Opinion
5-22-0822
06-18-2024
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. KEMION D. DORRIS, Defendant-Appellant.
This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
Appeal from the Circuit Court of Champaign County. No. 21-CF-1226 Honorable Randall B. Rosenbaum, Judge, presiding.
JUSTICE BOIE delivered the judgment of the court. Presiding Justice Vaughan and Justice McHaney concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
BOIE, JUSTICE.
¶ 1 Held: We affirm the trial court's denial of the defendant's motion to revoke his jury waiver, where the waiver was knowingly and voluntarily made, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion.
¶ 2 The defendant, Kemion D. Dorris, was convicted of being an armed habitual criminal after a bench trial. On appeal, the defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to revoke jury waiver and that the error is reviewable under the first prong of the plain-error doctrine. The defendant requests this court to remand the case for a new trial. For the following reasons, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
¶ 3 I. BACKGROUND
¶ 4 On October 12, 2021, the defendant was charged with one count of armed habitual criminal in violation of section 24-1.7(a) of the Criminal Code of 2012 (Code) (720 ILCS 5/24-1.7(a) (West 2020)), and four counts of unlawful possession of a weapon in violation of section 24-1.1(a) of the Code (id. § 24-1.1(a)). The defendant was represented by counsel from October 2021 to February 2022, when the trial court granted the defendant's motion to proceed pro se in this matter. On March 16, 2022, the defendant appeared before the trial court for a motion hearing. At the hearing, the defendant executed a written jury waiver and the trial court, after duly admonishing the defendant of his right to a jury trial, accepted the waiver, finding that the defendant knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to a jury trial. The defendant's bench trial was scheduled for May 4, 2022.
¶ 5 At the defendant's next hearing date, April 1, 2022, the defendant made an oral motion to revoke his jury waiver. The defendant stated that he was unprepared for the motion hearing on March 16, 2022, and had come to the conclusion, thereafter, that he did not want to have a bench trial. The only reason the defendant gave for his request to revoke his jury waiver was that he was unprepared at the earlier hearing and was not ready "for all of my motions on that date."
¶ 6 The trial court indicated that it needed to conduct some research on the issue, but believed that once a defendant waived his right to trial, "that's something that you've given up." After taking the matter under advisement, the trial court entered a written order the same day, denying the defendant's motion to revoke his jury waiver. The trial court specifically wrote in its order that "[o]nce a defendant waives jury trial, he does not have the ability to withdraw the waiver as a matter of right but rather the decision of whether to permit withdrawal of the waiver is within a trial court's discretion." Further, the trial court stated that the defendant's motion to revoke his jury waiver "appears to the Court that the request is a delay tactic and/or a reaction to the Court's ruling on motions."
¶ 7 A bench trial was held over three days: July 29, 2022, August 31, 2022, and September 6, 2022. During the bench trial, evidence was adduced that is not relevant to the issue raised by the defendant on appeal. After hearing the evidence and arguments from the State and the defendant, the trial court found the defendant guilty of all charges. At the sentencing hearing held on October 31, 2022, the trial court found that each count merged into count I, armed habitual criminal, and entered a conviction on that charge. The defendant was sentenced to 20 years' incarceration within the Illinois Department of Corrections.
¶ 8 On November 22, 2022, the defendant filed a notice of appeal. On November 23, 2022, the defendant filed a motion to vacate his conviction and sentence. On December 16, 2022, the trial court acknowledged that there was a timely-filed motion to vacate that it had failed to rule on. The trial court vacated the previously filed notice of appeal and considered the defendant's motion to vacate, which did not raise the issue of the defendant's jury waiver. The trial court denied the motion and the defendant filed a new notice of appeal on the same date.
¶ 9 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 10 On appeal, the defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion by refusing to allow the defendant to vacate his jury waiver. The defendant does not deny that his jury waiver was knowingly and voluntarily made but argues that the trial court should have granted his motion to revoke his jury waiver under the circumstances of this case. The defendant argues that his motion to revoke should have been granted because it was timely made and would not have delayed his trial or impeded justice where the trial did not occur for several more months. The defendant acknowledges that he did not preserve this issue for review because he failed to raise the issue in his posttrial motion. See People v. Hammond, 48 Ill.App.3d 707, 708 (1977) (it has been well established that the failure to raise an issue in a written posttrial motion generally constitutes a waiver of that issue).
¶ 11 The defendant argues, however, that the error is reviewable under the plain-error doctrine. The plain-error doctrine, codified in Illinois Supreme Court Rule 615 (eff. Jan. 1, 1967), is a narrow and limited exception to the general rule of procedural default which allows plain errors or defects affecting substantial rights to be noticed although the error or defect was not brought to the attention of the trial court. People v. Hillier, 237 Ill.2d 539, 545 (2010). Under the plain-error doctrine, we" 'will review unpreserved error when a clear and obvious error occurs and: (1) the evidence is closely balanced; or (2) [the] error is so serious that it affected the fairness of the defendant's trial and challenged the integrity of the judicial process.'" People v. McIntyre, 2022 IL App (2d) 200535, ¶ 7 (quoting People v. Bannister, 232 Ill.2d 52, 65 (2008)). The first step under plain-error review is to determine whether there was a clear or obvious error. People v. Moon, 2022 IL 125959, ¶ 22. Where there is no reversible error, there can be no plain error. People v. McGee, 398 Ill.App.3d 789, 794 (2010).
¶ 12 The defendant argues that the trial court's denial of his motion to revoke jury waiver was plain error due to the closely balanced nature of the case, and the defendant requests that the case be remanded for a new trial. The State responds that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the defendant's motion to revoke his jury waiver because the defendant voluntarily waived his right to a jury trial, understood the consequences of the waiver, and there was no fundamental right to withdraw the waiver. The trial court based its denial on its finding that the motion was a delay tactic on the part of the defendant, and this decision was not arbitrary, fanciful, unreasonable, nor a situation where no reasonable person would take the view adopted by the trial court.
¶ 13 All defendants have a right to a jury trial. U.S. Const., amends. VI, XIV; Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, §§ 8, 13. However, this right can be waived. People v. Bracey, 213 Ill.2d 265, 268 (2004); 725 ILCS 5/103-6 (West 2020). For a jury waiver to be valid, the waiver must be made knowingly and understandingly in open court. 725 ILCS 5/103-6 (West 2020); People v. Smith, 106 Ill.2d 327, 334 (1985). "When a defendant waives the right to a jury trial, the pivotal knowledge that the defendant must understand *** is that the facts of the case will be determined by a judge and not a jury." Bannister, 232 Ill.2d at 69.
¶ 14 There is no fundamental right for a defendant to withdraw a jury waiver. McIntyre, 2022 IL App (2d) 200535, ¶¶ 9-10. Although a defendant has a right to a trial by jury, once he has voluntarily waived that right, he cannot withdraw his waiver as a matter of right. People v. Catalano, 29 Ill.2d 197, 202 (1963). Whether a defendant may withdraw his waiver is within the discretion of the trial court, unless the circumstances indicate that the defendant failed to realize the consequences of his waiver. People v. Peacock, 324 Ill.App.3d 749, 753 (2001) (citing Catalano, 29 Ill.2d at 202). Where, as in the case at bar, the validity of the waiver is undisputed, the question for a reviewing court "is whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying [the] defendant's motion to withdraw [the] validly entered jury waiver." Id. The abuse of discretion standard of review is the most deferential standard available with the exception of no review at all and is traditionally reserved for those decisions of the lower court which deserve great deference on review, i.e., decisions made by the trial judge in overseeing his or her courtroom or in maintaining the progress of a trial. People v. Coleman, 183 Ill.2d 366, 387 (1998). Recognizing the deference to which the trial court is entitled, this court will find an abuse of discretion only if we conclude that the trial court's ruling is arbitrary, fanciful, unreasonable, or where no reasonable person would take the view adopted by the trial court. People v. Hall, 195 Ill.2d 1, 20 (2000).
¶ 15 The defendant states in his opening brief, and reaffirms in his reply brief, that he does not dispute that his jury waiver was knowingly and voluntarily made. Despite this acknowledgement, the defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to inform the defendant that his jury waiver was not revocable as a matter of right. The trial court, however, need not give any specific admonition or advice for a defendant to make an effective jury waiver. Bannister, 232 Ill.2d at 66. The necessary element to understand for a valid jury waiver is that the case will be heard in front of a single judge instead of a 12-person jury of the defendant's peers. Id. at 69. The defendant's failure to understand, at the time the defendant waived his jury trial, that his ability to revoke his jury waiver would be at the trial court's discretion, does not lead us to the conclusion that the trial court abused its discretion in denying the defendant's motion.
¶ 16 The defendant also argues that his motion should have been granted because it was timely, occurring 16 days after the jury waiver was signed, and approximately 1 month before the scheduled trial date. The defendant further argues that granting the motion to revoke his jury waiver would not have caused any inconvenience or delay in the proceedings and would not have impeded justice. The defendant notes that his oral motion to revoke his jury waiver was made months before the trial occurred, thus no parties or potential witnesses would have been prejudiced in any way.
¶ 17 As we recognized in Peacock, the Illinois Supreme Court has provided guidance for trial courts to use when determining whether to allow a defendant to withdraw a validly entered waiver of the right to a trial by jury, noting that the factors to be considered may include the timeliness of the motion to withdraw the waiver, which in turn may involve the question of whether a pretrial motion to withdraw the waiver would, if granted, impede justice, prejudice the State, or cause inconvenience to the witnesses. We reiterated, however, that the trial court maintains "discretion in ruling on [a] defendant's motion to withdraw [a] validly executed jury waiver and the court [is] not required to apply a specific 'timeliness test' or to enunciate findings regarding timeliness" in its ruling. Peacock, 324 Ill.App.3d at 756. The defendant emphasizes the Peacock factors, and essentially asks this court to reweigh the factors and conclude that the trial court abused its discretion.
¶ 18 The defendant further argues, in his reply brief, that the trial court did not understand that it had discretion to allow the defendant to withdraw his waiver and this mistake of law resulted in an abuse of discretion. This is not, however, a correct interpretation of the record. While the trial court did say during the hearing on the defendant's motion, "Well, I would have to do a little bit of research on the issue, but I think once you've waived your right to a [jury] trial, that's something you've given up," this was not the trial court's ruling on the motion. The trial court entered a written order, after taking the matter under advisement, that stated it was within the trial court's discretion to deny the withdrawal motion, and due to the reasons stated in the order, denied the motion to revoke the jury waiver. The trial court did not deny the motion because it incorrectly believed the defendant's waiver was irrevocable, but rather, denied the motion in its own discretion.
¶ 19 As previously discussed, the defendant did not have an absolute right to withdraw his jury waiver, and he supplied no reason or rationale that would have prompted the trial court to allow his motion to revoke his jury waiver. The defendant does not contend that the jury waiver was in any way improper or involuntary, and the record would belie such a claim. After a careful review of the arguments set forth by the defendant, against the backdrop of our highly deferential standard of review, we do not conclude that the trial judge's ruling was arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable, nor do we conclude that no reasonable person would take the view of the trial judge. See, e.g., People v. Ursery, 364 Ill.App.3d 680, 686 (2006). Accordingly, we affirm the trial judge's decision.
¶ 20 As the defendant waived this issue by failing to raise it in the lower court, there must be a clear error to warrant a plain error analysis of the denial of the defendant's motion to revoke his jury waiver. Since the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the defendant's request to revoke the jury waiver, there is no error. Where there is no error, there can be no plain error. Bannister, 232 Ill.2d at 71. Therefore, the procedure default of forfeiture remains, and the defendant has forfeited this issue on appeal.
¶ 22 For the reasons stated, we affirm the trial court's denial of the defendant's motion to revoke his jury waiver.
¶ 23 Affirmed.