Opinion
4-23-0230 4-23-0231 4-23-0232 423-0233 4-23-0234
06-13-2023
In re A.W., Zam. C., Zac. C., E.C., and T.J., Minors v. Destiny M., Respondent-Appellant). (The People of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee,
This Order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
Appeal from the Circuit Court of Peoria County Nos. 22JA193, 22JA194, 22JA195, 22JA196, 22JA197 Honorable Derek G. Ashbury, Judge Presiding.
JUSTICE LANNERD delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Steigmann and Doherty concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
LANNERD, JUSTICE
¶ 1 Held: The appellate court granted appellate counsel's motion to withdraw and affirmed, concluding no issue of arguable merit could be raised on appeal.
¶ 2 In November 2022, the State filed petitions against respondent, Destiny M., alleging her children, A.W., Zam. C., Zac. C., E.C., and T.J. were neglected because respondent shot at one of the children and then left the loaded gun in a place accessible to them. Respondent filed an answer stipulating the State could call witnesses who would support the allegations in the petition. However, respondent denied intentionally shooting the gun at A.W. and alleged it accidentally discharged.
¶ 3 On January 11, 2023, the trial court, noting the stipulations, set the matter for a hearing. After the hearing, the court found the State proved respondent shot the gun in the direction of A.W., which was the only allegation in dispute. Respondent did not object to any evidence proving the remainder of the allegations. Other than requesting to combine services with a single counselor, respondent did not object to any recommended services and agreed to the overall disposition. The court entered an order finding the children neglected and entered a separate agreed order making the children wards of the court and placing their custody with the Illinois Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS).
¶ 4 Respondent appealed. This court appointed counsel to represent respondent. Counsel filed a motion to withdraw pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), arguing respondent's appeal presents no potentially meritorious issues for review. This court gave respondent the opportunity to respond to the motion, and respondent did not file a response. We grant the motion to withdraw and affirm the trial court's judgment.
¶ 5 I. BACKGROUND
¶ 6 On November 1, 2022, the State filed a single-count petition in each case, alleging the children were neglected under section 2-3(1)(b) of the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (Juvenile Court Act) (705 ILCS 405/2-3(1)(b) (West 2022)), in that their environment was injurious to their welfare. Other than the names of the children's fathers, the allegations in each petition were the same.
¶ 7 The State alleged, on October 28, 2022, respondent became angry when A.W. did not want to go to school, and respondent shot a gun at him in the living room of their home. The bullet pierced a wall and lodged in a neighboring home. The State claimed two of the other children were present and respondent left the gun fully loaded in an area accessible to all the children. Additionally, the State asserted respondent had previously been indicated by DCFS for inadequate supervision and for "substantial risk of physical injury/environment." It was noted A.W. had previously been adjudicated delinquent and was on probation. The State also maintained respondent had a history of domestic violence with the father of one of the children. This court does not need to address the additional allegations concerning the fathers of the children because they are not at issue in this appeal. The trial court placed temporary guardianship of the children with DCFS.
¶ 8 On January 11, 2023, the trial court held a hearing, during which respondent's counsel advised respondent would stipulate to the petition. Respondent stated her understanding of the meaning of a stipulation. The court set a hearing for February 23, 2023.
¶ 9 On January 12, 2023, respondent filed an answer stating, in part, the following:
"Respondent stipulates that the State would call witnesses at Adjudication who would support the allegations contained in [the petition] but does not stipulate to any proffer beyond what has been specifically alleged. However [respondent] denies she shot the gun at the minor [A.W.] and affirmatively states that the gun accidentally discharged."
¶ 10 At the hearing, the trial court again noted the stipulation, and the State presented evidence concerning the issue of whether respondent intentionally fired the gun. Peoria police officer Zachary O'Connor testified he responded to a call from A.W. reporting respondent shot at him. Respondent denied shooting the gun. Instead, respondent maintained she argued with A.W, who was able to get the gun and fire a round. However, respondent changed her story concerning the direction she and A.W. were facing in the home. O'Connor opined respondent's story "wasn't really adding up" and noted, based on respondent's information, A.W would have had to grab the gun and extend it to his right behind him to shoot the round into the neighboring house. Security camera video showed A.W. at the front door during the argument holding only a phone when the shot was fired. Another officer, Brandon Kientzle, provided similar testimony. Respondent did not object to the admission of exhibits establishing the remainder of the State's allegations. The court found the children neglected and proceeded instanter to the dispositional hearing.
¶ 11 The State recommended it was in the best interests of the children to be made wards of the State, with DCFS named guardian, and the State outlined suggested services. Respondent's counsel agreed with the State's recommendations but asked that, instead of multiple classes, the trial court consider an individual counselor who could try to address the multiple issues. Counsel then suggested "we come back in six months." The State indicated its agreement. The court noted the parties' agreement. The court asked respondent if she agreed, and respondent stated she did. The court found respondent's consent to the agreement was knowing and voluntary. The same day, the court entered orders finding the children neglected and entered a separate "agreed dispositional order" in each case, finding respondent unfit and ordering the children to be made wards of the court.
