Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of the County of Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. BA295303, Norm Shapiro, Judge. Affirmed.
Gloria C. Cohen, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Pamela C. Hamanaka, Senior Assistant Attorney General, John R. Gorey and Stephanie C. Brenan, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
MOSK, J.
INTRODUCTION
Defendant and appellant Francisco Donis (defendant) took a car by force from the victim, who positively identified defendant as the carjacker from a photographic lineup two days later. A jury convicted defendant of carjacking and robbery.
On appeal, defendant contends that the trial court committed prejudicial error when it allowed an investigating detective to provide expert opinion about what typically happens to cars after they are stolen. We hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting the detective’s expert testimony, and any such claimed error was harmless.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
John Invina (the victim) parked his black Mercedes Benz station wagon in front of a friend’s residence and waited outside the vehicle for his friend. While he was waiting, defendant and another man approached on bicycles and demanded money. Standing face-to-face with the victim, the men forced him to back up against a wall. The victim, knowing they wanted something from him, handed over his cell phone. With the other man standing by with his hand in his pocket—as if he had a weapon—defendant demanded and took the victim’s car keys. As the victim was looking down, he was struck with a fist and fell to the ground, cutting his head.
The victim saw defendant walk toward the black Mercedes Benz station wagon and heard him load two bicycles into it. He next heard his car start, saw the other man enter it on the passenger side, and assumed defendant had entered the vehicle on the driver’s side.
Several minutes later, while Los Angeles Police Officers Carlos Figueroa and Christopher Vasquez were preparing to serve a search warrant in another case, they observed defendant exit the driver’s side of a black Mercedes Benz station wagon. The location was a mile or two from the scene of the carjacking, which crime had not yet been reported over the Officer’s radio. Officer Figueroa made eye contact with defendant. Somewhere between five to fifteen minutes later, the Officers received a radio dispatch about a carjacking of a black Mercedes Benz station wagon. Several days later, Officer Figueroa was shown a photograph of defendant by the investigating detective and “immediately recognized” defendant as the man he had seen exiting the driver’s side of the black Mercedes Benz station wagon several minutes after the carjacking.
The day following the carjacking, Los Angeles Police Officers observed a black Mercedes Benz station wagon commit a traffic violation. When the Officers learned the car was stolen, they stopped the vehicle. Defendant was one of the five occupants of the car, but he was not the driver.
Two days after the carjacking, the victim identified defendant from a photographic line-up. He also identified defendant in court during the preliminary hearing and the trial.
Detective Ray Mendoza investigated the carjacking and testified, inter alia, about his experience in car theft cases. He had been a uniformed police officer for over 20 years, during which time he had handled close to 500 “grand theft auto” cases. As a detective, he handled another 100 such cases. In addition, he had interviewed numerous suspects who had been arrested driving stolen cars. Based on his experience and training, he was aware of what can happen to a vehicle after it is stolen. According to Detective Mendoza, cars can be stolen for parts, they can be used for transportation, and they can be used to commit other crimes; it is also “very common” for the person who stole the car to give it to someone else to drive.
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The Los Angeles County District Attorney filed an information charging defendant in Count 1 with carjacking in violation of Penal Code section 215, subdivision (a) and in Count 2 with second degree robbery in violation of section 211. Defendant pleaded not guilty.
All further statutory references are to the Penal Code.
Following a trial, the jury returned guilty verdicts on both counts. The trial court sentenced defendant on Count 1 to the midterm of five years and on Count 2 to the midterm of three years, but stayed the sentence on Count 2 pursuant to section 654. Defendant was awarded 212 days of actual custody credit and 31 days of conduct credit, for a total of 243 days of custody credit.
DISCUSSION
Defendant contends that the trial court erred when it overruled his objection to Detective Mendoza testifying as an expert concerning car thefts. According to defendant, the matters about which Detective Mendoza testified were within the common knowledge of people who live in Los Angeles County, and his expert testimony was therefore unnecessary and prejudicial.
“We apply an abuse of discretion standard in reviewing a trial court’s decision to admit the testimony of an expert.” (People v. Prince (2007) 40 Cal.4th 1179, 1222.) “A trial court’s determination to admit expert evidence will not be disturbed on appeal absent a showing that the court abused its discretion in a manner that resulted in a miscarriage of justice. (People v. Catlin (2001) 26 Cal.4th 81, 131 [109 Cal.Rptr.2d 31, 26 P.3d 357]; People v. Rodrigues (1994) 8 Cal.4th 1060, 1124–1125 [36 Cal.Rptr.2d 235, 885 P.2d 1].)” (People v. Robinson (2005) 37 Cal.4th 592, 630.)
“[A]lthough ordinarily courts should not admit expert opinion testimony on topics so common that persons of ‘“ordinary education could reach a conclusion as intelligently as the witness”’ (People v. McDonald (1984) 37 Cal.3d 351, 367 [208 Cal.Rptr. 236, 690 P.2d 709], disapproved on another ground in People v. Mendoza (2000) 23 Cal.4th 896, 914 [98 Cal.Rptr.2d 431, 4 P.3d 265]), experts may testify even when jurors are not ‘wholly ignorant’ about the subject of the testimony. (People v. McDonald, supra, 37 Cal.3d at p. 367.) ‘[I]f that [total ignorance] were the test, little expert opinion testimony would ever be heard.’ (Ibid.) [¶] Rather, the pertinent question is whether, even if jurors have some knowledge of the subject matter, expert opinion testimony would assist the jury. (Evid. Code, § 801, subd. (a); People v. McDonald, supra, 37 Cal.3d at p. 367.)” (People v. Prince, supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 1222.)
In this case, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting Detective Mendoza’s expert testimony. Contrary to defendant’s assertion, persons of ordinary education would not necessarily be aware of what generally happens to cars after they are stolen and, in particular, whether it is “very common” for a car thief to pass the stolen car on to another person. Given Detective Mendoza’s substantial experience with stolen car cases, his opinion that it was “very common” for a thief to give a stolen car to someone else to drive would have assisted the jurors in understanding why defendant was not driving the car the day after he stole it. Therefore, even if the jurors had some knowledge as to what typically happens to cars after they are stolen, such as, for example, knowledge that they are stripped for parts, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting Detective Mendoza’s testimony on the issue of whether a car thief typically transfers possession.
Moreover, even if the trial court did err in admitting the challenged expert testimony, that error did not result in a “miscarriage of justice.” (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 13.) The victim, who had a face-to-face confrontation with defendant before he was knocked to the ground, had ample opportunity to observe defendant during the carjacking, and he had no difficulty identifying defendant from a photographic lineup two days later. And, one day after the carjacking, defendant was riding in the victim’s car as a passenger when it was stopped by the police. That he was not driving the victim’s car at that point was not significant, given the victim’s positive identification of defendant as the man who had confronted him and taken his car keys, as well as Officer Figueroa’s testimony about seeing defendant several minutes after the carjacking exit the driver’s side of a black Mercedes Benz station wagon a mile or two from the scene of the carjacking. Based on the victim’s testimony as corroborated by Officer Figueroa, it was not “reasonably probable that a result more favorable to [defendant] would have been reached in the absence of the error.” (People v. Prieto (2003) 30 Cal.4th 226, 247.)
DISPOSITION
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
We concur: TURNER, P. J., ARMSTRONG, J.