplicability to this situation: