Opinion
March 9, 1998
Appeal from the Supreme Court, Kings County (Brill, J.).
Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.
The defendant was convicted of various crimes arising from the theft of the complainant's automobile. The defendant contends that reversible error took place because the prosecutor mischaracterized the defense theory of the case by arguing on summation that the defendant's guilt of criminal possession of stolen property was "undisputed". However, the defendant's claim is not supported by the record, which reveals that the defense strategy was to concede that the defendant had committed larceny by taking the complainant's automobile, but to deny that force had been used to accomplish the theft. Under these circumstances, the prosecutor's remarks were fair comment on the defense trial strategy ( see, People v. Ashwal, 39 N.Y.2d 105, 109; cf., People v. Levy, 202 A.D.2d 242).
In addition, there is no merit to the defendant's claim that the trial court's charge on reasonable doubt diluted the burden of proof. It was not error for the court to instruct the jurors that if they were "satisfied that in entertaining such a doubt [they were] acting as a reasonable person should act in a matter of this importance, then that is a `reasonable doubt'" ( see, 1 CJ[NY] 6. 20; People v. Hill, 154 A.D.2d 887; see also, People v. Johnson, 245 A.D.2d 570).
The defendant's remaining contention is without merit.
Bracken, J. P., Rosenblatt, Krausman and Goldstein, JJ., concur.