The trial judge who accepted that plea was not required to advise defendant of his continuing duty to act as a law abiding citizen. Russel v. District Court, 191 Colo. 298, 552 P.2d 297 (1976). We note also that neither the American Law Institute Model Code of Pre-Arraignment Procedure, see ยง 350.4 and comments thereto (1975), the American Bar Association Standards Relating to Pleas of Guilty, 14-1.4 (Approved Draft, 1978), nor the American Bar Association Standards Relating to the Function of the Trial Judge, 6-4.2 (Approved Draft, 1978), require that a defendant be informed of the possible future application of habitual offender laws.
The trial judge who accepted that plea was not required to advise defendant of his continuing duty to act as a law-abiding citizen. Russell v. District Court, 191 Colo. 298, 552 P.2d 297 (1976). We note also that neither the American Law Institute Model Code of Pre-Arraignment Procedure, see ยง 350.4 and comments thereto (1975), the American Bar Association Standards Relating to Pleas of Guilty, 14-1.4 (Approved Draft, 1978), nor the American Bar Association Standards Relating to The Function of The Trial Judge, 6-4.2 (Approved Draft, 1978), require that a defendant be informed of the possible future application of habitual offender laws.
Since the points to be assessed by virtue of the July 20 violation did not appear on the summons, nor was the appellant advised by the arresting officer in reference to the points, points cannot be assessed against him for that offense. The department contends, however, that the outcome in the instant case is controlled by our decision in People v. District Court, 191 Colo. 298, 552 P.2d 297 (1976). We disagree.
However, defendant's attorney failed to seek such a recommendation from the sentencing court in this case, since, as he testified at defendant's Crim. P. 35(c) hearing, he was unaware of it. The People argue that under People v. District Court, 191 Colo. 298, 552 P.2d 297 (1976), the trial court need not advise an accused of the "many legal consequences, direct or collateral, of a guilty plea." We have no quarrel with this principle, but point out that the issue we are addressing is limited strictly to the advice a defense attorney must give a defendant in a criminal case, and in no way imposes an additional requirement upon trial courts during a Crim. P. 11 providency hearing.