MEMORANDUM AND ORDER It is hereby ORDERED that the case is held, the decision is reserved and the matter is remitted to Monroe County Court for further proceedings in accordance with the following memorandum: Defendant appeals from a judgment convicting him, upon his plea of guilty, of manslaughter in the first degree ( Penal Law § 125.20 [1] ). Preliminarily, we note that defendant's "waiver of his right to appeal was invalid ... and, in any event, [would] not bar his contention that [County] Court failed to properly consider youthful offender treatment" ( People v. Dhillon , 143 A.D.3d 734, 735, 39 N.Y.S.3d 181 [2d Dept. 2016] ). On the merits, as the People correctly concede, we agree with defendant that the court erred in determining that he was ineligible for youthful offender status.
Defendant appeals from a judgment convicting him, upon his plea of guilty, of manslaughter in the first degree (Penal Law § 125.20 [1]). Preliminarily, we note that defendant's "waiver of his right to appeal was invalid... and, in any event, [would] not bar his contention that [County] Court failed to properly consider youthful offender treatment" (People v Dhillon, 143 A.D.3d 734, 735 [2d Dept 2016]). On the merits, as the People correctly concede, we agree with defendant that the court erred in determining that he was ineligible for youthful offender status.
It is hereby ORDERED that the case is held, the decision is reserved and the matter is remitted to Monroe County Court for further proceedings in accordance with the following memorandum: Defendant appeals from a judgment convicting him, upon his plea of guilty, of manslaughter in the first degree (Penal Law § 125.20 [1]). Preliminarily, we note that defendant's "waiver of his right to appeal was invalid... and, in any event, [would] not bar his contention that [County] Court failed to properly consider youthful offender treatment" (People v Dhillon, 143 A.D.3d 734, 735 [2d Dept 2016]). On the merits, as the People correctly concede, we agree with defendant that the court erred in determining that he was ineligible for youthful offender status.
Further, to the extent that defendant contends that the court erred in failing to strike certain statements from the PSR, defendant did not meet his burden of establishing that the challenged statements were inaccurate (seePeople v. Washington , 170 A.D.3d 1608, 1610, 95 N.Y.S.3d 707 [4th Dept. 2019], lv denied 33 N.Y.3d 1036, 102 N.Y.S.3d 496, 126 N.E.3d 146 [2019] ).However, we agree with defendant that, as the People correctly concede, the court erred in concluding that defendant was ineligible for youthful offender treatment (seePeople v. Willis , 161 A.D.3d 1584, 1584, 77 N.Y.S.3d 259 [4th Dept. 2018] ; People v. Dhillon , 143 A.D.3d 734, 735, 39 N.Y.S.3d 181 [2d Dept. 2016] ). Inasmuch as "the sentencing court must make ‘a youthful offender determination in every case where the defendant is eligible, even where the defendant fails to request it’ " ( Willis , 161 A.D.3d at 1584, 77 N.Y.S.3d 259, quoting People v. Rudolph , 21 N.Y.3d 497, 501, 974 N.Y.S.2d 885, 997 N.E.2d 457 [2013] ), we therefore again hold the case, reserve decision, and remit the matter to Supreme Court to make and state for the record a determination whether defendant should be afforded youthful offender status (see id. ; Dhillon , 143 A.D.3d at 736, 39 N.Y.S.3d 181 ).
It is hereby ORDERED that the case is held, the decision is reserved and the matter is remitted to Monroe County Court for further proceedings in accordance with the following memorandum: Defendant appeals from a judgment convicting him, upon his plea of guilty, of manslaughter in the first degree (Penal Law § 125.20 [1]). Preliminarily, we note that defendant's "waiver of his right to appeal was invalid... and, in any event, [would] not bar his contention that [County] Court failed to properly consider youthful offender treatment" (People v Dhillon, 143 A.D.3d 734, 735 [2d Dept 2016]). On the merits, as the People correctly concede, we agree with defendant that the court erred in determining that he was ineligible for youthful offender status (see People v Graham, 202 A.D.3d 1482, 1482-1483 [4th Dept 2022]).
