Opinion
4-24-0694
09-17-2024
In re E.C., a Minor, v. Dominique K., Respondent-Appellant The People of the State of Illinois, Petitioner-Appellee,
This Order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
Appeal from the Circuit Court of Stephenson County No. 20JA70 Honorable Peter J. McClanathan, Judge Presiding.
JUSTICE LANNERD delivered the judgment of the court. Presiding Justice Cavanagh and Justice Vancil concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
LANNERD JUSTICE
¶ 1 Held: The appellate court affirmed the judgment of the trial court terminating respondent's parental rights, concluding (1) respondent forfeited her claim the family service plans were overly broad by failing to raise it in the trial court, (2) respondent forfeited any claim relating to procedural due process by failing to make a coherent argument in her appellate brief, (3) the court did not consider "incompetent" evidence in ruling respondent was an unfit parent, and (4) the court's determination respondent was unfit was not against the manifest weight of the evidence.
¶ 2 In January 2024, the State filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of respondent, Dominque K., as to her minor child, E.C. (born in 2016). In February 2024, the trial court found respondent was an unfit parent and, in March 2024, it found that termination of her parental rights would be in E.C.'s best interest. The court also terminated the parental rights of E.C.'s father, Jermario C., who is not a party to this appeal.
¶ 3 Respondent timely appeals, arguing: (1) "the trial court erred in finding [respondent] an unfit person by clear and convincing evidence when the State failed to establish a nexus between [her] failure to make reasonable efforts or progress and the alleged review period," (2) "the trial court violated [her] substantive due process by failing to narrowly tailor the service plan to be consistent with the Court's findings of the basis for removal," and (3) "the trial court violated [her] procedural due process [rights] by failing to narrowly tailor its fitness analysis to the findings at the adjudication hearing." We affirm.
¶ 4 I. BACKGROUND
¶ 5 A. Procedural History
¶ 6 In July 2020, the State filed a petition seeking to adjudicate E.C. neglected under the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (Juvenile Court Act) (705 ILCS 405/1-1 et seq. (West 2020)). The State alleged E.C. was neglected pursuant to section 2-3(1)(b) of the Juvenile Court Act (id. § 2-3(1)(b)) because of respondent's ongoing issues with (1) substance abuse, (2) domestic violence, (3) mental health concerns and angry outbursts that had "often led to her arrest," and (4) homelessness. The trial court appointed counsel for respondent.
¶ 7 On March 1, 2021, the trial court entered an adjudicatory order finding E.C. was a neglected minor based on her being in an injurious environment. It found the State had failed to establish its first three claims: (1) it had not shown "any shortcomings" in respondent's care of E.C. were the result of substance abuse, (2) it had failed to show E.C. had been exposed to domestic violence in which respondent had been involved, and (3) although it had demonstrated respondent had severe difficulty managing her anger, it had failed to show this difficulty was linked to any mental health diagnosis. However, the State had shown respondent could not provide adequate shelter: even when respondent had housing, it was filthy and an unfit place for a child, and, as of the hearing that preceded the court's ruling, respondent did not have a proper residence. This lack of proper housing constituted an injurious environment for E.C.
¶ 8 On March 23, 2021, the State filed the initial family service plan in the case, which was initiated on January 27, 2021. Under the plan, respondent was required to "fully participate in a mental health assessment and cooperate with any recommendations made as a result of the assessment," "participate in individual counseling," "demonstrate progress in counseling by full communication with [the] counselor on characteristics of healthy relationships, signs of power and control, and safety planning," and "cooperate with a psychiatrist including prescriptions and administration of psychotropic medication in order to treat her mental health diagnoses." Subsequent plans had identical or similar requirements. The last plan filed before the trial court changed the goal from "return home" to substitute care pending termination of parental rights had an added requirement that respondent "[c]omplete [a] psychological referral."
¶ 9 In April 2021, the trial court entered a dispositional order finding both parents were "currently unable, for reasons other than financial circumstances alone, to care for the child" and it was in E.C.'s best interest to be made a ward of the court. It noted respondent had "made such efforts since the case started (at least recently) to address relevant concerns, that she was actually positioned to secure the placement of her child." However:
"by the time the case came back in for hearing on the continuing Dispositional Hearing, the evidence indicated that we did not have a specific home to send the child to, and *** [respondent] actually has to be in a specific home for the Court to return to the child to such home."
The court set a permanency goal of" 'Return Home in Five Months'" based on respondent's recent progress.
¶ 10 On April 18, 2023, the trial court changed the goal to substitute care pending termination of parental rights.
¶ 11 B. The Termination Proceedings
¶ 12 In May 2023, the State filed a petition to terminate respondent's parental rights. As amended in January 2024, it alleged respondent was unfit because (1) in the nine-month period from July 2022 to April 2023, she failed to make reasonable efforts to correct the conditions that were the bases for the removal of the child; (2) in the same nine-month period, she failed to make reasonable progress toward the return of the child; and (3) she failed to maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern, or responsibility as to the children's welfare. See 750 ILCS 50/1(D)(b), (m)(i), (ii) (West 2022). It noted the only review period in which respondent was favorably rated for her efforts and progress was December 2021 to July 2022.
¶ 13 1. The Fitness Portion of the Termination Proceedings
¶ 14 The State asked the trial court to take judicial notice of "the adjudication order of March 1st, 2021," and "the dispositional order of April 26th, 2021." It also asked the court to take notice of "the permanency order from July 12th, 2022, the permanency order from February 21st, 2023, and the permanency order from April 18, 2023," within all of which respondent's progress and efforts were found unsatisfactory. No party objected.
¶ 15 a. Testimony of Evanya Perry-Burks
¶ 16 The State called Evanya Perry-Burks as its sole witness. Perry-Burks had been the Youth Services Bureau (YSB) worker for E.C.'s case since "the middle of 2021." When Perry-Burks took over the case, respondent "needed to complete a psychiatric assessment, a psychological evaluation, other mental health treatment, parent education, parent coaching, [domestic violence] services and cooperate with [YSB]." She also needed to address "drug problems."
¶ 17 As of the hearing, respondent had not successfully completed mental health services, had not complied with the "recommendations of the psychological evaluation," was not "maintaining] sobriety through substance drops," had not completed parent coaching, and did not have stable housing or employment. Respondent had completed "parent education" before Perry-Burks took over the case. Additionally, she had completed psychiatric and psychological evaluations. Respondent stated she had completed a mental health assessment at Rosecrance, but Perry-Burks had not received "the paperwork." Respondent was discharged twice from parenting coaching, the first time for being combative and missing appointments and the second time for falling asleep during the sessions.
¶ 18 Respondent received a recommendation for mental health services in 2020. She went to "Howard counseling" and participated in a mental health assessment. She was discharged from counselling for being "combative and uncooperative." The psychological evaluation recommended respondent complete a parenting capacity assessment, which respondent never completed. Perry-Burks was not aware of any other mental health services she completed.
¶ 19 Respondent was required to complete 10 or 15 drug drops a year prior to the change of goals in 2023. She completed one, which was "clean," but she failed to appear for the others. On cross-examination, Perry-Burks said she was uncertain of the exact dates of any of the missed tests. She believed the missed drops occurred between the end of 2021 and 2023 (when the goal changed). Perry-Burks stated, "to the best of [her] knowledge," respondent completed only one test during this period. YSB gave respondent notice 24 hours in advance of when she needed to appear for testing and offered her "Uber card[s]" or other forms of transportation.
¶ 20 Perry-Burks later stated the only services respondent had completed were parent education, which she completed before 2021, a mental health assessment at "Howard," and a psychiatric assessment. On cross-examination, she agreed that although respondent had initially refused to participate in the psychological evaluation, ultimately, she completed it. This evaluation resulted in her referral to counseling services. She was discharged from counseling, rereferred, and then discharged again. She later "self-referr[ed]" to another counseling service. She was wait-listed, removed from the list when she failed to respond to communications from the service, and placed back on the list at Perry-Burks's request. Respondent told someone at YSB she had completed domestic violence counseling through Voices, but YSB did not receive documentation verifying the completion; YSB repeatedly contacted Voices but was told the documentation would have to come through respondent.
¶ 21 Perry-Burks testified respondent did not have stable housing or employment, and she agreed this was not "something new." She stated:
"The last time I met with [respondent] in her home on [W]alnut [S]treet, [YSB] helped her pay for back rent arrearages and then a few months later I was notified that she was evicted from that home. Since then, I have not been told of any stable housing or seen any stable housing."
