Opinion
No. 333752
09-14-2017
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. VICTOR VISON DONALDSON, Defendant-Appellant.
UNPUBLISHED Ottawa Circuit Court
LC No. 14-038709-FC Before: TALBOT, C.J., and O'CONNELL and CAMERON, JJ. PER CURIAM.
Defendant, Victor Vison Donaldson, appeals by right from his conviction, following a jury trial, of second-degree murder, MCL 750.317. Donaldson was found not guilty of first-degree murder, MCL 750.316. The trial court sentenced Donaldson to a prison term of 120 to 360 months, with credit for 493 days served. We affirm.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
This case involves a fight between Donaldson and Japaris Rodgers, during which Donaldson stabbed Rodgers, and Rodgers died from the resulting injuries.
On the day of the fight, Donaldson attended a festival with a group of friends. Donaldson carried a pocket knife and told his friend Jamie Motley-Moten, "If I gotta use it, I'll use it, like if somebody messes with me." While the group was walking home, they came across Mario Diaz and Rodgers. Donaldson did not get along with Rodgers or Diaz, and vice versa. Donaldson tried to walk around and past Rodgers and Diaz. However, Rodgers ran at Donaldson and threw a punch. Motley-Moten testified that Rodgers was unarmed. Motley-Moten further testified that Donaldson then tried to run away and reached to his pocket. But Rodgers followed. So Donaldson turned to face Rodgers, and the fight resumed. Rodgers then grunted, backed away from Donaldson, and fell to the ground. Rodgers sustained lacerations on his chest and arm. Motley-Moten testified that Donaldson yelled "You mess with me, you die" and fled the scene. A hospital later pronounced Rodgers dead. Dr. David Start performed an autopsy and determined that a stab wound to the heart caused Rodgers' death.
At trial, Donaldson argued that he acted in self-defense. Donaldson moved for a directed verdict at the close of the prosecution's case. The trial court denied the motion. The jury found Donaldson guilty of second-degree murder.
After the verdict, the trial court's law clerk found an internet article printout about self-defense inside a jury notebook. The printout appeared to be printed during the multi-day trial. The trial court held an evidentiary hearing to determine whether the printout could have affected the verdict. One juror admitted to doing computer research about self-defense. However, he denied discussing his research with any other juror, denied printing the article, and testified that he was an alternate juror, which meant that he did not participate in deliberations. All other jurors denied doing computer research, denied being aware of another juror doing computer research, denied having seen the printout, and denied discussing, considering, or applying a definition of self-defense other than the definition given by the trial court.
Donaldson moved for new trial, arguing that he was entitled to a new trial because: (1) the trial court should have granted his motion for a directed verdict because the guilty verdict was against the great weight of the evidence, and (2) at least one juror doing their own research and bringing that research into the courtroom deprived him of his right to a fair and impartial jury. The trial court denied Donaldson's motion.
II. GREAT WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE
Donaldson argues that we should vacate his conviction because the jury's verdict was against the great weight of the evidence. We disagree.
Donaldson abandoned his alternate argument that we should reduce his conviction to involuntary manslaughter because he merely announced his position without developing his argument or citing supporting authority that this Court can order such a remedy. See People v Matuszak, 263 Mich App 42, 59; 687 NW2d 342 (2004).
A verdict is against the great weight of the evidence when "the evidence preponderates so heavily against the verdict that it would be a miscarriage of justice to allow the verdict to stand." People v Lacalamita, 286 Mich App 467, 469; 780 NW2d 311 (2009). Typically, courts will vacate a verdict "only when the evidence does not reasonably support it and it was more likely the result of causes outside the record, such as passion, prejudice, sympathy, or some other extraneous influence." Id. Courts will not discard a verdict due to conflicting testimony alone. See People v Lemmon, 456 Mich 625, 647; 576 NW2d 129 (1998). Rather, courts defer to the trier of fact's credibility determination unless "directly contradictory testimony was so far impeached that it was deprived of all probative value or that the jury could not believe it," the determination "contradicted indisputable physical facts," or the determination "defied physical realities." See id. at 645-646 (quotations and citation omitted).
