Opinion
4-22-0130
07-06-2022
In re M.L., a Minor v. Devin L., Respondent-Appellant. The People of the State of Illinois, Petitioner-Appellee,
This Order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
Appeal from the Circuit Court of Adams County No. 20JA25 Honorable John C. Wooleyhan, Judge Presiding.
JUSTICE STEIGMANN delivered the judgment of the court. Presiding Justice Knecht and Justice DeArmond concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
STEIGMANN JUSTICE
¶ 1 Held: The appellate court affirmed the trial court's judgment terminating respondent's parental rights because (1) the trial court' did not err by finding respondent unfit because respondent's offer of proof was insufficient to rebut the presumption of depravity raised by her prior felony convictions, (2) the trial court did not consider any inadmissible evidence in reaching its fitness and best interest determinations, and (3) the trial court's finding that it was in the minor's best interest to terminate respondent's parental rights was supported by the evidence.
¶ 2 Respondent, Devin L., is the mother of ML. (born February 2017). In February 2022, the trial court found (1) respondent was an unfit parent and (2) it was in M.L.'s best interest to terminate respondent's parental rights. Respondent appeals, arguing that the trial court erred by (1) not allowing evidence of respondent's conduct after the date the motion for termination of parental rights was filed, (2) taking judicial notice of the entire contents of the court file, and (3) finding that it was in M.L.' s best interest to terminate respondent's parental rights. We disagree and affirm.
¶ 3 I. BACKGROUND
¶ 4 A. Procedural History
¶ 5 In February 2020, the State filed a petition for adjudication of wardship, alleging M.L. was neglected in that her environment was injurious to her welfare due to respondent's drug use. 705 ILCS 405/2-3(1)(b) (West 2018). In particular, the State alleged that (1) a witness observed respondent using methamphetamine around M.L. and (2) respondent was "currently incarcerated in [the] Sangamon County jail" due to federal charges of possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine. That same day, the trial court conducted a shelter care hearing and placed temporary custody with the guardianship administrator of the Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS).
¶ 6 In February 2021, the trial court conducted an adjudicatory hearing and adjudicated M.L. a neglected minor.
¶ 7 Later that month, the trial court conducted a dispositional hearing. The court entered a written order finding that it was in the best interest of M.L. and the public that M.L. be made a ward of the court. The court further found respondent unfit and unable for reasons other than financial circumstances alone to care for, protect, train, educate, supervise, or discipline the minor. The court noted in its dispositional order that the unfitness finding was "due to [respondent's] incarceration." The court placed custody and guardianship of M.L. with the guardianship administrator of DCFS and set the permanency goal as substitute care pending termination of parental rights. The written order also admonished the parents that they must (1) cooperate with DCFS, (2) comply with the terms of the service plan, and (3) correct the conditions that required M.L. to be taken into care or they risked termination of their parental rights.
¶ 8 B. The Termination Hearing
¶ 9 In March 2021, the State filed a motion for termination of respondent's parental rights. The State alleged that respondent was an unfit parent within the meaning of the Adoption Act (750 ILCS 50/1 et seq. (West 2020)) due to her (1) depravity (id. § 1(D) (i)) and (2) repeated incarceration (id. § 1(D)(s)). Specifically, the State alleged (1) respondent "has been criminally convicted of at least 3 felonies under the laws of this State or any other State, or under federal law *** and at least one of these convictions took place within 5 years of the filing of the petition *** seeking termination of parental rights" (id. § 1(D)(i) (depravity)) and (2) "[M.L.] is in the temporary custody *** of [DCFS], [respondent] is incarcerated at the time the petition *** is filed, [respondent] has been repeatedly incarcerated as a result of criminal convictions, and [her] repeated incarceration has prevented [her] from discharging *** her parental responsibilities for the child." Id. § 1(D)(s) (repeated incarceration).
¶ 10 1. The Fitness Proceedings
¶ 11 In February 2022, the trial court conducted the fitness portion of the termination proceedings.
¶ 12 a. The State's Evidence
¶ 13 i. Certified Copies of Conviction
¶ 14 The State offered into evidence four certified copies of conviction for respondent that established the following facts.