¶ 22 Perry-Burks stated the meeting took place "approximately three months after [respondent's] second daughter was born. I would say it was September, December, September" 2022. She learned respondent was no longer at the Walnut Street residence when performing a search to provide "judicial notice" "several months" after the September 2022 meeting. Perry-Burks had not seen proof of stable housing or regular employment since "early[ ] 2023."
¶ 23 Perry-Burks testified, when she took over the case, respondent had been having visits with E.C. Those visits stopped when Perry-Burks took over. When the visits resumed, "[T]hey were very chaotic":
"Our agency moved them back into the Rockford office and then from that point, [respondent] would not show, [respondent] would say she was on her way and then not show. [E.C.] would get brought to the office and be very upset, be very confused, and then the recommendation from her therapist was that visits be halted, because of her emotional well-being, then they were halted."
¶ 24 Asked to clarify the timeline, Perry-Burks testified respondent's visits had temporarily ceased about a year before Perry-Burks became involved. When the visits resumed, "they were very chaotic." Perry-Burks explained when visits restarted there were "maybe" three or four months of consecutive visits, "and then they were off and on, off and on because mom no showed." Respondent's lack of consistency in visiting continued until YSB ended visits altogether when the goal changed to substitute care.
¶ 25 b. Respondent's Testimony
¶ 26 Respondent testified. Her testimony regarding completed services did not differ greatly from that of Perry-Burks. She testified she had completed the program at Voices but was unable to obtain documentation. Perry-Burks referred her for an evaluation at Rosecrance. She had the evaluation in November or December 2023; no new services were recommended. She signed a release to allow YSB to receive the record and told Perry-Burks she had done the evaluation.
¶ 27 Respondent alleged Perry-Burks had blocked phone communications with her, preventing her from confirming visits. She had obtained stable housing in Mississippi and informed YSB. Respondent claimed YSB had never recommended services. She insisted YSB was incorrect that she had not participated in drug testing. Rather, respondent claimed the testing agency was switched and the new one did not have her paperwork.
¶ 28 c. The Trial Court's Findings
¶ 29 The trial court entered a written order finding both parents unfit. It rejected the State's allegation of a failure to maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern, or responsibility for E.C.'s welfare. However, it found respondent had failed to make reasonable progress or efforts in the nine-month period from July 2022 to April 2023. It specified, "For the Court's analysis, the period will specifically be from the Permanency Order of July 12, 2022, through the Permanency Order of April 18, 2023, including the Permanency Order of February 21, 2022."
¶ 30 The trial court concluded respondent completed parenting education before the start of the period. It found she had been discharged twice from Howard Counseling, "one of the discharges being in September 2022, for being combative with the provider, failing to show up for multiple session[s], being unwilling to be redirected in sessions in which [she] was present, and for sleeping in session and not following feedback provided." Further, during the relevant period, respondent "did not engage in further mental health services."
¶ 31 The trial court continued:
"[D]uring the alleged period, [respondent] was evicted, despite [YSB] having previously paid back rent. The testimony established [she] was evicted around September 2022 and did not have stable housing during the remainder of the alleged period, nor did [she] provide any proof of employment.
During the alleged period, visits continued to be problematic. [Respondent] did not consistently attend visits. After the discharge from Howard in September 2022 visits were moved to the Rockford [Illinois Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS)] office, but continued to be 'chaotic' when [she] did show, with multiple 'no shows'. Ultimately, there was a finding from the minor's therapist that visits were harmful to the minor.
[Respondent] testified to completing another substance abuse evaluation in October or November 2023, after the goal change and filing of the petition, and said there was no recommended treatment, but [she] did not provide any documentation to verify completion of the assessment or the recommendation. She further testified to difficulty with transportation for visits as an explanation for her missed visits. She also testified to moving to the State of Mississippi, and on cross examination clarified that the move occurred in July 2023, being outside the period of review for paragraph 9(a) but applicable to the analysis for paragraph 9(b).
On cross examination, [respondent] acknowledged she did not complete a Parenting Capacity Assessment, was unsuccessfully discharged from Howard on two occasions, only did one drug test, and was discharged from parenting coaching on multiple occasions.
