People v. Dominguez

18 Citing cases

  1. People v. Trout

    596 P.2d 762 (Colo. 1979)   Cited 2 times

    Affirmed1. ASSAULT AND BATTERY — First Degree — Guilty — Second Degree — Discharge — Negative — People v. Dominguez. Defendant, who was originally charged with first-degree assault but found guilty of second-degree assault, was not entitled to a discharge by reason of People v. Dominguez, 193 Colo. 468, 568 P.2d 54 (1977), which held the elements of first- and second-degree assault to be the same under the statute which defendant was charged with violating. 2.

  2. People v. Duncan

    545 P.3d 963 (Colo. App. 2023)   Cited 1 times

    ¶ 14 Relying on People v. Dominguez, Duncan argues that, because protracted and permanent lack a "sufficiently pragmatic difference," protracted necessarily means permanent. 193 Colo. 468, 470, 568 P.2d 54, 55 (1977) (quoting People v. Calvaresi, 188 Colo. 277, 282, 534 P.2d 316, 319 (1975)).

  3. Bruce v. Clementi

    Civil Action No. 15-cv-01653-REB (D. Colo. Jun. 26, 2017)

    A statute violates equal protection if a separate law covers the identical conduct but has lower penalties, even if different acts could potentially be covered. See, e.g., People v. Marcy, 628 P.2d 69, 80 (Colo. 1981) (invalidating extreme indifference first degree murder as indistinguishable from second degree murder); People v. Calvaresi, 534 P.2d 316, 318-319 (Colo. 1975) (then existing manslaughter violated equal protection since practically identical to criminally negligent homicide); People v. Dominquez, 568 P.2d 54, 55 (Colo. 1977) (conviction for first degree assault reversed due then existing statute being basically identical to second degree assault).The tax evasion statute does not define what is mean [sic] by evading or defeating a tax and how that can be differentiated from legal activity to minimize taxes in naming deductions.

  4. Crespin v. People

    721 P.2d 688 (Colo. 1986)   Cited 21 times
    Remanding for a new trial or entry of judgment on lesser included offense, at the choice of the prosecution, where instructional error affected only an element of the greater offense

    We have held on several occasions that when all the elements of a lesser offense have been established by competent evidence and have been included in the jury's guilty verdict to the more serious but constitutionally infirm crime, it is appropriate to vacate the conviction and remand the case with directions to enter a judgment of conviction on the lesser offense and to resentence the defendant for that crime. E.g. Curtis, 627 P.2d 734; Till v. People, 196 Colo. 126, 581 P.2d 299 (1978); People v. Dominguez, 193 Colo. 468, 568 P.2d 54 (1977); People v. Horrocks, 190 Colo. 501, 549 P.2d 400 (1976); People v. Webb, 189 Colo. 400, 542 P.2d 77 (1975); People v. Bowers, 187 Colo. 233, 530 P.2d 1282 (1974). Under the state of the record before us, we are satisfied that there was abundant evidence establishing all the essential elements of the lesser offense of second degree murder, which consists of causing the death of another "knowingly."

  5. People v. Wilhelm

    676 P.2d 702 (Colo. 1984)   Cited 24 times

    Statutes prescribing different sanctions for what ostensibly might be different acts, but offering no rational standard for distinguishing such different acts for purposes of disparate punishment, also contravene the equal protections guaranties of Colorado's constitution. People v. Dominguez, 193 Colo. 468, 568 P.2d 54 (1977); People v. Calvaresi, 188 Colo. 277, 534 P.2d 316 (1975). Therefore, statutory classifications of crimes must be based on differences that are real in fact and reasonably related to the purposes of the legislative enactments.

  6. People v. Jones, JR

    668 P.2d 937 (Colo. 1983)   Cited 1 times

    1981); People v. Westrum, 624 P.2d 1302 (Colo. 1981); People v. Bramlett, 194 Colo. 205, 573 P.2d 94 (1977), cert. denied 435 U.S. 956, 98 S.Ct. 1590, 55 L.Ed.2d 808 (1978); People v. Dominguez, 193 Colo. 468, 568 P.2d 54 (1977); People v. Calvaresi, 188 Colo. 277, 534 P.2d 316 (1975). On July 30, 1974, the defendant was charged in the Boulder District Court with extreme indifference murder.

  7. People v. Castro

    657 P.2d 932 (Colo. 1983)   Cited 103 times
    Holding there is no legal or logical inconsistency in the statutory proscription of attempted extreme indifference murder

    ." People v. Marcy, 628 P.2d at 74-75; see also, e.g., People v. Bramlett, 194 Colo. 205, 573 P.2d 94 (1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 956, 98 S.Ct. 1590, 55 L.Ed.2d 808 (1978); People v. Dominguez, 193 Colo. 468, 568 P.2d 54 (1977); People v. Calvaresi, 188 Colo. 277, 534 P.2d 316 (1975). A review of the statutory definitions of attempted extreme indifference murder and of assault in the first degree satisfies us that there is a sufficient difference in the conduct proscribed by these offenses to justify the resulting differential in penalty.

  8. People v. Mumaugh

    644 P.2d 299 (Colo. 1982)   Cited 21 times
    Holding that defendant's conviction of a class 1 traffic offense proscribing leaving the scene of an accident violated equal protection because it was not sufficiently distinguishable from a class 2 traffic offense proscribing virtually identical conduct

    People v. Marcy, 628 P.2d at 75. See, e.g., People v. Bramlett, supra; People v. Dominguez, 193 Colo. 468, 568 P.2d 54 (1977); People v. Calvaresi, supra. The distinction, if any, between "directly involved in an accident" and "involved in an accident" is "one without a sufficiently pragmatic difference to permit an intelligent and uniform application of the law."

  9. People v. Lee

    630 P.2d 583 (Colo. 1981)   Cited 38 times
    Reversing and remanding for new trial in part because prosecutor elicited prejudicial and irrelevant testimony concerning the defendant's role in the death of his victim's unborn child, a crime for which he was not charged

    "On prior occasions where all the elements of the lesser offense were proved by competent evidence and were included in the jury's verdict of guilty to the more serious but constitutionally infirm crime, we have vacated the conviction and remanded with directions to enter a judgment of conviction on the lesser offense and to resentence the defendant. People v. Dominguez, 193 Colo. 468, 568 P.2d 54 (1977); People v. Horrocks, 190 Colo. 501, 549 P.2d 400 (1976); People v. Webb, 189 Colo. 400, 542 P.2d 77 (1975); People v. Bowers, 187 Colo. 233, 530 P.2d 1282 (1974)."

  10. People v. McKnight

    626 P.2d 678 (Colo. 1981)   Cited 35 times
    In People v. McKnight, 200 Colo. 486, 626 P.2d 678 (1981), we contrasted the language of Crim. P. 16 I (a)(1)(I) with that of Crim. P. 16 I (a)(1)(II), which requires disclosure of "Any written or recorded statements and the substance of any oral statements made by the accused...."

    Equal protection prohibits a state from enacting a statute which prescribes different punishments for the same acts committed under like circumstances by persons similarly situated. People v. Dominguez, 193 Colo. 468, 568 P.2d 54 (1977); People v. Calvaresi, 188 Colo. 277, 534 P.2d 316 (1975). However, the law has long recognized a relation between punishment for escape and the offense for which the prisoner was held at the time of the escape, and the courts have approved statutes which provide for increasingly severe punishments for escape by those inmates serving sentences for more grievous crimes.