(1) In Adams County case No. 99-CF-121, respondent was convicted in July 1999 of possession of a controlled substance and sentenced to probation. She was later resentenced to 18 months in the Illinois Department of Corrections (DOC).
(2) In Adams County case No. 09-CF-268, respondent was convicted in October
2009 of possession of methamphetamine and sentenced to probation. She was later resentenced to drug court probation.
(3) In Adams County case No. 13-CF-259, respondent was convicted in July 2013 of possession of methamphetamine precursors and possession of methamphetamine. Respondent was sentenced to concurrent terms of seven years and five years in DOC.
(4) In United States District Court, Central District of Illinois, case No. 19-30061, respondent was convicted in January 2021 of possession with intent to distribute 50 grams or more of methamphetamine. The offense was committed on August 28, 2019. On January 8, 2021, respondent was sentenced to 87 months in federal prison. On June 11, 2021, respondent's sentence was reduced to "time served plus 72 hours."
¶ 15 The trial court admitted the certified copies of conviction without objection.
¶ 16 ii. Judicial Notice of Court File
¶ 17 Next, the State asked the trial court "to take judicial notice of all pleadings and prior findings in this case, all service plans filed with the court, and all court reports filed in this case[.]"
¶ 18 The court responded, "The Court can take judicial notice of its own records and will take notice of those items contained within this file."
¶ 19 iii. Julie Jones
¶ 20 The State then called Julie Jones as a witness. Jones testified that she was previously employed by Lutheran Child and Family Services (LCFS) and was M.L.'s caseworker from August 2020 to July 2021. Jones testified that, when she received M.L.'s case in August 2020, respondent was incarcerated in the Sangamon County jail for her pending federal charges. Jones stated that in January 2021 respondent advised Jones that respondent had been sentenced to "somewhere between 84 and 87 months" in federal prison, but if she complied with all options for sentence reductions, respondent's earliest "out date" would be March or May of 2023.
¶ 21 Jones testified that, while she was the caseworker, respondent sent cards and letters to M.L. but had no visitation with M.L. "per court order." The prosecutor asked Jones, "And there was no other things [sic] [respondent] could do to discharge her parental duties during that period of time she was incarcerated, is that correct?" Jones answered, "That's correct."
¶ 22 On cross-examination, respondent asked Jones whether, during the time Jones was caseworker, respondent (1) sent cards and letters to M.L., (2) was concerned about M.L.'s welfare, and (3) participated "in every program available to her in order to work on her service plan." Jones answered all three questions affirmatively. (We note that respondent's counsel did not ask Jones any specific questions about which programs respondent participated in.) Respondent's counsel also asked Jones, "[D]id you feel that she was very concerned and a loving mother?" Jones answered, "Based on conversations that I had with her, she appeared to be, yes." Respondent's counsel added, "And while you were on the case, she did everything she could in order to be reunited with [M.L.]?" Jones answered, "Yes."
¶ 23 b. Respondent's Evidence
¶ 24 i. Kasey Gooding
¶ 25 Kasey Gooding testified that she was employed as a child welfare specialist by LCFS. Gooding stated that she was M.L.'s caseworker from September 2021 to the present. During that time, respondent was not incarcerated and was complying with her service plan. Gooding testified that respondent expressed to her that respondent was interested in M.L., loved her daughter, and wanted to do everything she could to be reunited with her daughter. Respondent's counsel asked, "And she was in compliance with the service plan?" Gooding answered, "Yes, until last week." Respondent's counsel continued, "And on November 10th of 2021, in your permanency report did you state that you recommended [the] permanency goal be changed to return home in twelve months?"
¶ 26 The State objected, arguing that everything after the date the motion for termination of parental rights was filed in February 2021 was irrelevant. Respondent's counsel responded as follows:
"Your Honor, I would ask that [Gooding] be allowed to answer. This is alleging depravity. That raises a presumption. That presumption can be rebutted. Certainly, if she was working her service plan and interested in doing everything she could to be reunited with her daughter, that is relevant evidence whether- grounds of depravity."
