Although the statute cited in the charging documents was no longer in effect, the criminal offense of child endangerment was still embodied in the Criminal Code. Accordingly, defendants' claim that they were convicted of a nonexistent crime is without merit. Further, we find this court's prior decision in People v. Dismore, 33 Ill. App.3d 495, 342 N.E.2d 151 (1975), controlling. In Dismore, defendants were charged and convicted of deceptive practices under a section of the Criminal Code that had previously been repealed.

05(b)(2) (West 2012)). ¶ 28 Furthermore, we find the decision in People v. Melton, 282 Ill. App. 3d 408 (1996), and our previous decision in People v. Dismore, 33 Ill. App. 3d 495 (1975), controlling. In Melton, 282 Ill. App. 3d at 414, following a bench trial, several defendants were convicted of multiple counts of endangering the health of a child.

Nor is this a case where the defendant was charged with an offense that still existed, and which he committed, though the statutory language for the offense had been moved elsewhere within the Criminal Code. See Melton, 282 Ill. App. 3d at 415; People v. Dismore, 33 Ill. App. 3d 495, 498 (1975) (conviction under repealed deceptive-practices statute was not void, as law remained on books under Credit Card Law, and defendant did not claim prejudice). Here, the proper criminal statute was on the books at the time, but the State charged him under a different statute, incorrectly so.

This is the only insufficiency which the defendant points out in the charging instrument, and an examination of the information indicates that this is the only defect contained therein. • 1 It is well established that reference in a charging instrument to an incorrect chapter or section of a statute, or both, is regarded as a formal rather than substantive defect ( People v. Oswald (1979), 69 Ill. App.3d 524, 527; People v. Dismore (1975), 33 Ill. App.3d 495, 498; People v. Parr (1970), 130 Ill. App.2d 212, 219-20; People v. Gilmore (1968), 101 Ill. App.2d 447, 454), and a formal defect, such as an incorrect citation of the criminal statute violated, does not require or warrant reversal of a conviction unless the defendant was prejudiced by the miscitation ( People v. Oswald (1979), 69 Ill. App.3d 524, 527; People v. Gray (1978), 61 Ill. App.3d 243, 246; People v. Dismore (1975), 33 Ill. App.3d 495, 498). • 2 In the present case, the miswriting of the correct statutory provision was a formal rather than a substantive defect, whether labelled as a typographical error or a clerical oversight.

• 3 Defendant next contends that he was not represented by counsel at the sentencing hearing. Sentencing is a critical stage of criminal proceedings in which the defendant has a constitutional right to representation by counsel. (See People v. Salvaggio (1976), 38 Ill. App.3d 482, 487, 348 N.E.2d 243; People v. Campbell (1976), 37 Ill. App.3d 511, 514, 346 N.E.2d 441; People v. Dismore (1975), 33 Ill. App.3d 495, 502, 342 N.E.2d 151.) A defendant waives his right to counsel at a sentencing hearing if he knowingly and understandingly rejects representation by appointed counsel after the court has specifically and clearly offered such representation. (See People v. Dismore, 33 Ill. App.3d 495, 502, 342 N.E.2d 151.) A defendant, regardless of ability to pay, has a right to have counsel appointed for him, but has no right to select from or experiment with the counsel so appointed to the detriment of the orderly processes of law. ( People v. Leman (1968), 95 Ill. App.2d 212, 218, 238 N.E.2d 213, appeal denied, 39 Ill.2d 626.)

The citation to an incorrect statutory provision is not necessarily fatal, however. (See People v. Gray (1978), 61 Ill. App.3d 243; People v. Dismore (1975), 33 Ill. App.3d 495.) The citations used here are not so misleading that the defendants could be prejudiced by them.

Sentencing is a critical stage of a criminal prosecution. See, Mempa v. Rhay, 1967, 389 U.S. 128, 88 S.Ct. 254, 19 L.Ed.2d 336; People v. Dismore, 1975, 33 Ill. App.3d 495, 342 N.E.2d 151; von Lusch v. State, 1976, 31 Md. App. 271, 356 A.2d 277, 289. The word "prosecution" within the constitutional provision providing that "in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall have a right to be heard by himself and his counsel, or either, at his election" is a term of art and in legal perspective encompasses the act of sentencing.

Substantial compliance with Rule 402 does not mean literal compliance. People v. Dismore, 33 Ill.App.3d 495, 501-02 (1975). Substantial compliance is determined by the admonishments provided to the defendant at the hearing when the guilty plea is received.

Substantial compliance with Rule 402 does not mean literal compliance. People v. Dismore, 33 Ill.App.3d 495, 501-02 (1975). Substantial compliance is determined by the admonishments provided to the defendant at the hearing when the guilty plea is received. People v. Blankley, 319 Ill.App.3d 996, 1007 (2001). A defendant's due process rights are violated if the trial court does not substantially comply with the required admonishments.

Substantial compliance with Supreme Court Rule 402 does not mean literal compliance. People v. Dismore, 33 Ill.App.3d 495, 501-02 (1975). Substantial compliance is determined by the admonishments provided to the defendant at the hearing when the plea of guilt is received.