A similar situation existed in the First Department, which first addressed the issue in December of 1990 (People v Lee, 168 A.D.2d 267) and then, in the three successive cases raising the issue, reached inconclusive results (compare, People v Rose, 175 A.D.2d 32, affd 80 N.Y.2d 802; with People v Jordan, 174 A.D.2d 490; and People v Cruz, 179 A.D.2d 529, revd 81 N.Y.2d 738, supra). The Second Department also demonstrated some uncertainty about the correct resolution of the issue (compare, People v Scott, 163 A.D.2d 341; and People v Jenkins, 157 A.D.2d 854; with People vPeterson, 151 A.D.2d 512; People v Dokes, 173 A.D.2d 724, revd 79 N.Y.2d 656, supra; People v Floyd, 179 A.D.2d 770; People v Ray, 184 A.D.2d 596; People v Gebrosky, 181 A.D.2d 692, revd 80 N.Y.2d 995, supra). In fact, the only real consistency on the issue came from the Fourth Department, which held, in a series of 1991 decisions, that the defendant's exclusion from Sandoval hearings did not require reversal in the absence of preservation or a showing of prejudice (People v Wynn, 175 A.D.2d 659; People v Lomack, 174 A.D.2d 1037; People v Alexander, 174 A.D.2d 996, revd 80 N.Y.2d 801; People v Cole, 174 A.D.2d 970; People v Favor, 172 A.D.2d 1052, supra [revd herein]; People v Dunbar, 172 A.D.2d 1006). And, even these Fourth Department decisions, which rested primarily on preservation grounds, could hardly be regarded as ringing endorsements of the practice of excluding the accused from Sandoval hearings.
Nor was the defendant prejudiced by his absence from the precharge conference. The defendant's absence did not affect his ability to defend himself against the charges in any way, and thus did not violate his due process right to be present at trial (see, People v Rodriguez, 76 N.Y.2d 918; People v Dokes, 173 A.D.2d 724). We have examined the defendant's remaining contentions and find them to be without merit.
, People v Turaine, 78 N.Y.2d 871; see, People v Reed, 168 A.D.2d 645, 646). Moreover, since the transcript of the proceeding was available to the defense before trial, the defendant's absence did not have substantial effect on his ability to defend (see, People v Rodriguez, 76 N.Y.2d 918; see, People v Floyd, 179 A.D.2d 770; People v Dokes, 173 A.D.2d 724, lv granted 78 N.Y.2d 1075; People v Jordan, 174 A.D.2d 490; cf., People v Turaine, supra). We have reviewed the defendant's remaining contentions and find them to be either unpreserved for appellate review or without merit.
Moreover, upon the exercise of our factual review power, we are satisfied that the verdict was not against the weight of the evidence (see, CPL 470.15). Further, we find that, under the facts of this case, the defendant's absence from a portion of the Sandoval hearing did not prejudice him or affect his ability to defend and thus did not constitute a deprivation of due process (see, People v Velasco, 77 N.Y.2d 469; People v Floyd, 179 A.D.2d 770; People v Dokes, 173 A.D.2d 724). The defendant was present when the court made its ruling. Also, although a dispute arose as to the nature of a prior conviction, the defendant was present for part of this discussion and the court prohibited the prosecutor from cross-examining the defendant as to this conviction.
)" (People v Velasco, supra, at 472.) Thus, where a defendant's absence does not prejudice him or affect his ability to defend, there is no deprivation of due process (see, e.g., People v. Rodriguez, 76 N.Y.2d 918 [defendant was absent from a colloquy outside the jury's presence in which his attorney discussed the sufficiency of the rending back of testimony to the jury]; People v. Dokes, 173 A.D.2d 724 [defendant was absent from a precharge conference, an informal conference prior to voir dire concerning ministerial matters of jury selection, and a conference in which the court modified its earlier Sandoval ruling slightly in the defendant's favor]; People v. Jordan, 174 A.D.2d 490 [defendant was absent during a Sandoval hearing, but "`none of the parties attached any significance' to (his) absence" at the time, his criminal record was undisputed, and he testified on direct examination about his previous felony convictions]). In the instant case, the record discloses that during the trial none of the parties attached any significance to the defendant's absence at the Sandoval conference. The present claim is raised for the first time on appeal. Notably, no dispute concerning the defendant's criminal record was raised at the conference (cf.
CHALLENGING THE JURORS The procedure engaged in by the court to effectuate the attorneys' challenges for cause and peremptory challenges after each round of the formal jury selection is substantially the same as the procedure the Court of Appeals approved of in People v Velasco ( 77 N.Y.2d 469, 473 [The defendant was absent from "the robing room discussion in which the attorneys advanced the legal basis for their challenges for cause and identified their peremptory challenges, later formally effected in open court."]) and People v Dokes ( 173 A.D.2d 724, revd onother grounds 79 N.Y.2d 656 [The defendant was absent from "the recording of the peremptory and for-cause challenges" in chambers]). "The in-chambers discussion was a mere preliminary advisement of the Court of challenges later effectuated in open court in the presence of defendant and thus did not constitute a material part of the trial" (People v Velasco, supra, at 473).