¶ 27 The trial court ruled as follows on the State's objection:
"Under the statute, the Court can consider those nine-month periods of time starting with the date of adjudication, from then up until the time that the Motion for Termination is filed. In this particular case, the record shows that the date of adjudication was in February of 2021, and then the Motion for Termination was filed in March of 2021. So, I believe we are limited to those things that happened prior to the date of the Motion for Termination being filed. So the objection by [the State] is sustained."
¶ 28 Respondent's counsel pointed out that there was no nine-month period alleged and asked that Gooding be allowed to answer the question. The court responded, "That's what the Court just ruled on, that [the State's] objection is sustained."
¶ 29 Respondent's counsel stated, "I have no further questions[,]" then asked if she could make an offer of proof. The court assented, and respondent's counsel made the following proffer:
"MS. BRENNAN [(RESPONDENT'S COUNSEL)]: As of the report that you made on November 10th, 2021, did you recommend that the permanency goal of return home in twelve months?
MS. GOODING: Yes. My supervisor said that that's what I needed to do since she was out of prison and participating in services.
MS. BRENNAN: And again, on January 18th of 2022 you made a permanency hearing report- MS. GOODING: Yes.
MS. BRENNAN: -that you submitted to this Court? And at that time [respondent] was in compliance with services? MS. GOODING: Yes.
MS. BRENNAN: And at that time you again made that same recommendation that the goal be made return home twelve months? MS. GOODING: Yes.
MS. BRENNAN: I have no further questions.
THE COURT: That was your offer of proof?
MS. BRENNAN: That was my offer of proof.
THE COURT: We can show that in the record as an offer of proof then."
¶ 30 The court asked respondent's counsel if she had any further witnesses, and she responded, "No, Your Honor."
¶ 31 c. The Trial Court's Fitness Ruling
¶ 32 After hearing the arguments of the parties, the trial court found respondent was unfit by reason of (1) depravity and (2) repeated incarceration. When pronouncing its ruling, the court commented that it was "able to take into consideration those time periods which exist between the date of adjudication and the date of the motion being filed in this case." The trial court then recited the evidence against respondent, being four prior felony convictions, starting in 1999 with the most recent being the 2021 federal conviction. Based upon these convictions, the court found that "depravity has been proven by clear and convincing evidence with regard to the number of *** felony convictions, and the most recent one having occurred within five years of the Motion for Termination being filed."
¶ 33 The trial court continued as follows:
"The [repeated incarceration] allegation has also been proven by clear and convincing evidence. The record shows that the mother was incarcerated throughout the life of this case, both before and after the Motion for Termination was filed, and because of that incarceration was unable to have contact with the minor, was unable to do anything with regard to her parental obligations.
There was evidence that during that time that she did send cards, written communication, to the minor. There was evidence that the mother had tried to do what she could at the Department of Corrections to engage in services. There's not any evidence today to show specifically what those services were or what she was able to engage in. The law is clear that under the Juvenile Court Act there is nothing in that statute that provides a procedure for a juvenile case to be put on hold while a parent is incarcerated *** and to wait for that parent to be released to start the
case up again and see if the parent is able to care for the child or provide a placement for the child.
The allegation of depravity does carry with it a rebuttable presumption of that. That is, it can be rebutted if there is evidence to show that perhaps at one time a parent had felony convictions as described in the statute but at some point after those convictions has been able to correct all those convictions and be able to provide a placement for the child. In this case we don't have any of that evidence.
[Respondent] was convicted of the most recent felony in 2021 and was apparently released from that Department of Corrections conviction in 2021, on or about July or August of 2021, and we don't have enough evidence to show because of the restrictions of when the adjudication occurred and when the Motion for Termination was filed to show that there has been any rebuttal of the depravity, which had been proven by the evidence."
¶ 34 2. The Best Interest Proceedings
¶ 35 After finding respondent unfit, the trial court conducted the best interest portion of the termination proceedings.