¶ 12 Respondent appealed, contending the findings of the trial court were against the manifest weight of the evidence. This court appointed counsel to represent respondent. The cases were consolidated for appeal.
¶ 13 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 14 Appellate counsel moves to withdraw. Counsel supports her motion with a memorandum of law providing a statement of facts, a discussion of potential claims, and arguments why those issues lack arguable merit. Notice of counsel's request to withdraw was sent to respondent's last known address. This court advised respondent she had until May 23, 2023, to respond to the motion, and respondent did not file a response.
¶ 15 Counsel submits it would be frivolous to argue the trial court erred in finding the children neglected. We agree.
¶ 16 The Juvenile Court Act (705 ILCS 405/1-1 et seq. (West 2022)) governs petitions for adjudication of wardship and outlines a "two-step process a trial court must employ in deciding whether a minor should be made a ward of the court." In re Jay. H., 395 Ill.App.3d 1063, 1068, 918 N.E.2d 284, 288 (2009). Step one requires the trial court to hold an adjudicatory hearing, where the court shall first consider only the question of whether the minor is abused, neglected, or dependent. Jay. H., 395 Ill.App.3d at 1068; 705 ILCS 405/2-18(1) (West 2022). If the court answers the first question in the affirmative, i.e., the minor is an abused, neglected, or dependent child, the court must move to step two-the dispositional hearing. In re A.P., 2012 IL 113875, ¶ 21, 981 N.E.2d 336; 705 ILCS 405/2-21(2) (West 2022).
¶ 17 Neglect cases are" sui generis, and must be decided on the basis of their unique circumstances." In re Arthur H., 212 Ill.2d 441, 463, 819 N.E.2d 734, 747 (2004); see also A.P., 2012 IL 113875, ¶ 24 ("[W]here neglect is alleged, each case is to be decided on its particular facts."). Our supreme court has repeatedly emphasized the "fact-driven nature of neglect and injurious environment rulings." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) A.P., 2012 IL 113875, ¶ 17. While the term "injurious environment" is an "amorphous concept that cannot be defined with particularity," the term "has been interpreted to include the breach of a parent's duty to ensure a safe and nurturing shelter for his or her children." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) A.P., 2012 IL 113875, ¶ 22.
¶ 18 After the trial court determines a minor is neglected, the court moves to the second step, which is the dispositional hearing. 705 ILCS 405/2-21(2) (West 2022). At this hearing, the court ascertains the necessary further actions required in the best interests of the minor. In re April C., 326 Ill.App.3d 225, 237, 760 N.E.2d 85, 95 (2001). The court's ruling must "determine the proper disposition best serving the health, safety[,] and interests of the minor and the public." 705 ILCS 405/2-22(1) (West 2022).
¶ 19 On review, we will reverse a trial court's order if the findings are against the manifest weight of the evidence. In re T.B., 215 Ill.App.3d 1059, 1062, 574 N.E.2d 893, 896 (1991). "The finding of the trial court is against the manifest weight of the evidence if a review of the record clearly demonstrates that the proper result is the one opposite that reached by the trial court." In re M.K., 271 Ill.App.3d 820, 826, 649 N.E.2d 74, 79 (1995).
¶ 20 The State has the burden of proving the allegations of neglect by a preponderance of the evidence. A.P., 2012 IL 113875, ¶ 17. However, "a respondent parent's stipulation of facts can provide a sufficient basis by itself for a trial court's finding of neglect." In re R.B., 336 Ill.App.3d 606, 618, 784 N.E.2d 400, 410 (2003). "A stipulation, or a judicial admission, is an agreement between the parties or their attorneys with respect to business before the court." Lee v. Chicago Transit Authority, 152 Ill.2d 432, 462, 605 N.E.2d 493, 505-06 (1992). "It has the effect of withdrawing a fact from issue and dispensing wholly with the need for proof of that fact." Lee, 152 Ill.2d at 462 . "In other words, if a fact is judicially admitted, the adverse party has no need to submit any evidence on that point. The admission serves as a substitute for proof at trial." People v. Wright, 2012 IL App (1st) 073106, ¶ 92, 971 N.E.2d 549.
¶ 21 Here, except for disputing that she intentionally fired the gun, respondent stipulated to the State's factual basis showing neglect, which the State recited in open court at the adjudicatory hearing without objection from respondent. Moreover, the State also presented evidence that respondent intentionally fired the gun at A.W. and proved her assertion it was accidentally discharged was not credible. Security video showed A.W. standing near the door during the argument with only a phone in his hand at the time the shot was fired. Respondent then agreed to the recommendations proposed at the dispositional hearing concerning placement of the children with DCFS and engaging in services to allow her to regain parental fitness. Thus, after considering defendant's stipulation, the evidence provided at the dispositional hearing, and respondent's agreement to the recommended disposition and services, we conclude the trial court's determination the children were neglected and should be made wards of the court was not against the manifest weight of the evidence.
¶ 22 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 23 After examining the record, the motion to withdraw, and the memorandum of law, we agree with counsel that this appeal presents no issue of arguable merit. Accordingly, we grant the motion to withdraw as appellate counsel and affirm the trial court's judgment.
¶ 24 Affirmed.