See People v. Unander, 404 Ill. App. 3d 884, 890 (2010). ¶ 36 Defendant argues that the $5-per-day presentence incarceration credit should be applied against the $25 VCVAF fine, imposed by the trial court pursuant to section 10 of the Violent Crime Victims Assistance Act (Act) (725 ILCS 240/10 (West 2010)). In support of his position, defendant cites People v. Dickey, 2011 IL App (3d) 100397, ¶ 32, in which we applied the $5-per-day presentence incarceration credit against the defendant's VCVAF fine. Id. However, the State correctly asserts that section 10(c) of the Act (725 ILCS 240/10(c) (West 2010)) provides that fines imposed pursuant to the Act are not subject to the presentence incarceration credit.

At this point, a reasonable jury could conclude the danger had ended, and no additional force was necessary, making Flores' subsequent conduct objectively unreasonable, defeating the sixth element. See People v. Dickey, 2011 IL App (3d) 100397, ¶ 15. ¶ 53 We find that Dickey provides helpful guidance on this point.

"The court must determine the actual costs incurred by the victim; a guess is not sufficient." People v. Dickey, 2011 IL App (3d) 100397, ¶ 25, 961 N.E.2d 816. "Restitution should be determined by using the fair market value of the property at the time the property was damaged or destroyed."

Defendant further provides three examples where restitution issues were addressed without any mention of whether the challenge was preserved. People v. Dickey, 2011 IL App (3d) 100397, ¶¶ 25, 27, 961 N.E.2d 816; People v. Hamilton, 198 Ill. App. 3d 108, 114-16, 555 N.E.2d 785, 788-89 (1990), rev'd on other grounds, People v. Williams, 149 Ill. 2d 467, 495, 599 N.E.2d 913, 926 (1992); People v. White, 146 Ill. App. 3d 998, 1002-03, 497 N.E.2d 888, 891-92 (1986).¶ 46 Defendant's laundry list of reasons is unconvincing.

An order that does not comply with section 5-5-6(f) must be remanded for a new hearing and compliance with the statute. People v. Dickey, 2011 IL App (3d) 100397, ¶ 24. ¶ 4 We first turn to defendant's contention that the trial court failed to set forth that it considered whether he had the ability to pay a restitution order. Defendant is correct that the statute expressly makes this a mandatory consideration.

"The court must determine the actual costs incurred by the victim; a guess is not sufficient." People v. Dickey, 2011 IL App (3d) 100397, ¶ 25, 356 Ill.Dec. 427, 961 N.E.2d 816. "Alleged losses which are unsupported by the evidence must not be used as a basis for awarding restitution."

According to the statute's plain language, "the trial court must evaluate the actual costs incurred by the victim and cannot rely on conjecture or speculation as to the amount to be awarded." People v. Birge, 2021 IL 125644, ¶ 48 (citing People v. Dickey, 2011 IL App (3d) 100397, ¶ 25).

" Jones , 206 Ill. App. 3d at 482, 151 Ill.Dec. 489, 564 N.E.2d 944. "The court must determine the actual costs incurred by the victim; a guess is not sufficient." People v. Dickey , 2011 IL App (3d) 100397, ¶ 25, 356 Ill.Dec. 427, 961 N.E.2d 816. Evidence of value can be found in the PSI. Id. ¶ 26.

People v. Lee, 213 Ill. 2d 218, 224-25, 821 N.E.2d 307, 311 (2004); People v. Jeffries, 164 Ill. 2d 104, 127, 646 N.E.2d 587, 597-98 (1995). In order to require the State to disprove a defendant's claim of self-defense, however, the defendant must present at least some evidence of each of the elements of self-defense. Jeffries, 164 Ill. 2d at 127-28, 646 N.E.2d at 598; People v. Dickey, 2011 IL App (3d) 100397, ¶ 14, 961 N.E.2d 816. Those elements are: (1) the defendant was threatened with unlawful force; (2) the defendant was not the aggressor; (3) the danger of harm was imminent; (4) the defendant's use of force was necessary to prevent the threatened harm; (5) the defendant "actually and subjectively" believed both that the danger of harm existed and that the force used was necessary to prevent the threatened harm; and (6) the defendant's beliefs were objectively reasonable.

The VCVA assessment is a creditable fine. People v. Dickey, 2011 IL App (3d) 100397, ¶ 32, 961 N.E.2d 816, 823. The State concedes defendant is entitled to such credit.