¶ 36 The State called Gooding as a witness. Gooding testified that M.L. was currently five years old and was placed with "fictive kin." Gooding explained that "fictive kin" means someone who has previously had a relationship with the child. She testified that, in this case," [the foster mother] had worked at the daycare that [M.L.] attended, and they had a relationship, so they used that as a placement." M.L. had been placed with the foster parents since September 2020.
¶ 37 Gooding testified that she monitored the current foster placement twice per month and observed M.L.'s interactions with her foster parents. Gooding testified that M.L. was bonded to her foster parents and the foster parents provided appropriate discipline. She stated that M.L. had no special education needs and all of her educational needs were being met. Gooding further testified that M.L. needed dental surgery and her foster parents took care to ensure all of M.L.'s dental needs were met. Gooding also testified that the foster parents had expressed a willingness to adopt M.L. Gooding testified that it was her opinion that adoption by the foster parents was in M.L.'s best interest.
¶ 38 At the conclusion of the State's direct examination of Gooding, the trial court invited respondent's counsel to inquire, but she stated, "No questions, Your Honor." After the prosecutor stated she had no further evidence, the court asked respondent's counsel if she had any evidence to present, and respondent's counsel answered, "No, Your Honor."
¶ 39 The trial court began its oral ruling by noting that" [t]he evidence today on the issue of the best interest of the minor has been provided by one witness called by the People [.]" The court found that it was in M.L. 's best interest to terminate respondent's parental rights. In reaching this conclusion, the court emphasized that M.L. had been in her current foster placement since September 2020, which was a fictive kin placement, and that M.L. was bonded to her foster parents. The court noted that all of M.L. 's needs were being met there and the home appeared safe and appropriate for M.L. The court acknowledged that respondent had love for M.L. and sent her cards while respondent was incarcerated but due to respondent's inability to carry out her parental duties, there was "little evidence today to show currently *** what the relationship is between [M.L. and respondent]." The court stated it was possible that there "could come a time" when M.L. could possibly be placed with respondent but that was an unknown and the Juvenile Court Act required the court to try to achieve permanency for the minor "as soon as that can be done." The court found that M.L.'s best chance for permanency was through the adoptive foster home and terminated respondent's parental rights.
¶ 40 This appeal followed.
¶ 41 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 42 Respondent appeals, arguing the trial court erred by (1) not allowing evidence of respondent's conduct after the date the motion for termination of parental rights was filed, (2) taking judicial notice of the entire contents of the court file, and (3) finding that it was in M.L. 's best interest to terminate respondent's parental rights. We disagree and affirm.
¶ 43 A. The Parental Fitness Determination
¶ 44 Respondent first argues that the trial court erred by finding respondent unfit because the court did not allow respondent to present evidence of her conduct after filing of the motion for termination of parental rights. Respondent contends that the court's ruling prevented her from (1) rebutting the presumption of depravity raised by the certified copies of her prior felony convictions and (2) establishing that her repeated incarcerations did not prevent her from discharging her parental responsibilities.
¶ 45 "Because each of the statutory grounds of unfitness is independent, the trial court's finding may be affirmed where the evidence supports a finding of unfitness as to any one of the alleged grounds." In re Adoption of P.J.H., 2019 IL App (5th) 190089, ¶ 11, 143 N.E.3d 805. Based on our review of the record, we conclude that the trial court properly found that the State proved the allegation of depravity by clear and convincing evidence. Accordingly, we discuss only that finding.
¶ 46 1. The Applicable Law and Standard of Review
¶ 47 The State must prove unfitness as defined in section 1(D) of the Adoption Act (750 ILCS 50/1(D) (West 2018)) by clear and convincing evidence. In re N.G., 2018 IL 121939, ¶ 28, 115 N.E.3d 102. One of the grounds for unfitness is depravity. 750 ILCS 50/1 (D)(i) (West 2018). Depravity is not defined in the statute but is defined in caselaw as "an inherent deficiency of moral sense and rectitude." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Donald A. G, 221 Ill.2d 234, 240, 850 N.E.2d 172, 175 (2006). "Depravity must be shown to exist at the time of the petition to terminate parental rights, and the acts constituting depravity *** must be of sufficient duration and of sufficient repetition to establish a 'deficiency' in moral sense and either inability or an unwillingness to conform to accepted morality." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re A.M., 358 Ill.App.3d 247, 253, 831 N.E.2d 648, 654 (2005).
