Opinion
KA 01-00350
October 1, 2002.
PRESENT: PINE, J.P., HAYES, KEHOE, GORSKI, AND LAWTON, JJ.
EDWARD J. NOWAK, PUBLIC DEFENDER, ROCHESTER (ELIZABETH CLARKE OF COUNSEL), FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
HOWARD R. RELIN, DISTRICT ATTORNEY, ROCHESTER (STEPHEN X. O'BRIEN OF COUNSEL), FOR PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT.
Appeal from a judgment of Supreme Court, Monroe County (Fisher, J.), entered December 7, 2000, convicting defendant after a jury trial of, inter alia, assault in the first degree (three counts).
It is hereby ORDERED that the judgment so appealed from be and the same hereby is unanimously affirmed.
Memorandum:
Defendant appeals from a judgment convicting him after a jury trial of three counts of assault in the first degree (Penal Law § 120.10, [4]), one count each of criminal possession and criminal sale of a controlled substance in the third degree (§ 220.16 [1]; § 220.39 [1]), and other offenses. We reject defendant's contention that Supreme Court erred in admitting evidence of uncharged crimes. That evidence was properly admitted to establish that defendant possessed the cocaine with the intent to sell it ( see People v. Hernandez, 71 N.Y.2d 233, 245; People v. Rodriguez, 224 A.D.2d 346, lv denied 88 N.Y.2d 969; People v. Brown, 214 A.D.2d 579, 580, lv denied 86 N.Y.2d 732; People v. Archibald, 211 A.D.2d 451, lv denied 85 N.Y.2d 935). The probative value of that evidence exceeded its potential for prejudice ( see People v. Alvino, 71 N.Y.2d 233, 242), and any prejudice to defendant was minimized by the court's limiting instructions ( see People v. Maddox, 256 A.D.2d 1066, 1067; Rodriguez, 224 A.D.2d at 346).