Opinion
C089479
04-21-2020
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. LUIS ALBERTO DOMINGUEZ, Defendant and Appellant.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Super. Ct. Nos. STK-CR-FE-2003-0006973 & SF087807B)
Originally charged with first degree murder, defendant Luis Alberto Dominguez pleaded guilty in 2004 to voluntary manslaughter and attempted first degree robbery in concert; he further admitted a principal intentionally discharged a firearm during the attempted robbery and that the offense had been committed to benefit a criminal street gang. While serving his 26-year prison term, the Legislature enacted Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill 1437) (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, §§ 1-4), which amended the law governing murder liability under felony murder and natural and probable consequences theories, and provided a new procedure under Penal Code section 1170.95 for eligible defendants to petition for recall and resentencing. Defendant filed a section 1170.95 petition, but the trial court denied it after finding defendant had pleaded guilty to a nonqualifying offense.
Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
Defendant claims on appeal that section 1170.95 applies to persons who were charged with murder under a felony murder or natural and probable consequences theory but pleaded guilty to manslaughter to avoid trial. Finding no merit to his contention, we affirm.
The Supreme Court is currently reviewing the related question of whether Senate Bill 1437 extends to defendants convicted of attempted murder. (See People v. Lopez (2019) 38 Cal.App.5th 1087, review granted Nov. 13, 2019, S258175; People v. Munoz (2019) 39 Cal.App.5th 738, review granted Nov. 26, 2019, S258234.)
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In 2002, defendant was involved in an attempted residential robbery that resulted in the murder of Daniel McDougal. Although defendant did not enter the residence or personally kill McDougal, he was a passenger in the car that dropped off, picked up, and drove the killers away.
In 2003, defendant and several cohorts were charged with the first degree murder of McDougal (§ 187, subd. (a), count 1; § 190.2, subd. (a)(17)(A) & (G)), first degree residential burglary (§ 459, count 2), and attempted home invasion robbery (§§ 664, 211, count 3). It was alleged that the murder occurred during a robbery or burglary (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17)(A) & (G)), and various firearm (§§ 12022.53, subd. (d), 12022, subd. (a)) and gang enhancements (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)) were alleged.
In September 2004, defendant agreed to plead guilty to an amended charge of voluntary manslaughter (§ 192, count 1) and attempted robbery (count 3), and he admitted an amended allegation of vicarious use of a firearm (§ 12022.53, subds. (c) & (e)) and a gang enhancement (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)) in exchange for a stipulated 26-year prison term and dismissal of the remaining charges and enhancements. The trial court later denied his motion to withdraw his plea and, consistent with the plea agreement, sentenced defendant to a state prison term of 26 years, including the midterm of six years for the voluntary manslaughter charge and 20 years for the firearm enhancement; the court imposed a concurrent term for the attempted robbery and stayed the sentence on the gang enhancement.
Defendant also resolved two additional cases pending in Stanislaus County as part of the plea agreement.
While defendant was serving his sentence, the Legislature passed Senate Bill 1437. In February 2019, defendant filed a petition pursuant to newly enacted section 1170.95 seeking to vacate his voluntary manslaughter conviction. In April 2019, the trial court summarily denied defendant's petition on the ground that he had "[pleaded] to a negotiated non-qualifying offense." Defendant timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
Defendant challenges the denial of his section 1170.95 petition, arguing that a person who pleads to voluntary manslaughter when facing a murder charge qualifies for relief under the statute even though he or she has not been convicted of murder. We disagree. A person convicted of manslaughter is not eligible for relief under section 1170.95, and the trial court did not err in summarily denying defendant's petition.
1.0 Senate Bill 1437 Overview
Senate Bill 1437, effective January 1, 2019, "amend[ed] the felony murder rule and the natural and probable consequences doctrine, as it relates to murder, to ensure that murder liability is not imposed on a person who is not the actual killer, did not act with the intent to kill, or was not a major participant in the underlying felony who acted with reckless indifference to human life." (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 1(f) [uncodified preamble], italics added.)
The bill amended section 188, which defines malice, and section 189, which defines the degrees of murder, to address felony-murder liability. (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, §§ 2, 3.) It also added new section 1170.95, which provides a procedure by which those convicted of murder can seek retroactive relief if the changes in the law would affect their previously sustained convictions. (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 4.)
1.1 Definition of Malice under Section 188
Senate Bill 1437 redefined malice under section 188 to require that a principal acted with malice aforethought; malice may no longer be imputed to a person based solely on his or her participation in a crime. (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 2.) Section 188, subdivision (a)(3) now provides in relevant part: "Except as stated in subdivision (e) of Section 189, in order to be convicted of murder, a principal in a crime shall act with malice aforethought. Malice shall not be imputed to a person based solely on his or her participation in a crime."
1.2 Felony Murder under Section 189
Section 189 was amended to include new subdivision (e), which provides:
"A participant in the perpetration or attempted perpetration of [particular crimes, including kidnapping,] in which a death occurs is liable for murder only if one of the following is proven:
"(1) The person was the actual killer.
"(2) The person was not the actual killer, but, with the intent to kill, aided, abetted, counseled, commanded, induced, solicited, requested, or assisted the actual killer in the commission of murder in the first degree.
"(3) The person was a major participant in the underlying felony and acted with reckless indifference to human life, as described in subdivision (d) of Section 190.2." (Stats. 2018, ch. 15, § 3.)
1.3 Petitioning Procedure under Section 1170 .95
Senate Bill 1437 created a petitioning procedure under newly enacted section 1170.95 for those eligible to have their murder convictions vacated and to seek resentencing on the remaining counts. (Stats. 2018, ch. 15, § 4.) Under the new statute, "[a] person convicted of felony murder or murder under a natural and probable consequences theory may file a petition with the court that sentenced the petitioner to have the petitioner's murder conviction vacated and to be resentenced on any remaining counts when all of the following conditions apply: [¶] (1) A complaint, information, or indictment was filed against the petitioner that allowed the prosecution to proceed under a theory of felony murder or murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine. [¶] (2) The petitioner was convicted of first degree or second degree murder following a trial or accepted a plea offer in lieu of a trial at which the petitioner could be convicted for first degree or second degree murder. [¶] [And] (3) The petitioner could not be convicted of first or second degree murder because of changes to Section 188 or 189 made effective January 1, 2019." (§ 1170.95, subd. (a), italics added.)
A petitioning defendant must file a declaration stating that he or she meets the above criteria and may request counsel be appointed. (§ 1170.95, subd. (b)(1)(A) & (C).) If the defendant makes a prima facie showing of eligibility, the court must issue an order to show cause and hold a hearing "to determine whether to vacate the murder conviction and to recall the sentence . . . ." (§ 1170.95, subds. (c), (d)(1), italics added.) At that hearing, the prosecution bears the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is not eligible for resentencing. (§ 1170.95, subd. (d)(3).) "The prosecutor and the petitioner may rely on the record of conviction or offer new or additional evidence to meet their respective burdens." (Ibid.)
The parties also may waive a resentencing hearing and stipulate that a defendant "is eligible to have his or her murder conviction vacated and for resentencing." (§ 1170.95, subd. (d)(2), italics added.)
2.0 Applicability of Senate Bill 1437 to Voluntary Manslaughter Convictions
Despite the numerous references to murder convictions in Senate Bill 1437 (italicized ante) and none to manslaughter convictions, defendant contends Senate Bill 1437 and section 1170.95 extend to individuals who risked a murder conviction under a theory of felony murder or natural and probable consequences murder but agreed to plead guilty to manslaughter instead. The People disagree, arguing section 1170.95 applies exclusively to defendants convicted of murder under one of those theories, and not to persons like defendant who were convicted of other crimes like manslaughter pursuant to a plea agreement.
