Opinion
November 23, 1998
Appeal from the Supreme Court, Kings County (Douglass, J.).
Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.
Contrary to the defendant's contention, the showup identification procedure, at which he was identified by one of the complainants, was reasonable and was not impermissibly suggestive as it was conducted in close temporal and spatial proximity to the crime ( see, People v. Duuvon, 77 N.Y.2d 541; People v. Riley, 70 N.Y.2d 523; People v. Love, 57 N.Y.2d 1023; People v. Brnja, 50 N.Y.2d 366). The contention that the complainant may have been improperly influenced at the time of the identification is purely speculative ( see, People v. Chipp, 75 N.Y.2d 327, affd 498 U.S. 833; People v. Mitchell, 185 A.D.2d 249).
Any error in the failure to preclude the identification testimony of another complainant because of the People's withdrawal of their notice pursuant to CPL 710.30 was harmless in light of other overwhelming evidence of the defendant's guilt ( see, People v. Bradshaw, 232 A.D.2d 499; People v. Bradshaw, 223 A.D.2d 651; People v. Reed, 154 A.D.2d 629), including the fact that the defendant was spotted by the police in the stolen Jeep minutes after and a few miles away from the incident, that he attempted to escape from the police both in the Jeep and later on foot, and that at the time he was apprehended he was in possession of a silver gun described by both complainants, and two clips of ammunition.
O'Brien, J. P., Florio, McGinity and Luciano, JJ., concur.