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People v. Dennis

Illinois Appellate Court, Fifth District
Oct 27, 2023
2023 Ill. App. 5th 220419 (Ill. App. Ct. 2023)

Opinion

5-22-0419

10-27-2023

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ROBERT J. DENNIS, Defendant-Appellant.


This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).

Appeal from the Circuit Court of Jackson County. No. 16-CF-450 Honorable Joseph M. Leberman, Judge, presiding.

JUSTICE MOORE delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Cates and McHaney concurred in the judgment.

ORDER

MOORE JUSTICE

¶ 1 Held: Defendant was not prejudiced by not having counsel during a period when the court entertained a bona fide doubt of his fitness, he did not unequivocally waive counsel at a later hearing after counsel was reappointed, the evidence overwhelmingly supported the court's finding that he had been restored to fitness, there was no objective basis for defendant's alleged belief that he would have to serve only 50% of his first-degree murder sentence, and counsel filed a certificate in compliance with Rule 604(d). As any argument to the contrary would lack merit, we grant defendant's appointed counsel on appeal leave to withdraw and affirm the circuit court's judgment.

¶ 2 Defendant, Robert J. Dennis, appeals the circuit court's order denying leave to withdraw his guilty plea. Defendant's appointed appellate counsel, the Office of the State Appellate Defender (OSAD), has concluded that there is no reasonably meritorious argument that reversible error occurred. Accordingly, it has filed a motion to withdraw as counsel along with a supporting memorandum. See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967). OSAD has notified defendant of its motion, and this court has provided an opportunity to respond. Defendant has filed a brief response. However, after considering the record on appeal, OSAD's motion supporting brief, and defendant's response, we agree that this appeal presents no arguably meritorious issues. Thus, we grant OSAD leave to withdraw and affirm the circuit court's judgment.

¶ 3 BACKGROUND

¶ 4 Defendant was charged with two counts of first-degree murder and concealment of a homicidal death in connection with the death of Robin Stief. In December 2017, defense counsel moved to have defendant examined by Dr. Fred Klug after expressing a bona fide doubt that defendant was fit for trial.

¶ 5 After administering several tests, Dr. Klug concluded that defendant was malingering and was indeed fit for trial. He testified to these conclusions at a fitness hearing, after which the court found defendant fit.

¶ 6 Shortly thereafter, defense counsel moved to withdraw, citing "irreconcilable differences." The court denied the motion, but defendant expressed interest in proceeding pro se. After providing appropriate admonishments, the court allowed defendant to proceed pro se.

¶ 7 On October 1, 2018, the case was called for jury trial. During opening statements, defendant told the jury that the three codefendants had developed a "second story," explaining: "I could take the rap for it and I go to a mental hospital and play incompetent, and I did, I tried to play incompetent to do NGRI, not guilty by reason of insanity, and Dr. Klug found me competent for court. It didn't work."

¶ 8 On the trial's third day, the court declared a mistrial when defendant violated a pretrial order not to refer to an incident at the j ail. The court expressed a bona fide doubt about defendant's fitness and ordered a new fitness examination. However, the court did not appoint new counsel for defendant at that time.

¶ 9 Dr. Angeline Stanislaus evaluated defendant and concluded that he displayed "manic symptoms and psychotic symptoms" that were severe enough to impair his ability to understand the nature and purpose of the proceedings and assist in his defense. Stanislaus concluded that, with treatment, defendant could be found fit within one year. Accordingly, the court found defendant unfit, remanded him to the Department of Human Services, and appointed new counsel for him.

¶ 10 In July 2020, the court conducted a hearing to decide whether defendant had been restored to fitness. Todd Moody, a clinical social worker at the Alton Mental Health Center (Alton) who had worked with defendant, concluded that defendant understood court procedures and, moreover, had an advanced ability to cite caselaw and other complex legal concepts. He diagnosed defendant with antisocial personality disorder (APD) and malingering. Moody concluded that defendant was fit for trial.

¶ 11 Dr. Delsie Gavali, a psychiatrist, agreed that defendant's primary diagnoses were APD and malingering. She testified that defendant believed that if he acted a certain way, he would return to Alton rather than go to prison. Defendant appeared to prefer the former option. Dr. Gavali opined that defendant "knows how to manipulate," would "act crazy," and would "put on symptoms and take off symptoms." Gavali explained that a person who is "really psychotic" could not turn symptoms on and off at will.