"We review for an abuse of discretion a trial court's grant or denial of a motion for a new trial on the ground that the verdict was against the great weight of the evidence." Lacalamita, 286 Mich App at 469. A trial court abuses its discretion when it "chooses an outcome falling outside the range of reasonable and principled outcomes." Id. We review a trial court's decision on a motion for directed verdict de novo "to determine whether the prosecutor's evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, could persuade a rational trier of fact that the essential elements of the crime were proven beyond a reasonable doubt." People v Martin, 271 Mich App 280, 319-320; 721 NW2d 815 (2006), aff'd 482 Mich 851 (2008).
To support a conviction of second-degree murder, the prosecutor must prove beyond a reasonable doubt the occurrence of "(1) a death, (2) caused by an act of the defendant, (3) with malice, and (4) without justification or excuse." People v Goecke, 457 Mich 442, 463-464, 471; 579 NW2d 868 (1998). Donaldson argues that the prosecution failed to prove that there was no justification or excuse for his actions because he acted in self-defense. A defendant "may use deadly force against another individual anywhere he or she has the legal right to be with no duty to retreat if the defendant "has not or is not engaged in the commission of a crime at the time he or she uses deadly force" and "honestly and reasonably believes that the use of deadly force is necessary to prevent the imminent death of or imminent great bodily harm to himself or herself or to another individual." MCL 780.972(1)(a). When considering whether a defendant has the right to use deadly force, this Court has considered any prior relationship between the defendant and the victim, who initiated the conflict, People v Guajardo, 300 Mich App 26, 41-43; 832 NW2d 409 (2013), the size difference between the defendant and the victim, whether the victim was armed, the degree or force the victim used against the defendant, whether the defendant sustains injury, and whether the defendant indicated that he feared death or serious bodily injury, People v Roper, 286 Mich App 77, 87-89; 777 NW2d 483 (2009).
In this case, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Donaldson's motion for a new trial because a finding that Donaldson did not act in self-defense is not against the great weight of the evidence. Specifically, the evidence reasonably supports a conclusion that Donaldson did not need to resort to the use of deadly force. Multiple persons testified that Donaldson did not get along with Rodgers or Diaz prior to the fight, Motley-Moten testified that Rodgers' and Diaz's gang "had it out" for Donaldson, and testimony that Rodgers initiated contact with, "rushed" at, and started punching Donaldson suggests that Rodgers acted as the aggressor, and Motley-Moten testified that Donaldson looked scared. However, Motley-Moten described Donaldson as bigger than Rodgers "by a pretty good margin." Witnesses testified that Rodgers only punched Donaldson. Rodgers did not have a weapon. Donaldson only sustained a one centimeter scrape on his left elbow. Diaz had a baseball bat in his backpack, but there was conflicting testimony as to when Diaz removed the bat from his backpack, whether Diaz swung the bat at Donaldson, and whether Diaz hit Donaldson with the bat. We defer to the jury's credibility determinations. See Lemmon, 456 Mich at 645-647. Therefore, the evidence did not preponderate so heavily against the verdict that it would be a miscarriage of justice to allow the verdict to stand.
Likewise, the trial court did not err in denying Donaldson's motion for a directed verdict because the evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, could persuade a rational trier of fact that the essential elements of second-degree murder were proven beyond a reasonable doubt.
III. JUROR MISCONDUCT
Donaldson also argues that the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion for a new trial because a juror conducting online research about self-defense and bringing that research to court deprived him of his constitutional rights to a trial by a fair and impartial jury. We disagree.
We review a claim of constitutional error de novo. See People v Stokes, 312 Mich App 181, 186; 877 NW2d 752 (2015), lv app held in abeyance 878 NW2d 886 (2016). We review a trial court's factual findings for clear error. See People v Miller, 482 Mich 540, 544; 759 NW2d 850 (2008). Findings are clearly erroneous if we are "left with a definite and firm conviction" that the trial court made a "mistake." Id. (quotations and citation omitted). We ultimately review a trial court's decision on a motion for a new trial for an abuse of discretion. People v Johnson, 245 Mich App 243, 250; 631 NW2d 1 (2001).