¶ 48 The statute provides that a rebuttable presumption that a parent is depraved arises if (1) the parent has been criminally convicted of at least three felonies under state or federal law and (2) at least one of these convictions took place within five years of the filing of the petition for termination of parental rights. 750 ILCS 50/1 (D)(i) (West 2020).
¶ 49 A parent may rebut the depravity presumption with evidence of rehabilitation. In re Shanna W., 343 Ill.App.3d 1155, 1167, 799 N.E.2d 843, 851-52 (2003); In re J.A., 316 Ill.App.3d 553, 563, 736 N.E.2d 678, 687 (2000). "If a strong presumption arises, the weight of the evidence brought in to rebut it must be great." J.A., 316 Ill.App.3d at 563.
¶ 50 A determination of parental unfitness involves factual findings and credibility determinations that the trial court is in the best position to make because "the trial court's opportunity to view and evaluate the parties *** is superior." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re M.I., 2016 IL 120232, ¶ 21, 77 N.E.3d 69. A trial court's finding of parental unfitness will not be reversed unless it is against the manifest weight of the evidence. N.G., 2018 IL 121939, ¶ 29. A decision is against the manifest weight of the evidence when the opposite conclusion is clearly apparent. Id.
¶ 51 2. This Case
¶ 52 In the present case, the State's presentation of four certified copies of conviction for methamphetamine-related offenses between 1999 and 2021 was sufficient to raise a strong presumption of depravity. Respondent's convictions for methamphetamine-related offenses were numerous and spanned a twenty-year period. We note that respondent was convicted not only of mere possession of methamphetamine, but also possession of methamphetamine precursors and possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine. These convictions indicate that respondent not only used methamphetamine but was also involved in its production and distribution. Notably, respondent committed her most recent (and arguably most serious) offense-possession with intent to distribute 50 grams or more of methamphetamine-in August 2019, when M.L. was only two and a half years old.
¶ 53 Respondent argues that the trial court erred by preventing her from presenting evidence of her conduct after she was released from prison in June 2021. She contends that, had the court permitted such evidence, she would have rebutted the presumption of depravity and the court would not have found her to be unfit. We disagree.
¶ 54 Respondent provides no authority holding that a trial court should consider evidence of a parent's conduct between the date of the filing of the motion for termination and the date of the fitness portion of the termination proceedings when determining if a parent is depraved. Respondent correctly cites In re Gwynne P., 215 Ill.2d 340, 358, 830 N.E.2d 508, 519 (2005), for the proposition that the time period for considering whether a parent is unfit due to her repeated incarceration under section D(1)(s) extends to the time the of the hearing on the termination petition. However, Gwynne P. applies only to section D(1) (s) of the Adoption Act, which concerns a parent's unfitness due to her repeated incarceration and does not apply to section D(1)(i), which concerns a parent's unfitness due to her depravity. Respondent provides no authority holding that the time period for considering an allegation of depravity under section D(1) (i) extends to the time of the hearing on the termination petition. Nor were we able to locate any such authority.
¶ 55 However, this question need not be answered to resolve respondent's case because, even if we assumed the trial court erred by prohibiting Gooding from testifying about her November 2021 permanency report, respondent's offer of proof was insufficient to rebut the presumption of depravity.
¶ 56 As an initial matter, we commend respondent's counsel for following the proper procedure and making an offer of proof to preserve the alleged error for review. "When *** a [party] claims on appeal that the trial court improperly barred some defense evidence, he must provide the reviewing court with an adequate offer of proof as to what the excluded evidence would have been." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) People v. Forrest, 2015 IL App (4th) 130621, ¶ 34, 40 N.E.3d 477." [A]n offer of proof serves dual purposes: (1) it discloses to the court and opposing counsel the nature of the offered evidence, thus enabling the court to take appropriate action, and (2) it provides the reviewing court with an adequate record to determine whether the trial court's action was erroneous." Forrest, 2015 IL App (4th) 130621, ¶ 34.
