Opinion
2014-01-8
The PEOPLE, etc., respondent, v. Ralph DiMASSI, appellant.
Lynn W.L. Fahey, New York, N.Y. (Winston McIntosh and Kendra Hutchinson of counsel), for appellant. Kenneth P. Thompson, District Attorney, Brooklyn, N.Y. (Leonard Joblove, Keith Dolan, and Michael Brenner of counsel), for respondent.
Lynn W.L. Fahey, New York, N.Y. (Winston McIntosh and Kendra Hutchinson of counsel), for appellant. Kenneth P. Thompson, District Attorney, Brooklyn, N.Y. (Leonard Joblove, Keith Dolan, and Michael Brenner of counsel), for respondent.
WILLIAM F. MASTRO, J.P., SHERI S. ROMAN, ROBERT J. MILLER, and SYLVIA O. HINDS–RADIX, JJ.
Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Guzman, J.), rendered July 16, 2010, convicting him of rape in the first degree, criminal sexual act in the first degree, sexual abuse in the first degree, robbery in the first degree, and burglary in the first degree, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence.
ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed.
The defendant's contention that the evidence was legally insufficient to support his conviction of burglary in the first degree is unpreserved for appellate review ( seeCPL 470.05[2]; People v. Hawkins, 11 N.Y.3d 484, 872 N.Y.S.2d 395, 900 N.E.2d 946). In any event, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution ( see People v. Contes, 60 N.Y.2d 620, 621, 467 N.Y.S.2d 349, 454 N.E.2d 932), we find that it was legally sufficient to establish the defendant's guilt of burglary in the first degree beyond a reasonable doubt. Moreover, in fulfilling our responsibility to conduct an independent review of the weight of the evidence ( seeCPL 470.15 [5]; People v. Danielson, 9 N.Y.3d 342, 849 N.Y.S.2d 480, 880 N.E.2d 1), we nevertheless accord great deference to the jury's opportunity to view the witnesses, hear the testimony, and observe demeanor ( see People v. Bleakley, 69 N.Y.2d 490, 495, 515 N.Y.S.2d 761, 508 N.E.2d 672). Upon reviewing the record here, we are satisfied that the verdict of guilt of burglary in the first degree was not against the weight of the evidence ( see People v. Romero, 7 N.Y.3d 633, 826 N.Y.S.2d 163, 859 N.E.2d 902).
The defendant's challenge to the trial court's interested witness charge is unpreserved for appellate review ( seeCPL 470.05[2]; People v. Rivera, 307 A.D.2d 369, 369–370, 762 N.Y.S.2d 828; People v. Brown, 209 A.D.2d 532, 619 N.Y.S.2d 625). In any event, the court's charge in this regard was proper ( see People v. Dees, 45 A.D.3d 602, 603, 845 N.Y.S.2d 115; People v. Varughese, 21 A.D.3d 1126, 1128, 801 N.Y.S.2d 415; People v. Lopez, 1 A.D.3d 458, 459, 767 N.Y.S.2d 778).
The sentence imposed was not excessive ( see People v. Suitte, 90 A.D.2d 80, 455 N.Y.S.2d 675).