While [respondent] was coming out a positive report that led to the findings on July 12, 2022, in the period from July 12, 2022, through April 18, 2023, the State has proven by clear and convincing evidence that [she] failed to make either reasonable efforts to correct the conditions or make reasonable progress toward the return of the child to her. The Court further notes that while efforts and progress are in the disjunctive in the statute, and the State is only required to prove either efforts or progress, the Court finds the State has proven a lack of reasonable efforts and a lack of reasonable progress during the alleged period."
¶ 32 2. The Best Interest Portion of the Termination Proceedings
¶ 33 A hearing on the best interest portion of the State's termination petition took place on April 2, 2024. On April 3, 2024, the trial court entered an order finding termination of respondent's parental rights was in E.C.'s best interest. It noted E.C. had been in her placement since "around Labor Day in 2020, slightly less than a month and a half after an order for temporary shelter care was entered." E.C. was thus accustomed to the placement.
¶ 34 This appeal followed.
¶ 35 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 36 In this appeal, respondent makes three claims of error. First, respondent asserts procedural due process required the trial court to disregard any of her failures to complete the plan requirements to the extent those requirements were unrelated to the basis for the neglect adjudication. Second, she contends her rights to substantive due process were violated by an unconstitutionally broad service plan, that is, requirements which were not narrowly tailored to the court's findings in the adjudication order. Her third argument relates to the sufficiency of the evidence of the link between the nine-month period in which the State alleged respondent failed to make reasonable efforts or reasonable progress. We reject each of these arguments and accordingly affirm.
¶ 37 A. The "Unconstitutionally Overbroad Service Plan"
¶ 38 1. Respondent 's Argument
¶ 39 Respondent argues, because control of one's own children is a fundamental liberty interest, the right to substantive due process requires courts to subject family service requirements to strict scrutiny and, therefore, all plan requirements must be narrowly tailored to correcting the only bases upon which the trial court adjudicated E.C. to be neglected. She contends, consequently, the services required of her in the family service plan could address only her inability to provide adequate care due to her lack of adequate shelter. She argues the plan requirements she "undergo a psychiatric assessment, a psychological evaluation, various mental health treatments, domestic violence services, and cooperate with drug treatment services" were "not supported by the court's findings and impose unnecessary burdens on [her]."
¶ 40 The language of "strict scrutiny" and "narrow[ ] tailoring]" is associated with challenges to the constitutionality of legislation:
"When the basis of the constitutional challenge is an alleged violation of the due process clauses of the state or federal constitutions, the court will ordinarily apply the rational basis test ***. [Citation.] If, however, the challenged legislation implicates a fundamental right, *** far more demanding scrutiny is required. [Citation.] Under the strict scrutiny standard, a statute violates due process unless it is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest. [Citation.]" Village of Lake Villa v. Stokovich, 211 Ill.2d 106, 122, 810 N.E.2d 13, 23-24 (2004).
¶ 41 Here, however, respondent does not challenge any legislation. Instead, she says parts of the plan "were not supported by the record." Respondent does not explain how such an error is of a constitutional magnitude, nor do we note any basis for concluding it is. Therefore, we conclude respondent's argument fails to contain any true claim of constitutional error.
¶ 42 2. Forfeiture
¶ 43 The State argues respondent has forfeited her objections to the plan by failing to raise them in the trial court. We agree.
¶ 44 The ordinary rule requiring a timely objection to preserve a claim of error applies in proceedings under the Juvenile Court Act, but a postjudgment motion is not required. See In re M.W., 232 Ill.2d 408, 430, 905 N.E.2d 757, 772 (2009) (holding the appellant forfeited a claim relating to improper notice because it was not raised in the trial court and noting a postjudgment motion was unnecessary); see also In re Stephen K., 373 Ill.App.3d 7, 22, 867 N.E.2d 81, 95-96 (2007) (holding the respondent forfeited her claim she did not need to comply with the specifics of a medical treatment plan because she did not raise the issue in the trial court). A reviewing court may appropriately overlook a forfeiture in the trial court when a respondent raises a constitutional claim relating to a fundamental liberty interest. In re Z.L., 2021 IL 126931, ¶ 88, 190 N.E.3d 193 (overlooking a forfeiture to address a claim that a provision of the Juvenile Court Act was unconstitutionally vague). However, as we held above, respondent has not raised a constitutional claim.
