We conclude that this pleading was invalid ab initio because the probation officer lacked authority to file it. In People v. Dinger, 136 Ill. 2d 248 (1990), the Illinois Supreme Court held that a defendant could not petition to revoke her own probation. The court specifically observed that "the Unified Code of Corrections contemplates the revocation of an offender's probation only upon the filing by a proper party of a petition charging a violation of a condition of probation."
When interpreting a statute, the court should attempt to ascertain the legislative intent and render it effective. See People v. Dinger, 136 Ill.2d 248, 257, 554 N.E.2d 1376, 1379 (1990); Illinois Power Co. v. Mahin, 72 Ill.2d 189, 194, 381 N.E.2d 222, 224 (1978); Christ Hospital Medical Center v. Illinois Comprehensive Health Insurance Plan, 295 Ill. App.3d 956, 960, 693 N.E.2d 1237, 1240 (1998). The first step is to look at the plain meaning of the words and to construe them in their context.
β’ 3 However, the trial court had no authority to order the State's Attorney's office to file the petition to revoke. Besides violating impartiality ( Pifer, 80 Ill. App.3d at 27), the court's directive violated the principle of separation of powers between the executive and judicial branches of the government ( People v. Dinger (1988), 177 Ill. App.3d 174, 176, aff'd in part (1990), 136 Ill.2d 248, 254-55). Only the prosecutor may initiate the proceeding.
The State has neither the burden of going forward with the evidence nor of proving the desirability of the modification it may be seeking. These views are in accord with the recent decision of the supreme court in People v. Dinger (1990), 136 Ill.2d 248, 257-58, 554 N.E.2d 1376, 1379, wherein the court stated the following: "[M]odification of probation may be made upon the petitioner's showing that there are sufficient reasons to warrant modification of the sentence.
We must construe the phrase βbased on the same actβ in the context of compulsory joinder and not in other situations. See, e.g., People v. Dinger, 136 Ill.2d 248, 257, 144 Ill.Dec. 88, 554 N.E.2d 1376 (1990) (construing specific statutory term in context in which language is used). Indeed, the committee comments observe that βthe requirement of a single prosecution is independent of the problem of the number of convictions which may be obtained.β
Initially, we observe that defendant failed to submit copies of the studies or cite to any other relevant authority as support for his contention and, therefore, the issue is waived. 155 Ill.2d R. 341(e)(7); People v. Dinger, 136 Ill.2d 248, 254 (1990). Nevertheless, we note that our prior decisions which rejected defendant's contention also found the Zeisel and Diamond studies unpersuasive.
The defendant presents these points without the benefit of any argument or analysis, however, and we decline to consider them here. (See People v. Dinger (1990), 136 Ill.2d 248, 254.) We note, however, that they are matters that could have been raised on direct appeal, and to that extent we must deem them waived.
In taking this position, the majority ignores the rudimentary principle that the terms of a statute must be construed in the context in which they appear. ( People v. Dinger (1990), 136 Ill.2d 248, 257.) Following this principle, which is fully applicable to our court rules (134 Ill. 2d R. 2(a), Committee Comments), it is manifest that when Rule 505 referred to a "demand" in the above-quoted passage, it meant the type of demand described in the preceding portions of the rule, namely, a demand which had been filed with the clerk at least five days before the date set for the defendant's appearance.
Thus, we deem the point to be waived. (134 Ill.2d R. 341(e)(7); People v. Dinger (1990), 136 Ill.2d 248, 254.) However, we agree with the trial judge that defendant failed to show that the venire was unconstitutionally selected.
ΒΆ 15 Section 5-6-4(f) of the Unified Code provides "[t]he conditions of probation *** may be modified by the court on motion of the supervising agency or on its own motion or at the request of the offender after notice and a hearing." 730 ILCS 5/5-6-4(f) (West 2012); see also People v. Dinger, 136 Ill. 2d 248, 257, 554 N.E.2d 1376, 1379 (1990) (stating "modification ofprobation may be made upon the petitioner's showing that there are sufficient reasons to warrant modification of the sentence").