2.1 Standard of Review
Whether defendant comes within the purview of section 1170.95 presents a question of statutory interpretation that we review de novo. (Goodman v. Lozano (2010) 47 Cal.4th 1327, 1332; People ex rel. Lockyer v. Shamrock Foods Co. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 415, 432.) We independently consider the statute to determine whether it provides relief to defendant, who was convicted of voluntary manslaughter by plea.
Our primary goal when interpreting a statute is to determine and give effect to the underlying purpose of the law. (Goodman v. Lozano, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 1332.) " 'Our first step is to scrutinize the actual words of the statute, giving them a plain and commonsense meaning.' " (Ibid.) " ' "If the words of the statute are clear, the court should not add to or alter them to accomplish a purpose that does not appear on the face of the statute or from its legislative history." ' " (Ibid.) But the plain meaning rule does not prohibit a court from determining whether the literal meaning of a measure comports with its purpose or whether such a construction of one provision is consistent with another provision of the statute. (People v. Canty (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1266, 1276.)
Where a statutory ambiguity exists, we adopt the interpretation that leads to a more reasonable result. (People v. Canty, supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 1277.) In attempting to ascertain the most reasonable interpretation, we consider the legislative intent and the words of the measure, as well as the history and background of the provision. (Ibid.) With these concepts in mind, we turn to the language of the statute.
2.2 Analysis
By its terms, subdivision (a) of section 1170.95 allows "[a] person convicted of felony murder or murder under a natural and probable consequences theory" to file a petition "to have [his or her] murder conviction vacated and to be resentenced on any remaining counts." (Italics added.) Subdivision (d), in turn, identifies the relief available as the vacating of a "murder conviction." (§ 1170.95, subd. (d)(1) [court holds hearing to determine whether to vacate murder conviction]; id., subd. (d)(2) [in lieu of hearing, parties may stipulate that a defendant is eligible to have murder conviction vacated].) These petitioning requirements and the available relief "indicate that the Legislature intended to limit relief to those convicted of murder under a theory of felony murder or natural and probable consequences murder." (People v. Turner (2020) 45 Cal.App.5th 428, 435 (Turner).) An uncodified section of Senate Bill 1437, which may be considered in determining section 1170.95's purpose (People v. Valencia (2017) 3 Cal.5th 347, 362 [" '[i]n considering the purpose of legislation, statements of the intent of the enacting body contained in a preamble, while not conclusive, are entitled to consideration' "]), further shows that the Legislature sought "to amend the felony murder rule and the natural and probable consequences doctrine, as it relates to murder," to limit the circumstances in which "murder liability" may be imposed (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 1(f), italics added), rather than to a broader scope of crimes like manslaughter.
Had the Legislature intended to make section 1170.95 applicable to defendants convicted of manslaughter, it easily could have done so. (See People v. Otis (1980) 111 Cal.App.3d 467, 476 ["If the Legislature had [intended] . . . it could have easily added manslaughter to those well-recognized crimes which are specifically enumerated in . . . section 220."].) It did not. "The absence of any reference to manslaughter implies the omission was intentional." (People v. Flores (2020) 44 Cal.App.5th 985, 993 [finding section 1170.95 did not apply to manslaughter conviction].)
Other courts have reached a similar conclusion based on the statute's plain language. (See, e.g., People v. Cervantes (2020) 44 Cal.App.5th 884, 887 [section 1170.95's plain language "is explicit; its scope is limited to murder convictions"]; Turner, supra, 45 Cal.App.5th at pp. 436-438 [Senate Bill 1437 does not apply to manslaughter conviction]; People v. Flores, supra, 44 Cal.App.5th. at pp. 993-994 [same]; see also People v. Lopez, supra, 38 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1104-1105 [Senate Bill 1437 does not apply to offense of attempted murder], review granted; People v. Munoz, supra, 39 Cal.App.5th at p. 753, [same], review granted.)
