After reporting the incident to the police, defendant was spotted approximately half a mile away from the gas station and arrested. Based on the foregoing and viewing the evidence in a neutral light, we conclude that the weight of the evidence amply supports the jury's verdict (see People v. Dolan, 51 A.D.3d 1337, 1338–1339, 858 N.Y.S.2d 490 [2008], lv. denied 12 N.Y.3d 757, 876 N.Y.S.2d 709, 904 N.E.2d 846 [2009] ; People v. Heath, 49 A.D.3d 970, 972, 853 N.Y.S.2d 400 [2008], lv. denied 10 N.Y.3d 959, 863 N.Y.S.2d 143, 893 N.E.2d 449 [2008] ). Regarding defendant's contention that he was highly intoxicated during the incident, “whether an individual's level of intoxication negates the element of intent to commit a crime lies within the domain of the jury as the trier of fact” (People v. Kenyon, 108 A.D.3d 933, 939, 970 N.Y.S.2d 638 [2013] [internal quotation marks, brackets and citations omitted], lv. denied 21 N.Y.3d 1075, 974 N.Y.S.2d 324, 997 N.E.2d 149 [2013] ).

After reporting the incident to the police, defendant was spotted approximately half a mile away from the gas station and arrested. Based on the foregoing and viewing the evidence in a neutral light, we conclude that the weight of the evidence amply supports the jury's verdict (see People v Dolan, 51 AD3d 1337, 1338-1339 [2008], lv denied 12 NY3d 757 [2009]; People v Heath, 49 AD3d 970, 972 [2008], lv denied 10 NY3d 959 [2008]). Regarding defendant's contention that he was highly intoxicated during the incident, "whether an individual's level of intoxication negates the element of intent to commit a crime lies within the domain of the jury as the trier of fact" (People v Kenyon, 108 AD3d 933, 939 [2013] [internal quotation marks, brackets and citations omitted], lv denied 21 NY3d 1075 [2013]).

New York law requires the court to charge the jury on an affirmative defense only when the jury "could reasonably conclude that defendant had proven the existence of the defense by a preponderance of the credible evidence." People v. Dolan, 858 N.Y.S.2d 490, 490 (App. Div. 2008); see also People v. Gonzalez, 22 N.Y.3d 539, 545 (2014) ("A defendant is entitled to a jury charge . . . where the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the defendant, is sufficient for the jury to find by a preponderance of the evidence that the elements of the affirmative defense are satisfied."); People v. Miaram, 948 N.Y.S.2d 115, 115 (App. Div. 2012) (holding that a defendant was not entitled to a jury instruction on an affirmative defense because there was not sufficient evidence for the jury to find by a preponderance of the evidence that all the elements of the defense were satisfied). Under New York law, a renunciation is not "voluntary and complete" if it is motivated by outside circumstances that render the crime more difficult to complete. N.Y. Penal Law § 40.10(5); see People v. Taylor, 80 N.Y.2d 1, 13 (1992).

New York law provides that a court “must instruct a jury on the defense of justification ‘if on any reasonable view of the evidence, the fact finder might have decided that the defendant's actions were justified.’ ” People v. Cox, 92 N.Y.2d 1002, 684 N.Y.S.2d 473, 707 N.E.2d 428, 429 (1998) (quoting People v. Padgett, 60 N.Y.2d 142, 468 N.Y.S.2d 854, 456 N.E.2d 795, 797 (1983) ). “In determining whether the jury should be given a particular charge, the trial court must look to all of the evidence introduced at trial and view it in a light most favorable to the defendant.” People v. Dolan, 51 A.D.3d 1337, 858 N.Y.S.2d 490, 492 (2008). “A court need not charge justification if no reasonable view of the evidence establishes the elements of the defense.”

"In determining whether the jury should be given a particular charge, the trial court must look to all of the evidence introduced at trial and view it in a light most favorable to the defendant." People v. Dolan, 858 N.Y.S.2d 490, 492 (2008) (citations omitted).