¶ 45 Here, in reply, respondent concedes she failed to object to the service plans but asks us to overlook the forfeiture because of the importance of the interest involved. We decline to do so. We are inclined to use great caution before choosing to overlook a forfeiture relating to plan contents. The plan contents are, here and as a rule, too fundamental to how a respondent interacts with the minor and the relevant agency to disentangle them from his or her efforts and progress after the fact. Thus, the proceedings as a whole rely on any obj ections to plan elements being made early enough to allow YSB to modify the plan. We do not reject the possibility that a particular plan element could be so egregiously unlawful or counterproductive that overlooking a forfeiture would be appropriate. No such plan element existed here.
¶ 46 Forfeiture aside, in In re C.N., 196 Ill.2d 181, 752 N.E.2d 1030 (2001), our supreme court explicitly rejected respondent's position. The C.N. court held: "[S]ervice plans prepared by DCFS are not limited to addressing the condition which triggered the minor's removal. Rather, the service plans must reasonably relate to 'remedying a condition or conditions that gave rise or which could give rise to any finding of child abuse or neglect.'" (Emphasis in original.) Id. at 214 (quoting 325 ILCS 5/8.2 (West 1998)).
¶ 47 B. Procedural Due Process
¶ 48 Respondent contends the trial court violated her procedural due process rights by considering factors unrelated to the basis on which it found E.C. was neglected. As we understand it, she argues, notwithstanding her failure to object to the family service plan in any of its iterations, the court, in evaluating her progress and efforts at the fitness hearing, was required to sua sponte determine which parts of the evidence relating to her plan compliance were related to the grounds on which it found E.C. to be neglected and to consider only those parts.
¶ 49 We hold respondent has forfeited this argument by failing to develop it. A reviewing court "is entitled to have issues clearly defined with pertinent authority cited and coherent arguments presented; any arguments inadequately presented are forfeited." People v. Hui, 2022 IL App (2d) 190846, ¶ 52, 198 N.E.3d 305. Respondent has failed to present a coherent argument explaining why the trial court should have acted as she contends it should have.
¶ 50 Respondent cites one case, Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 323 (1976), concerning what procedural safeguards are necessary under the United States Constitution's due process clause before the government can terminate a recipient's Social Security disability benefits. She fails to link Eldridge's holding to the outcome for which she argues.
¶ 51 As respondent notes, the Eldridge court concluded:
"[Identification of the specific dictates of due process generally requires consideration of three distinct factors: First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail." Id. at 335.
Based on these factors, she argues, "[T]o provide due process to the parent the trial court at the fitness hearing must consider only the specific findings of fact forming the basis of the underlying determination of neglect *** if the [adjudicatory] order fails to require DCFS to amend the services plan consistent with those findings." However, she does not address how the factors apply to her case or explain why the factors require this precise procedure. Notably, given Eldridge's requirement to consider "the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards" (id.), she does not address why her right to challenge the plan contemporaneously was insufficient to satisfy the requirements of due process. Respondent has thus failed to offer a coherent argument in support of her claim her procedural due process rights were violated.
¶ 52 C. The Fitness Determination
¶ 53 1. Respondent Made Her Argument Clearly Enough to Avoid Forfeiture
¶ 54 As we noted, a reviewing court "is entitled to have issues clearly defined with pertinent authority cited and coherent arguments presented; any arguments inadequately presented are forfeited." Hui, 2022 IL App (2d) 190846, ¶ 52. Before we evaluate respondent's claim relating to the fitness determination, we must decide whether she has made an argument we can address. The relevant section of respondent's brief falls perilously close to a line below which we would deem it forfeited based on a failure to make a coherent argument. Indeed, portions do fall below that line. Nevertheless, sufficient portions of the brief are coherent. First, she asserts the State's evidence was insufficient because it failed to establish she failed to make reasonable progress or efforts in the period from July 2022 to April 2023. Second, she explicitly argues the trial court improperly relied on evidence from outside the relevant time period to find her unfit.