In an attempt to avoid the statute's plain language, defendant points to a portion of section 1170.95, subdivision (a)(2), which is one of the criteria a defendant must satisfy to establish a prima facie case that he comes within the statute's ambit; the provision requires that "[t]he petitioner was convicted of first degree or second degree murder following a trial or accepted a plea offer in lieu of a trial at which the petitioner could be convicted for first degree or second degree murder." (Italics added.) Noting the provision does not expressly require a defendant to have accepted a plea offer for murder, he urges us to interpret the provision broadly "because the natural and probable consequence doctrine has been criticized as unduly expanding criminal liability." Defendant, however, ignores the introductory language in section 1170.95, subdivision (a) that limits petitions to a person "convicted of . . . murder." (Italics added.) (Accord, Turner, supra, 45 Cal.App.5th at p. 436 [rejecting similar argument].)
As the court in Turner recognized, even if defendant were correct that an ambiguity exists, the legislative history demonstrates he is not entitled to relief. (See Turner, supra, 45 Cal.App.5th at pp. 436-438 [for extensive discussion of Senate Bill 1437's legislative history materials].) Numerous committee reports for the legislation discussed the lengthy prison terms for murder, distinguished the offense of murder from manslaughter, and evaluated the bill's fiscal impact in terms of the number of inmates who were serving a term for the principal offenses of first and second degree murder. (See, e.g., Sen. Com. on Public Safety, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 1437 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.) as introduced Feb. 16, 2018, pp. 2-4; Sen. Com. on Appropriations, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 1437 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.) as introduced Feb. 16, 2018, pp. 2-3 [discussing fiscal impacts in terms of murder convictions]; Sen. Rules Com., Off. of Sen. Floor Analyses, 3d reading analysis of Sen. Bill No. 1437 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.) as amended May 25, 2018, pp. 1-2; Assem. Com. on Appropriations, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 1437 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.) as amended May 25, 2018, pp. 1-2 [noting lengthy prison terms for murder and suggesting reform to permit "individuals previously sentenced on a theory of felony murder to petition for resentencing if they meet specified qualifications"].) These legislative materials show "the Legislature understood the distinction between murder and manslaughter and focused its efforts on revising accomplice liability under a felony murder or natural and probable consequences theory" rather than on manslaughter or other crimes. (Turner, at p. 438.)
Committee reports and bill analyses are properly considered as legislative history because they "shed light on the collegial view of the Legislature as a whole." (Kaufman & Broad Communities, Inc. v. Performance Plastering, Inc. (2005) 133 Cal.App.4th 26, 30.)
And as the People note, the Senate passed Senate Bill 1437 with the following introductory clause: "A defendant may submit a request to have his or her conviction vacated and petition for resentencing when all of the following conditions apply . . . ." (Sen. Amend. to Sen. Bill No. 1437 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.) May 25, 2018, § 6; id. as introduced on Feb. 16, 2018, § 6.) The Assembly amended this language to its present form: "A person convicted of felony murder or murder under a natural and probable consequences theory may file a petition with the court that sentenced the petitioner to have the petitioner's murder conviction vacated and to be resentenced on any remaining counts when all of the following conditions apply . . . ." (Assem. Amend. to Sen. Bill No. 1437 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.) Aug. 20, 2018, § 4; see § 1170.95, subd. (a).) This shows the Legislature narrowed the petitioning procedure to apply to persons convicted of felony murder or murder under a natural and probable consequences theory.
"Viewed together, the legislative history confirms that a defendant who faces murder liability under the natural and probable consequences doctrine [or felony murder], but pleads guilty to manslaughter in lieu of trial, is not eligible for resentencing under section 1170.95." (Turner, supra, 45 Cal.App.5th at p. 438.)
Defendant argues that interpreting section 1170.95 in the above manner results in an absurdity and violates the Legislature's intent in enacting the provision. While it is true that we may disregard a statute's plain language if it leads to absurd results or contravenes clear evidence of a contrary legislative intent (Ornelas v. Randolph (1993) 4 Cal.4th 1095, 1105), neither of those circumstances exist here. The uncodified section of Senate Bill 1437 repeatedly references murder and not manslaughter, and the requirements for filing a petition and for the available relief "all presuppose a murder conviction." (Turner, supra, 45 Cal.App.5th at p. 439.) The legislative history materials, moreover, focused on the harsh penalties for murder as opposed to manslaughter, and noted the number of persons convicted of first and second degree murder in determining reform was necessary.
