Reversal is warranted where there is "a persistent pattern of racial references", the single isolated comment, uttered here, is not enough to justify overturning the jury's determination (People v Glenn, 185 A.D.2d 84, 90-91, cert denied 520 U.S. 1108; see, People v Ali, 158 A.D.2d 460, lv denied 76 N.Y.2d 784; compare, People v Thomas, 129 A.D.2d 596). Moreover, in view of the totality of the evidence, the error was not so prejudicial as to preclude an affirmance (see, People v. Dien, 161 A.D.2d 195, 196, affd 77 N.Y.2d 885; People v. Williams, supra, at 813). On this record, the jury could have found Washington's identification testimony eminently credible.

Testimony elicited by the People about defendant's derogatory racial and sexual reference to the prosecutor on one of the occasions when defendant threatened his ex-girlfriend was properly admitted as part of the People's proof on the intimidation charge, since this testimony completed the narrative and made clear that defendant was referring to the prosecutor, whom defendant did not otherwise identify in that statement. In any event, the testimony was not of an inflammatory nature (People v. Dien, 161 A.D.2d 195, affd 77 N.Y.2d 885). Defendant's challenge to the portion of the People's summation dealing with the same epithet is unpreserved and we decline to review it in the interest of justice. Were we to review this claim, we would reject it.