People v. Depaula

17 Citing cases

  1. People v. Liggins

    64 A.D.3d 1213 (N.Y. App. Div. 2009)   Cited 13 times

    The reported argument does not establish a "direct relationship" between defendant's apartment and the purported emergency ( id. at 179). To the contrary, it is undisputed that the shell casings were found outside the building, that defendant's apartment is on the third floor, and that no individual was observed entering the apartment after the shots were fired ( cf. People v Love, 84 NY2d 917, 918-919; People v Stevens, 57 AD3d 1515; People v Parker, 299 AD2d 859; Matter of Pablo C., 220 AD2d 235; People v DePaula, 179 AD2d 424, 426). Because the warrantless intrusion into defendant's apartment was not justified under the emergency exception to the warrant requirement ( see generally Mitchell, 39 NY2d at 177), the evidence seized as the result of that intrusion, including the evidence seized pursuant to the search warrant that was subsequently issued, should have been suppressed ( see Guins, 165 AD2d at 553).

  2. People v. Liggins

    16 N.Y.3d 748 (N.Y. 2011)   Cited 4 times

    In my view this was error. As the dissent at the Appellate Division pointed out: "In recognizing the danger of delayed response, the law does not require adherence to a standard which made stricter by hindsight would preclude the police from all courses of conduct but the least intrusive" ( 64 AD3d at 1216 [internal quotation marks omitted], quoting People v DePaula, 179 AD2d 424, 426 [1st Dept 1992] and People v Calhoun, 49 NY2d 398, 403). As noted in People v DePaula ( 179 AD2d 424, 426): "[I]t is difficult to conceive of what other action, consistent with their belief that someone inside [defendant's apartment] might be injured or threatened, could have been taken [by the officer] to provide immediate assistance."

  3. People v. Love

    204 A.D.2d 97 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994)   Cited 22 times

    Defendant was on the bed. We agree with the hearing court that the requirements of the emergency doctrine were satisfied, justifying the officers' warrantless entry into the room, and the resulting denial of defendant's motion to suppress the contraband (see, People v Mitchell, 39 N.Y.2d 173, 177-178, cert denied 426 U.S. 953). Contrary to the conclusion reached by the dissent, this case is not appreciably different from People v. DePaula ( 179 A.D.2d 424). In People v. DePaula (supra, at 426), it was stated that the "nature and specificity of the call, the speed with which the officers responded (thereby increasing the chances that the danger still existed) and their reception by defendant, together constituted a valid basis for an objective belief that an emergency situation existed".

  4. People v. Gibson

    117 A.D.3d 1317 (N.Y. App. Div. 2014)   Cited 21 times

    denied93 N.Y.2d 901, 689 N.Y.S.2d 714, 711 N.E.2d 990 [1999];People v. Love, 204 A.D.2d 97, 98, 610 N.Y.S.2d 958 [1994],affd.84 N.Y.2d 917, 620 N.Y.S.2d 809, 644 N.E.2d 1365 [1994];People v. DePaula, 179 A.D.2d 424, 426, 579 N.Y.S.2d 10 [1992];cf. People v. Stevens, 57 A.D.3d 1515, 1516, 871 N.Y.S.2d 525 [2008],lv.

  5. People v. Theodore

    114 A.D.3d 814 (N.Y. App. Div. 2014)   Cited 22 times
    In Theodore, the Appellate Division held that a blocked-off rear yard was part of the curtilage, far different facts from the case at bar.

    tes Supreme Court has determined that the second prong regarding the subjective intent of the police is no longer relevant under the Fourth Amendment ( see Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 404–405, 126 S.Ct. 1943, 164 L.Ed.2d 650). However, we need not decide whether the second prong of Mitchell is still viable under the New York Constitution because we conclude that the People did not satisfy the third prong of Mitchell (see People v. Doll, 21 N.Y.3d 665, 671 n. 1, 975 N.Y.S.2d 721, 998 N.E.2d 384;People v. Dallas, 8 N.Y.3d 890, 891, 832 N.Y.S.2d 893, 865 N.E.2d 1;People v. Rodriguez, 77 A.D.3d at 284, 907 N.Y.S.2d 294). There was no basis for believing that there was any “direct relationship” or “nexus” between the report of the fire and 123–09 Sutphin Boulevard ( see People v. Mitchell, 39 N.Y.2d at 179, 383 N.Y.S.2d 246, 347 N.E.2d 607;People v. Alster, 28 A.D.3d 490, 491, 811 N.Y.S.2d 784). The child caller reported the location of the fire as 123–06 Rockaway Boulevard ( see People v. DePaula, 179 A.D.2d 424, 579 N.Y.S.2d 10). Although the location Detective Anderson responded to, 123–06 Sutphin Boulevard, had the same number as the address reported, the two street names were not similar ( cf. United States v. Huebner, 125 Fed.Appx. 767). At that location, Detective Anderson did not find a fire or even a residence, only a vacant lot. Detective Anderson decided to continue his investigation across the street from the vacant lot at the defendant's home at 123–09 Sutphin Boulevard simply because it was closest in proximity to the vacant lot, but, again, he found no evidence of smoke or a fire.