The determinate sentencing ranges of three, six, or 11 years for voluntary manslaughter and two, three, or four years for involuntary manslaughter differ markedly from the lengthier sentences imposed for first or second degree murder. (§ 193, subds. (a)-(b).) First degree murder is punishable by death, life in prison without the possibility of parole, or 25 years to life in prison. (§ 190, subds. (a), (e).) A defendant convicted of second degree murder must serve a sentence of 15 years to life, with parole eligibility after 15 years. (Ibid.)
Citing People v. King (1993) 5 Cal.4th 59, defendant also argues that remedial legislation should be applied to lesser included offenses. King, however, is inapt. There, a series of then operative provisions of the Penal Code and the Welfare and Institutions Code, together with prior Supreme Court decisions, on their face permitted a person under the age of 18 who had committed first degree murder and was tried as an adult to be sentenced to the California Youth Authority (CYA), while the same person who had attempted but failed to commit the same crime was not eligible for CYA and had to be sentenced to state prison. (Id. at pp. 62-63.) Recognizing the absurdity of such a result, and after reviewing the legislative history of the statutory change that created the anomaly, the Court explained: "The clear legislative intent to make first degree murderers under the age of 18--and by extension those who attempt but fail to commit the crime--eligible for CYA should prevail over any irrational result caused by the amendment of different statutes in separate codes at different times for unrelated purposes." (Id. at p. 69.)
Nothing similar occurred here. Unlike in King, we are not faced with "amendment of different statutes in separate codes at different times" leading to an absurd and unintended result. Senate Bill 1437 is a solitary piece of legislation in which the Legislature specifically elected to provide a benefit to one category of persons--certain individuals with murder convictions based on the theory of felony murder or murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine--and not to others. Interpreting section 1170.95 in accord with its plain language accomplishes this goal.
Given the statute's plain language, which applies only to qualifying defendants convicted of felony murder or murder under a natural and probable consequences theory, we conclude defendant was statutorily ineligible for relief under section 1170.95. The trial court did not err in summarily denying his petition.
3.0 Equal Protection
Defendant contends the failure to include voluntary manslaughter convictions in section 1170.95 violates his constitutional rights to equal protection. He argues that persons convicted of murder and those convicted of manslaughter are similarly situated because both are at risk of losing their liberty for violating the penal law, and that it is irrational to permit imposition of a more severe penalty on those convicted of the lesser crime. We disagree.
Both the federal and California Constitutions guarantee that no person shall be "den[ied] . . . the equal protection of the laws." (U.S. Const., 14th Amend.; Cal. Const., art. I, § 7.) To establish an equal protection claim, a defendant must show that the two classes receiving unequal treatment are similarly situated for purposes of the challenged law. (Johnson v. Department of Justice (2015) 60 Cal.4th 871, 881 [federal and state equal protection guarantees have similar interpretation]; People v. Morales (2019) 33 Cal.App.5th 800, 808; People v. Barrera (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 1555, 1565.) " '[O]nly those persons who are similarly situated are protected from invidiously disparate treatment.' " (Barrera, at p. 1565.) Ordinarily, "offenders who commit different crimes are not similarly situated" for equal protection purposes. (Morales, at p. 808.)
Here, defendant cannot show he is similarly situated to persons convicted of murder. He was convicted of voluntary manslaughter, a different crime which carries a different punishment. Having failed to establish that the unequally treated classes are similarly situated, defendant's equal protection challenge fails. The Legislature is permitted to treat these two groups of criminal offenders differently.
DISPOSITION
The order denying defendant's section 1170.95 petition is affirmed.
/s/_________
BUTZ, J. We concur: /s/_________
ROBIE, Acting P. J. /s/_________
MAURO, J.