¶ 57 In this case, respondent's offer of proof did not prompt the prosecution to withdraw its objection or the trial court to change its ruling, but the offer of proof does permit this court to determine if the trial court erred by excluding the evidence and finding respondent depraved. Having considered the evidence respondent would have presented had the court overruled the State's objection to Gooding's testimony, we conclude that (1) respondent's evidence would have been insufficient to rebut the strong presumption of depravity raised by the State and (2) the trial court did not err by finding respondent to be depraved.
¶ 58 Respondent's offer of proof established only that (1) after being released from prison, respondent was "in compliance with her service plan" and (2) in a November 2021 permanency report, Gooding recommended a "return home in 12 months" permanency goal because she was required to do so by her supervisor. Respondent's offer of proof did not contain any evidence of the substance of the service plan or what exactly respondent was doing to be in compliance with the plan.
¶ 59 We contrast respondent's offer of proof with the evidence presented in J. A., 316 Ill.App.3d at 563, which respondent cites in support of her argument and in which the respondent father successfully rebutted the presumption of depravity. In J.A., the trial court received evidence of a (1) negative drug test and (2) substance abuse evaluation that showed the respondent did not have a problem with substance abuse, despite his most recent felony conviction being a narcotics offense. Id. at 559. Moreover, (1) the respondent presented evidence that he held regular employment, (2) he testified about the circumstances behind each of his three felony convictions and took responsibility for his actions, (3) his wife and older son testified positively on his behalf, and (4) he visited with his child more frequently than the service plan required. Id. at 558-59.
¶ 60 Although there is no fixed measurement for the amount or quality of evidence a parent must present to rebut a presumption of depravity, and every case must be scrutinized closely on its own facts, we can easily say that in the present case, respondent's offer of proof comes nowhere close to rebutting the presumption of depravity raised by the State. Respondent's offer of proof simply established that respondent was in compliance with a service plan and Gooding changed the permanency goal to return home because respondent's release from incarceration and participation in services required Gooding to do so. Respondent offered no evidence of what that service plan required. Respondent offered no evidence of negative drug tests, the completion of a substance abuse evaluation, completion of any recommended treatment, or the frequency or quality of her visits with M.L., if any.
¶ 61 In short, respondent's offer of proof contained no evidence of rehabilitation that, if considered, would rebut the strong presumption raised by respondent's lengthy history of methamphetamine offenses, and the trial court did not err by finding respondent unfit by reason of depravity.
¶ 62 B. Judicial Notice of the Contents of the Court File
¶ 63 Next, respondent argues that the trial court erred by taking judicial notice of the contents of the court file. The State correctly argues that respondent failed to preserve this issue for review by raising a contemporaneous objection or raising it in a posttrial motion. In re Madison H., 215 Ill.2d 364, 378-79, 830 N.E.2d 498, 507 (2005). Respondent does not request plain error review. However, forfeiture is a limitation on the parties, not this court, and we briefly discuss the merits of this argument because this court recently addressed this precise issue in In re M.D., 2022 IL App (4th) 210288.
¶ 64 In M.D., this court explained that "a court may properly consider matters of record in its own proceedings, including its own orders" (id. ¶ 80), "[b]ut the evidence underlying those orders-particularly evidence from the permanency hearings-may not be considered by the court at the fitness portion of the termination proceedings." Id. ¶ 81. This is so because the information in a permanency report contains hearsay, which is not admissible at a fitness hearing. Id. ¶ 82.
¶ 65 Accordingly, we agree with respondent that the trial court erred by taking judicial notice of the entire contents of the court file. However, like in M.D., respondent does not demonstrate that the trial court in the present case actually considered or relied upon any materials from the court file in reaching its fitness or best interest determinations. Respondent argues merely that, based on the court's brief exchange with the State (see supra ¶¶ 16-18), "the Court could have considered inadmissible evidence." (Emphasis added.) She points to no comment showing that the court did consider admissible evidence. Accordingly, respondent fails to demonstrate that she was prejudiced in any way. After reviewing the record as a whole, we conclude that the trial court considered only evidence properly admitted at the fitness and best interest hearings in reaching its conclusion.