¶ 12 Dr. Ronald Sellers, a psychologist, performed a personal assessment inventory and concluded that defendant was malingering. Following this testimony, the hearing was continued several times. Defense counsel thereafter suggested that, because so much time had passed, defendant should be reevaluated.

¶ 13 Dr. Klug reevaluated defendant and again concluded that he was malingering. Dr. Klug's report noted that defendant became tangential and discussed irrelevant information when discussing the case with anyone directly involved in it but spoke clearly and did not "add strange ideas to the conversation" when discussing the case in a recorded visitation with a cousin. Klug found that defendant's reaction was "situational and not some involuntary psychotic break or manic episode." Klug explained that defendant, in recorded calls from the jail, "outlined a plan to distract the police by continuing to ramble and get off track." Defendant admitted to having "acted crazy" during their previous meetings. Klug found that defendant had "a robust method to avoid questions, to distract others, and to dominate interactions." Klug found that defendant was competent to stand trial but would "be disruptive during any hearing or trial."

¶ 14 Defendant repeatedly interrupted the court during the hearing and had to be removed from the courtroom. Thereafter, Dr. Klug testified consistently with his report. The court, after spending two days reviewing all of the testimony, found defendant fit for trial.

¶ 15 At a June 3, 2021, hearing, defendant opted to have counsel as opposed to proceeding pro se, and to have Judge Leberman preside over the case. At the September 21, 2021, hearing, defendant interrupted the court and claimed that both Judge Leberman and defense counsel were "off the case." Counsel explained that defendant had requested, and counsel had refused, to file a motion that lacked a basis in the law. When asked whether defendant had anything to say about counsel's representation, defendant referred to counsel as "very uneducated" and used expletives when speaking with the court. Defendant continued to argue with the court and claimed that he would not attend future hearings or the trial.

¶ 16 At a January 7, 2022, hearing, the court provided defendant with written pretrial admonishments, which the court also read in court. The court informed defendant, among other things, of the pending charges, the sentencing ranges for each charge, the possibility of consecutive sentences, that it was defendant's choice to plead guilty or have a bench or jury trial, and that defendant would be removed from the courtroom if he engaged in disruptive behavior and that the trial could continue in his absence.

¶ 17 On March 2, 2022, the parties stated that they had reached a plea agreement. Defendant would plead guilty to first-degree murder and be sentenced to 40 years in prison. The State would dismiss the remaining counts.

¶ 18 The court explained the charge and the possible penalties, which defendant claimed to understand. The court explained that defendant was presumed innocent, that the presumption of innocence remains throughout the entire case, that the State had the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, and that defendant had a right to hold the State to that burden by pleading not guilty and having a bench or jury trial. The court explained that defendant could testify or remain silent, cross-examine the State's witnesses, call his own witnesses, and have counsel during those proceedings. Defendant understood those rights. Defendant denied being threatened or promised anything to induce the plea.

¶ 19 As a factual basis, the prosecutor stated that on or about August 29, 2016, defendant was living in Carbondale with Robin Stief, Tiesha Anderson, and Lauren Stinde. During a confrontation, defendant hit Stief in the head with a hammer. Defendant and Anderson then strangled Stief with a belt, and defendant suffocated her with a pillowcase, causing her death. After Stief died, defendant, Anderson, and Stinde placed the body in a large garbage container and took it to a Midas shop in Carbondale. They returned later and set the container on fire. Defendant confirmed the State had sufficient evidence and "could win their case."

¶ 20 The court found the plea knowing and voluntary and imposed the agreed-upon sentence. According to a March 7, 2022, docket entry, after the guilty plea hearing, the court realized it had not admonished defendant that he would have to serve 100% of the sentence. Defense counsel affirmed that he had discussed the 100% requirement "in detail" with defendant. The court noted that it had informed defendant both orally and in writing at the January 7, 2022, hearing that he would have to serve 100% of any sentence. The court thus concluded that it was not necessary to bring defendant back to court. The court and defense counsel agreed that no further admonishments were necessary.

¶ 21 Defendant moved to withdraw the plea, arguing that the court did not admonish him about the requirement to serve 100% of the sentence. The State responded that this was a collateral consequence of the plea, about which admonishment was not constitutionally required. The court, agreeing that such an admonishment was not necessary but noting that it had nonetheless admonished defendant about this requirement only two months before the plea, denied the motion to withdraw. Defendant timely appealed.