¶ 55 Despite respondent's inconsistent descriptions of her claim, the body of her argument raises the issue of "[w]hether the trial court erred in finding [her to be] an unfit person by clear and convincing evidence when the State failed to establish a nexus between [her] failure to make reasonable efforts or progress and the alleged review period." She argues the evidence "does not establish any specific timeframes" during which she failed to make reasonable efforts or progress. Consistent with this, she details the ways in which Perry-Burks's testimony is chronologically vague.
¶ 56 Respondent also alleges, "In concluding that [she] was unfit under [section 1(D)(m)], the trial judge [improperly] relied on conduct occurring outside of the pertinent 9 month period of review" and explains how this occurred.
¶ 57 We deem these two claims to be sufficiently argued and thus address them. We start with respondent's claim the trial court improperly considered certain evidence and then address respondent's sufficiency of the evidence argument.
¶ 58 2. The Trial Court Did Not Rely on Improper Evidence
¶ 59 The record does not support the claim the trial court improperly relied on evidence from outside the nine-month period. The principle a reviewing court" 'presume[s] that the trial judge knows and follows the law unless the record indicates otherwise'" applies in these precise circumstances. In re Alexander R., 377 Ill.App.3d 553, 556, 880 N.E.2d 1016, 1019 (2007) (quoting People v. Gaultney, 174 Ill.2d 410, 420, 675 N.E.2d 102, 107 (1996)). Thus, a court, in deciding whether a respondent failed to make reasonable efforts or progress, does not need to state expressly it is limiting the evidence it considers to the evidence relevant to the nine-month period selected by the State. Id. at 561. We presume it has considered only relevant evidence unless the record demonstrates otherwise. Id. at 556-57. The record does not show the court considered irrelevant evidence.
¶ 60 Respondent points to evidence from outside the July 2022 to April 2023 time frame to argue the trial court considered improper evidence. For instance, she notes the court's order "observed that' [she] was referred multiple times to Howard Counseling for individual therapy and parent coaching.'" (Emphasis in original.)
¶ 61 This was not improper. The trial court repeatedly made clear it was considering only evidence relating to respondent's efforts and progress in the period between "the Permanency Order of July 12, 2022, through the Permanency Order of April 18, 2023." Thus, we presume that, regardless of what evidence the court mentioned, it was considering it only to the extent it was relevant to respondent's efforts and progress in that period. Of course, evidence not specifically tied to the nine-month period was relevant. Thus, for example, if the evidence shows respondent never completed a plan goal, it follows she did not make any progress toward that goal in the relevant nine-month period.
¶ 62 3. The Unfitness Finding Was Not Against the Manifest Weight of the Evidence
¶ 63 We next address the sufficiency of the evidence of respondent's unfitness. We limit ourselves to considering the finding of unfitness based on respondent's failure to make reasonable progress during the nine-month period specified by the State. "[A]ny one ground [for finding unfitness], properly proven, is sufficient to enter a finding of unfitness." (Emphasis omitted.) In re C.W., 199 Ill.2d 198, 210, 766 N.E.2d 1105, 1113 (2002). Thus, a reviewing court should affirm a trial court's finding of unfitness if any ground on which the court found the respondent unfit is sustainable (see, e.g., In re J.O., 2021 IL App (3d) 210248, ¶ 33, 195 N.E.3d 837), and we need not address every basis on which the court found respondent unfit to affirm the finding of unfitness. We conclude the evidence was sufficient to support the court's finding respondent failed to make reasonable progress with services, housing, and visits. Additionally, the evidence of a deteriorating relationship between respondent and E.C. would to be sufficient on its own to show a lack of reasonable progress.
¶ 64 a. The Standard of Review
¶ 65 "A trial court's finding of parental unfitness will not be reversed unless it is against the manifest weight of the evidence." In re Ta. T., 2021 IL App (4th) 200658, ¶ 48, 187 N.E.3d 763. "A trial court's decision is against the manifest weight of the evidence only if the opposite conclusion is clearly apparent or the decision is unreasonable, arbitrary, or not based on the evidence." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re N.B., 2019 IL App (2d) 180797, ¶ 30, 125 N.E.3d 444. A reviewing court "give[s] deference to the trial court as the finder of fact" and does not "substitute [its] judgment for that of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses, the weight given the evidence, or inferences drawn from the evidence." In re A.W., 231 Ill.2d 92, 104, 896 N.E.2d 316, 324 (2008).