  6. People v. Demartino

    82 A.D.3d 1260 (N.Y. App. Div. 2011)

    The Supreme Court properly denied that branch of the defendant's omnibus motion which was to suppress physical evidence seized as a result of a warrantless search of the defendant's home ( see People v Rodriguez, 77 AD3d 280, 287). The record supports the Supreme Court's determination that the warrantless entry into the home was justified by a reasonable belief by the police that an emergency situation required their immediate assistance ( see People v Molnar, 98 NY2d 328; People v Mitchell, 39 NY2d 173, cert denied 426 US 953; People v Rodriguez, 77 AD3d at 287; People v Desmarat, 38 AD3d 913; People v Manning, 301 AD2d 661; People v DePaula, 179 AD2d 424). Moreover, the Supreme Court properly denied suppression of certain evidence later seized from the defendant's garage pursuant to a search warrant.

  7. People v. Rodriguez

    77 A.D.3d 280 (N.Y. App. Div. 2010)   Cited 37 times
    Holding that warrantless entry of third-floor apartment to search for additional victims was reasonable where, responding to a report of a stabbing on the fifth floor of an apartment complex, the officer was told by the victim that he did not reside at the complex and had been attacked for no apparent reason on the fifth floor, but there was a blood trail leading to the door of an apartment on the third floor where no one responded to the officer's knocks

    For a reviewing court, the difficulty is that, detached from the tension and drama of the moment, it must engage in reflection and hindsight in balancing the exigencies of the situation against the rights of the accused ( id.). Critical to our determination, as the hearing court acknowledged, is that the defendant, after being stabbed, ran up to the fifth floor and, once the police arrived, was acting evasively as to whether he lived in the building ( see People v DePaula, 179 AD2d 424, 426 [where the police responded to a specific apartment based on a call informing them that shots were fired, their apprehension that the defendant, who answered the door, or another person, was armed, or that someone inside might be hurt, was heightened by the manner in which he refused them entry]; see also Matter of Pablo C., 220 AD2d 235 [where the police responded to a call informing them that shots were fired and were directed to the respondent's apartment, who refused them entry, and a man fled from that apartment via the fire escape and was apprehended but refused to answer questions, the police's warrantless entry was justified by the emergency at hand]; People v Carby, 198 AD2d 366 [where the police responded to a call informing them of shots fired at the subject residence and, upon inquiry, the defendant denied hearing any gunshots, that "denial heightened the officers' suspicions"]). Once Hennessy learned that the defendant did in fact live in the building, his suspicion, as

  8. Wheeler v. State

    956 So. 2d 517 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007)   Cited 9 times
    Finding the brunt of the findings of fact supported by competent, substantial evidence, requiring affirmance of the factual findings

    " Id. Other courts have also held that an anonymous 911 report of a grave threat to safety can provide the basis for the entry of a home, see State v. Torres, 201 Or.App. 275, 118 P.3d 268 (2005); see also People v. DePaula, 179 A.D.2d 424, 579 N.Y.S.2d 10 (N.Y.App.Div. 1992); State v. Boggess, 115 Wis.2d 443, 340 N.W.2d 516 (1983); or an investigatory detention, see People v. Dolly, 40 Cal.4th 458, 53 Cal.Rptr.3d 803, 150 P.3d 693 (2007); State v. Prendergast, 103 Hawai'i 451, 83 P.3d 714 (2004); State v. Golotta, 178 N.J. 205, 837 A.2d 359 (2003). The Supreme Court of New Jersey stated that "the State stands on firm constitutional ground when it treats the anonymous 9-1-1 caller in the same fashion as it would an identified citizen informant who alerts the police to an emergent situation."

  9. Commonwealth v. Hopson

    Record No. 0569-05-1 (Va. Ct. App. Sep. 6, 2005)

    If probable cause were required, "there would be no purpose for the emergency exception." People v. DePaula, 179 A.D.2d 424, 426 (N.Y.App.Div. 1992). The neighbor making the call was not truly anonymous as Hopson claims.

  10. People v. Salazar

    290 A.D.2d 256 (N.Y. App. Div. 2002)   Cited 14 times

    Defendant's suppression motion was properly denied. The court properly found that the warrantless entry into defendant's apartment, which resulted in the seizure of two knives in plain view, was justified under the emergency doctrine (see, People v. Mitchell, 39 N.Y.2d 173, 177-178;People v. DePaula, 179 A.D.2d 424), based on the totality of the information available to the officers concerning defendant's violent conduct, threats and disturbed mental condition. This information came from an identified victim-witness, from persons encountered by the officers on the street outside defendant's window, and from the officers' own observations.