We reject defendant's contention that County Court failed to make the necessary determination whether she was eligible for youthful offender treatment. "Although a youth convicted of an armed felony is eligible for youthful offender status only where the court determines that there are mitigating circumstances bearing directly upon the manner in which the crime was committed or that the defendant's participation in the crime was relatively minor" ( People v. Dhillon , 143 A.D.3d 734, 735, 39 N.Y.S.3d 181 [2d Dept. 2016] ; see CPL 720.10 [3] ; People v. Middlebrooks , 25 N.Y.3d 516, 524-526, 14 N.Y.S.3d 296, 35 N.E.3d 464 [2015] ), here, no such determination was required inasmuch as defendant was not convicted of an armed felony and was therefore an eligible youth (see CPL 1.20 [41] ; 720.10 [1], [2] [a] [ii]; People v. Crimm , 140 A.D.3d 1672, 1673, 34 N.Y.S.3d 285 [4th Dept. 2016] ; see alsoPeople v. Meridy , 196 A.D.3d 1, 6, 147 N.Y.S.3d 287 [4th Dept. 2021], lv denied 37 N.Y.3d 973, 150 N.Y.S.3d 698, 172 N.E.3d 810 [2021] ). We further conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant's request for youthful offender status (seePeople v. McDaniels, 19 A.D.3d 1071, 1072, 796 N.Y.S.2d 484 [4th Dept. 2005], lv denied 5 N.Y.3d 830, 804 N.Y.S.2d 45, 837 N.E.2d 744 [2005] ; People v. Weston , 275 A.D.2d 915, 915, 715 N.Y.S.2d 175 [4th Dept. 2000], lv denied 95 N.Y.2d 971, 722 N.Y.S.2d 489, 745 N.E.2d 409 [2000] ) and we decline to grant defendant's request to exer
We reject defendant's contention that County Court failed to make the necessary determination whether she was eligible for youthful offender treatment. "Although a youth convicted of an armed felony is eligible for youthful offender status only where the court determines that there are mitigating circumstances bearing directly upon the manner in which the crime was committed or that the defendant's participation in the crime was relatively minor" (People v Dhillon, 143 A.D.3d 734, 735 [2d Dept 2016]; see CPL 720.10 [3]; People v Middlebrooks, 25 N.Y.3d 516, 524-526 [2015]), here, no such determination was required inasmuch as defendant was not convicted of an armed felony and was therefore an eligible youth (see CPL 1.20 [41]; 720.10 [1], [2] [a] [ii]; People v Crimm, 140 A.D.3d 1672, 1673 [4th Dept 2016]; see also People v Meridy, 196 A.D.3d 1, 6 [4th Dept 2021], lv denied 37 N.Y.3d 973 [2021]). We further conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant's request for youthful offender status (see People v McDaniels, 19 A.D.3d 1071, 1072 [4th Dept 2005], lv denied 5 N.Y.3d 830 [2005]; People v Weston, 275 A.D.2d 915, 915 [4th Dept 2000], lv denied 95 N.Y.2d 971 [2000]) and we decline to grant defendant's request to exercise our interest of justice jurisdiction to afford her that status (see People v Lang, 178 A.D.3d 1362, 1363 [4th Dept
Any misconception by the court during the plea hearing regarding defendant's eligibility for youthful offender status was rectified at sentencing, during which the court explicitly found that defendant was eligible for youthful offender treatment and articulated the correct legal standard in declining to exercise its discretion to afford him such treatment (cf. People v Dhillon, 143 AD3d 734, 734-736 [2d Dept 2016]; People v Crimm, 140 AD3d 1672, 1673-1674 [4th Dept 2016]). Entered: July 17, 2020
Contrary to defendant's contention on the merits, however, County Court did not abuse its discretion in declining to grant him youthful offender status (seePeople v. Nicorvo [Appeal No. 2], 177 A.D.3d 1408, 1409, 114 N.Y.S.3d 541 [4th Dept. 2019] ), and we decline to exercise our interest of justice jurisdiction to adjudicate him a youthful offender (see id. ). Any misconception by the court during the plea hearing regarding defendant's eligibility for youthful offender status was rectified at sentencing, during which the court explicitly found that defendant was eligible for youthful offender treatment and articulated the correct legal standard in declining to exercise its discretion to afford him such treatment (cf.People v. Dhillon , 143 A.D.3d 734, 734-736, 39 N.Y.S.3d 181 [2d Dept. 2016] ; People v. Crimm , 140 A.D.3d 1672, 1673-1674, 34 N.Y.S.3d 285 [4th Dept. 2016] ).
DECISION & ORDER Appeal by the defendant from a resentence of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Stephanie Zaro, J.), imposed March 6, 2017, upon his conviction of manslaughter in the first degree, upon his plea of guilty, after remittitur from this Court for resentencing (see People v Dhillon, 143 AD3d 734), the resentence being a determinate term of imprisonment of 17 years to be followed by 5 years' postrelease supervision. ORDERED that the resentence is modified, as a matter of discretion in the interest of justice, by reducing the determinate term of imprisonment from 17 years to 12 years; as so modified, the resentence is affirmed.