¶ 22 ANALYSIS

¶ 23 OSAD identifies five possible issues but concludes that none has even arguable merit. We agree.

¶ 24 OSAD first concludes that there is no meritorious argument that reversible error occurred when the court failed to appoint new counsel for defendant after finding a bona fide doubt of his fitness for trial. Defendant represented himself at trial. After the court declared a mistrial, it expressed a bona fide doubt about his fitness and ordered him reexamined. However, the court did not appoint counsel at that time.

¶ 25 Where a trial court finds a bona fide doubt of a defendant's fitness to stand trial, the defendant is presumptively unable to knowingly and intelligently waive the right to counsel. People v. Washington, 2017 IL App (4th) 150054, ¶ 21. Thus, once a bona fide doubt is established, the court must appoint counsel for the defendant until he or she regains fitness. Id.

¶ 26 Nonetheless, defendant was not prejudiced by the failure to appoint counsel at that time. When the court subsequently found defendant unfit it immediately reappointed counsel and defendant continued to be represented throughout the proceedings.

¶ 27 OSAD next concludes that there is no reasonably meritorious argument that the court erred in finding in April 2021 that defendant had been restored to fitness. It violates due process to put on trial or require a plea from a defendant who is unfit to do so. People v. Hanson, 212 Ill.2d 212, 216 (2004). A defendant is unfit to stand trial if a mental or physical condition prevents him from understanding the nature and purpose of the proceedings against him or assisting in his defense. 725 ILCS 5/104-10 (West 2020). "[F]itness involves a defendant's ability to function at trial, not his sanity or competence in other contexts," and "a defendant may be fit for trial but otherwise mentally unsound." People v. Gipson, 2015 IL App (1st) 122451, ¶ 29. When a defendant has been found unfit to stand trial, a presumption exists that he remains unfit until he is found fit at a valid subsequent hearing. People v. Gillon, 2016 IL App (4th) 140801, ¶ 20.

¶ 28 The circuit court may not simply "rubber stamp" an expert's conclusion that a defendant is fit; the court must be active and not passive in assessing fitness. Id. ¶ 21. The record must affirmatively show the trial court exercised its independent judgment. Gipson, 2015 IL App (1st) 122451, ¶ 29.

¶ 29 Here, Moody, Gavali, and Sellers all concluded that defendant was fit for trial, that he understood court processes and could assist in his defense if he chose. They described his faking symptoms. After some time passed, defense counsel expressed a doubt of defendant's fitness, so the court ordered him to be reexamined by Dr. Klug. After evaluating defendant a second time, he reached the same conclusion he had before: that defendant was malingering. No one testified that defendant was not fit for trial. The court, rather than merely "rubber-stamping" their conclusions, showed that it carefully considered their testimony and reports, as well as the entire record in finding defendant fit. Thus, there is no meritorious argument that error occurred.

¶ 30 OSAD next concludes that there is no good-faith argument that defendant made an unambiguous request to waive counsel. A defendant has the right to represent himself but, to do so, must knowingly and intelligently relinquish the right to counsel. People v. Baez, 241 Ill.2d 44, 115-16 (2011). The waiver of the right to counsel must be clear and unequivocal, not ambiguous. Id. at 116. "Courts must 'indulge in every reasonable presumption against waiver' of the right to counsel." Id. (quoting Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 404 (1977)).

¶ 31 When, at a September 21, 2021, hearing, the court announced the jury trial setting, defendant interrupted the court to state that he did not want a jury. When defendant interrupted again, the court instructed him to let his attorney talk. Defendant responded, "He's not my attorney. I've already told him that he's not my attorney." Defendant said that the judge and defense counsel were both "off the case." Counsel explained that defendant was upset because counsel had refused to file a motion that lacked a legal basis. The court twice asked defendant if there was anything he wanted to say about defense counsel's representation. When asked why he did not want counsel, defendant responded, "He is very uneducated because he thinks that I'm going to do what he wants."

¶ 32 We agree with OSAD that this was not a clear and unequivocal request to waive counsel. The court specifically asked defendant what he wanted to do about counsel's representation. Defendant said that counsel was "very uneducated" but never unambiguously stated a desire to represent himself. It appears that defendant was merely complaining about counsel's refusal to file a frivolous motion. But a complaint about counsel's strategic decisions does not equate with a desire for self-representation. A court must indulge every reasonable presumption against a waiver of counsel, and in light of the lack of an unequivocal request to do so, the court did not err by failing to discharge counsel.