"The United States and Michigan Constitutions guarantee a criminal defendant a fair trial by an impartial jury." People v Jackson, 292 Mich App 583, 592; 808 NW2d 541 (2011). "Consistent with a defendant's right to a fair and impartial jury, 'jurors may only consider the evidence that is presented to them in open court.' " Stokes, 312 Mich App at 187, quoting People v Budzyn, 456 Mich 77, 88; 566 NW2d 229 (1997). Accordingly, a defendant may challenge a verdict "on the basis of juror misconduct" if "the verdict is influenced by matters unrelated to the trial proceedings." People v Fletcher, 260 Mich App 531, 540-541; 679 NW2d 127 (2004). Jury consideration of "extraneous facts not introduced in evidence . . . deprives a defendant of his rights of confrontation, cross-examination, and assistance of counsel embodied in the Sixth Amendment." Budzyn, 456 Mich at 88. Similarly, a jury's use of an outside source "to define a relevant legal term" constitutes error. People v Messenger, 221 Mich App 171, 176; 561 NW2d 463 (1997).
However, jury misconduct only requires a new trial if it affects the jury's impartiality. Miller, 482 Mich at 551. We presume jurors are impartial. Johnson, 245 Mich App at 256. Therefore, to establish that the jury's reliance on an extrinsic influence requires reversal, the party alleging the error must prove that (1) "the jury was exposed to extraneous influences" and that (2) "these extraneous influences created a real and substantial possibility that they could have affected the jury's verdict." Budzyn, 456 Mich at 88-89. To prove the second prong, a party typically "demonstrate[s] that the extraneous influence is substantially related to a material aspect of the case and that there is a direct connection between the extrinsic material and the adverse verdict." Id. at 89. Relatedly, to determine whether a jury's use of an outside source to define a relevant legal term requires reversal, the trial court must determine that (1) the jury substituted the outside definition for the jury instruction definition and that (2) use of the outside definition prejudiced the defendant. Messenger, 221 Mich App at 176. A defendant may not be entitled to a new trial when jurors properly follow their instructions. See Fletcher, 260 Mich App at 544.
In this case, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Donaldson's motion for a new trial. The trial court held an evidentiary hearing to determine whether the printout of an internet article about self-defense could have affected the jury verdict. Every deliberating juror testified that they did not conduct internet research, were not aware of any juror who did their own computer research, and that they had not seen the article before the evidentiary hearing. The only juror who admitted to doing his own computer research regarding self-defense was an alternate who was not involved in deliberations. The trial court found the jurors' testimony to be credible, and "[w]e defer to the trial court's credibility determinations." People v Eliason, 300 Mich App 293, 305; 833 NW2d 357 (2013). Therefore, Donaldson failed to meet his burden to prove that any deliberating juror was exposed to an outside definition of self-defense. Accordingly, Donaldson also failed to prove that the jury's exposure to the article prejudiced him or created a real and substantial possibility that the exposure could have affected the verdict because he failed to prove that any exposure had a direct connection to the verdict. Further, all deliberating jurors testified that they only discussed and applied the legal definition of self-defense given by the trial court. Therefore, the trial court's finding that "all jurors applied the law of self-defense as given by the court" is not clearly erroneous. Accordingly, Donaldson failed to meet his burden to prove that the jury acted impartially, and the trial court's denial of his motion for a new trial was not outside the range of reasonable and principled outcomes.
Donaldson asserts that the trial court further abused its discretion by refusing to ask the jurors all of his requested questions and by prohibiting his counsel from questioning the jurors. But Donaldson abandoned the argument because he merely announced his position without developing his argument or citing supporting authority. See Matuszak, 263 Mich App at 59. --------
Donaldson also argues that we should consider an e-mail that a juror sent to the judge after trial describing "her jury service and some lingering questions she had." However, this e-mail did not address the internet article about self-defense, or any other extraneous influence on the verdict. Therefore, we will not consider these juror statements to impeach the verdict. See Fletcher, 260 Mich App at 539.
We affirm.
/s/ Michael J. Talbot
/s/ Peter D. O'Connell
/s/ Thomas C. Cameron