¶ 66 Although the trial court's error had no effect on the outcome of these proceedings, we urge courts presiding over juvenile abuse and neglect proceedings and all counsel litigating abuse and neglect proceedings to consider this court's lengthy guide provided in M.D., 2022 IL App (4th) 210288, ¶¶ 50-88, regarding the proper procedure (and reasons therefor) for taking judicial notice in such proceedings in order to avoid this issue's arising on appeal.
¶ 67 C. The Best-Interest Determination
¶ 68 Last, respondent argues that the trial court erred by finding it was in M.L.'s best interest to terminate respondent's parental rights.
¶ 69 1. The Applicable Law and Standard of Review
¶ 70 At the best-interest stage of a termination proceeding, the State bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that termination of parental rights is in the child's best interest. In re C.P., 2019 IL App (4th) 190420, ¶ 71, 145 N.E.3d 605. In reaching a best-interest determination, the trial court must consider, within the context of the child's age and developmental needs, the following factors:
"(1) the child's physical safety and welfare; (2) the development of the child's identity; (3) the child's familial, cultural[,] and religious background and ties; (4) the child's sense of attachments, including love, security, familiarity, continuity
See also 705 ILCS 405/1-3(4.05) (West 2020).of affection, and the least disruptive placement alternative; (5) the child's wishes and long-term goals; (6) the child's community ties; (7) the child's need for permanence, including the need for stability and continuity of relationships with parent figures and siblings; (8) the uniqueness of every family and child; (9) the risks related to substitute care; and (10) the preferences of the person available to care for the child." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re J.B., 2019 IL App (4th) 190537, ¶ 32, 147 N.E.3d 953.
¶ 71 A reviewing court affords great deference to a trial court's best-interest finding because the trial court is in the superior position to view the witnesses and judge their credibility. C.P., 2019 IL App (4th) 190420, ¶ 71. An appellate court "will not disturb the trial court's decision regarding a child's best interests *** unless it is against the manifest weight of the evidence." Id. ¶ 68. A best-interest determination is against the manifest weight of the evidence only when the opposite conclusion is clearly the proper result. Id.
¶ 72 2. This Case
¶ 73 Respondent argues that at the time of the best interest hearing, respondent had been out of prison for seven months and "the Court prevented testimony regarding what M.L.'s life would look like if she were placed with [respondent]." (Respondent refers to the trial court's sustaining the prosecutor's objection to Gooding's testimony at the fitness hearing; she does not contend that the court made a separate evidentiary ruling at the best interest hearing.) Accordingly, respondent argues, the court did not make an informed decision about the best placement for M.L. because it did not consider "all viable options."
¶ 74 Respondent's argument ignores that the fitness and best interest portions of the termination proceedings are bifurcated proceedings, with the fitness and best interest portions of the proceedings addressing different legal issues, burdens of proof, and rules of evidence. M.D., 2022 IL App (4th) 210288, ¶¶ 73-76.
¶ 75 In the present case, the trial court did not prevent respondent from presenting evidence during the best interest proceedings. Instead, respondent failed to call any witness, present any evidence, or even cross-examine the sole witness called by the State.
¶ 76 The trial court's best interest finding was supported by evidence that M.L. (1) was bonded to her foster parents, (2) living in a safe and appropriate home that met her physical, emotional, and educational needs, and (3) the foster parents offered permanency through adoption. Importantly, M.L. lived in her foster home nearly half her life and had a previous relationship with her foster mother.
¶ 77 In contrast, M.L. had been out of her mother's custody for two years. While respondent was incarcerated, M.L. received letters and cards but had no in-person visits. The trial court acknowledged that respondent loved M.L., but also observed that there was little evidence of what M.L.'s life would be like in her mother's care. The court correctly declined to trade M.L.'s opportunity for permanency through adoption for "some other unknown possible outcome." Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court did not err by finding that termination of respondent's parental rights was in M.L.'s best interests.
¶ 78 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 79 For the reasons stated, we affirm the trial court's judgment.
¶ 80 Affirmed.