¶ 66 b. The Law Regarding Reasonable Progress
¶ 67 The State must prove unfitness as defined in section 1(D) of the Adoption Act (750 ILCS 50/1(D) (West 2022)) by clear and convincing evidence. In re N.G., 2018 IL 121939, ¶ 28, 115 N.E.3d 102. Section 1(D)(m)(ii) of the Adoption Act defines an unfit person as a parent who fails to make "reasonable progress toward the return of the child" during any specified nine-month period following an adjudication of neglect or abuse. 750 ILCS 50/1(D)(m)(ii) (West 2022).
¶ 68 The Illinois Supreme Court has held:
"[T]he benchmark for measuring a parent's 'progress toward the return of the child' under section 1(D)(m) of the Adoption Act encompasses the parent's compliance with the service plans and the court's directives, in light of the condition which gave rise to the removal of the child, and in light of other conditions which later become known and which would prevent the court from returning custody of the
child to the parent." C.N., 196 Ill.2d 181, 216-17 (2001).
Thus, the C.N. court explicitly "reject[ed] the narrow view that a court may only look to the situation that triggered the minor's initial removal, or the conditions existing at the time custody is taken, in measuring a parent's progress under section 1(D)(m) of the Adoption Act." Id. at 213.
¶ 69 Similarly, this court has defined "reasonable progress" as follows:
" 'Reasonable progress' is an objective standard which exists when the court, based on the evidence before it, can conclude that the progress being made by a parent to comply with directives given for the return of the child is sufficiently demonstrable and of such a quality that the court, in the near future, will be able to order the child returned to parental custody. The court will be able to order the child returned to parental custody in the near future because, at that point, the parent will have fully complied with the directives previously given to the parent in order to regain custody of the child." (Emphases in original.) In re L.L.S., 218 Ill.App.3d 444, 461, 577 N.E.2d 1375, 1387 (1991).
¶ 70 c. This Case
¶ 71 Here, the trial court did not err in finding the State presented clear and convincing evidence respondent failed to make reasonable progress towards E.C.'s return during the relevant nine-month period.
¶ 72 Respondent contends the State's proof failed to link her lack of progress to the nine months at issue. She notes Perry-Burks's testimony frequently related to the full time she was involved with the case-"the middle of 2021" until the time of the hearing-rather than July 2022 to April 2023, and argues this evidence is "incompetent" due to the lack of temporal specificity. For instance, she argues the evidence of when she lost her housing in Illinois is vague because it relates more to when Perry-Burks learned of her loss of housing than to the time the loss occurred.
¶ 73 Respondent's argument is unpersuasive. Although the State selected the nine-month period from July 2022 to April 2023 as the period in which it would show a lack of reasonable progress, it suggested in the termination petition the evidence would show respondent had failed to make reasonable progress at any time after the December 2021 to July 2022 review period. The State had persuasive evidence respondent stopped making progress early in the case and thus offered sufficient evidence she failed to make reasonable progress during the period from July 2022 until April 2023-a period toward the end of the case.
¶ 74 Critically, Perry-Burks's testimony showed respondent's progress in her relationship with E.C. had reversed itself after some progress in late 2021 or early 2022. Perry-Burks testified she became involved with the case around the start of September 2021. Respondent was not then visiting E.C. Shortly after Perry-Burks became involved, respondent had a period where she regularly visited E.C. However, respondent's visits declined over time to the extent YSB had to end her visitation with E.C. because E.C. was upset when respondent did not come.
¶ 75 Where the relationship between the respondent and the minor has broken down to the extent the relevant agency has to end visitation for the minor's well-being, it is impossible to conclude "that the progress *** [is] of such a quality that the trial court will be able to order the minor returned to parental custody in the near future." Id. Moreover, Perry-Burks's testimony also established, among other things, respondent failed to complete the plans' therapy requirement- despite that requirement having been in the plans from the outset.
¶ 76 For these reasons, we conclude the trial court's finding respondent was unfit was not contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence.
¶ 77 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 78 For the reasons stated, we affirm the trial court's judgment.
¶ 79 Affirmed.