February 3, 2009. Appeal from the 3d Dept: 51 AD3d 1337 (Albany). Smith, J.

These actions sufficiently supported the conviction of attempted first-degree rape (see People v Cruz, 170 A.D.3d 467, 468 [1st Dept 2019], lv denied 33 N.Y.3d 975 [2019]). Additionally, defendant did not renounce his crime within the meaning of Penal Law § 40.10(5) because he stopped attacking the victim only after she promised not to report him (see People v Dolan, 51 A.D.3d 1337, 1340 [3d Dept 2008], lv denied 12 N.Y.3d 757 [2009]).

Here, the testimony of appellant's wife and daughters, along with scientific DNA evidence, constitutes overwhelming evidence of appellant's guilt. See, e.g., People v. Dolan , 858 N.Y.S.2d 490, 51 A.D.3d 1337 (2008) [any error in the admission of the contents of the defendant's suicide note in a prosecution for attempted kidnapping and assault, was harmless due to overwhelming evidence of guilt]. Once again, aside from the note, the evidence included the testimony of law enforcement officers, appellant's wife, the two victim daughters, as well as DNA evidence that established a 99.999% probability that appellant is the biological father of his daughter's child.

The deputy also testified that the victim "seemed visibly shaken or frightened" while in the woods with him. Another law enforcement official testified that he observed multiple bruises on the victim, and a physician's assistant stated that the victim had a non-displaced rib fracture and bruises and abrasions throughout her body. Based on the foregoing and viewing the evidence in a neutral light, we are unpersuaded by defendant's argument that his convictions for kidnapping in the second degree and assault in the second degree were against the weight of the evidence (see People v. McCann, 126 A.D.3d 1031, 1033, 4 N.Y.S.3d 697 [2015], lv. denied 25 N.Y.3d 1167, 15 N.Y.S.3d 299 [2015] ; People v. Dolan, 51 A.D.3d 1337, 1338–1339, 858 N.Y.S.2d 490 [2008], lv. denied 12 N.Y.3d 757, 876 N.Y.S.2d 709, 904 N.E.2d 846 [2009] ; People v. Smith, 41 A.D.3d 1093, 1094, 839 N.Y.S.2d 557 [2007], lv. denied 9 N.Y.3d 1039, 852 N.Y.S.2d 24, 881 N.E.2d 1211 [2008] ). Nor do we find any merit in defendant's assertion that the larceny convictions were against the weight of the evidence inasmuch as the People established that defendant intended to deprive the victim of her vehicle, car keys and cell phone (see People v. Villanueva, 148 A.D.3d 210, 215–216, 46 N.Y.S.3d 615 [2017] ; People v. Perez, 93 A.D.3d 1032, 1035–1036, 942 N.Y.S.2d 227 [2012], lvs. denied 19 N.Y.3d 1000, 951 N.Y.S.2d 476, 975 N.E.2d 922 [2012] ; People v. Brightly, 148 A.D.2d 623, 624, 539 N.Y.S.2d 86 [1989], lv. denied 74 N.Y.2d 737, 545 N.Y.S.2d 111, 543 N.E.2d 754 [1989] ; see generally People v. Yusufi, 247 A.D.2d 648, 649, 669 N.Y.S.2d 66 [1998], lv. denied 92 N.Y.2d 863, 677 N.Y.S.2d 94, 699 N.E.2d 454 [1998] ). To the extent that defendant claims that the victim's te

Based on the callous and casual nature of the crime—firing five or six shots toward a friend at point blank range—the sentence was not harsh or excessive ( see People v. Dolan, 51 A.D.3d 1337, 1341, 858 N.Y.S.2d 490 [2008], lv. denied 12 N.Y.3d 757, 876 N.Y.S.2d 709, 904 N.E.2d 846 [2009] ). Defendant's remaining arguments have not been preserved for review, and we decline to exercise our interest of justice jurisdiction.