¶ 33 OSAD next concludes that there is no meritorious argument that the circuit court erred in denying defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea. A defendant has no absolute right to withdraw his guilty plea. People v. Hughes, 2012 IL 112817, ¶ 32. Rather, he must show a manifest injustice under the facts involved. Id.

¶ 34 Before accepting the plea, the court admonished defendant about the nature of the charge and the sentencing range, that he had a right to persist in a not-guilty plea and to have a trial by judge or jury, and that he had the right to cross-examine witnesses and to call witnesses of his own. The court also explained that, by pleading guilty, defendant was giving up those rights and would not have a trial of any kind. Defendant confirmed he understood. See Ill. S.Ct. R. 402(a) (eff. July 1, 2012).

¶ 35 Defendant denied that any threats or promises were made and agreed that the plea was made "[f]reely and voluntarily." See Ill. S.Ct. R. 402(b) (eff. July 1, 2012). And the court found a sufficient factual basis. See Ill. S.Ct. R. 402(c) (eff. July 1, 2012). Thus, the court presumptively complied with the applicable rule prior to accepting the plea.

¶ 36 The only reason asserted for withdrawing the plea was that the court failed to admonish defendant at the plea hearing that he would have to serve 100% of the sentence. Counsel argued that defendant believed he would have to serve only 50% of the sentence and that this was an integral part of the plea agreement, rendering the plea involuntary.

¶ 37 Citing People v. Frison, 365 Ill.App.3d 932 (2006), OSAD contends that the application of truth-in-sentencing provisions to defendant's sentence was a collateral consequence about which the court was not required to admonish him. See People v. Burge, 2021 IL 125642, ¶ 38 (due process does not require that defendant be informed of the collateral consequences of a guilty plea). Frison is arguably distinguishable in that the defendant was convicted of a Class X felony. This made him eligible for up to 4.5 days of good-time credit per month, but the application of the credit was beyond the court's control. Frison, 365 Ill.App.3d at 934-36. Here, the requirement that defendant serve 100% of his sentence is mandatory, with no provision for good-time credit at all. But even if the failure to admonish defendant at the plea hearing about the 100% requirement was error, he was not prejudiced.

¶ 38 The court noted that it had told defendant about the 100% requirement at a hearing only two months before the guilty plea. Defense counsel assured the court that he had discussed the issue with defendant extensively. Counsel and the court thus agreed that it was unnecessary to bring defendant back to court.

¶ 39 There is thus no basis for defendant's assertion that he reasonably believed he would have to serve only 50% of the sentence. "In the absence of substantial objective proof showing that a defendant's mistaken impressions were reasonably justified, subjective impressions alone are not sufficient grounds on which to vacate a guilty plea." People v. Artale, 244 Ill.App.3d 469, 475 (1993) (citing People v. Davis, 145 Ill.2d 240, 244 (1991)). Rather, the burden is on the defendant to establish that the circumstances existing at the time of the plea, judged by objective standards, justified the mistaken impression. Id. (citing People v. Hale, 82 Ill.2d 172, 176 (1980)). Where both the trial court and defense counsel had very recently informed defendant that he would have to serve 100% of the sentence, there was no objective basis for a belief that he would have to serve only 50%. As the motion cited no other basis for withdrawing the plea, the court did not err in denying it.

¶ 40 OSAD's final proposed issue is whether counsel complied with Illinois Supreme Court Rule 604(d) in connection with the motion to withdraw. The rule provides as follows:

"The defendant's attorney shall file with the trial court a certificate stating that the attorney has consulted with the defendant either by phone, mail, electronic means or in person to ascertain defendant's contentions of error in the sentence and the entry of the plea of guilty, has examined the trial court file and both the report of proceedings of the plea of guilty and the report of proceedings in the sentencing hearing, and has made any amendments to the motion necessary for adequate presentation of any defects in those proceedings." Ill. S.Ct. Rule 604(d) (eff. July 1, 2017).

¶ 41 Here, counsel filed a certificate that affirmed he consulted with defendant "in person, by mail, by phone or by electronic means to ascertain his contentions of error in the entry of the Plea of Guilty and in the Sentence," that he "examined the trial court file and report of proceedings of the Plea of Guilty and Sentencing," and that he had "made any amendments to the Motion necessary for the adequate presentation of any defects in those proceedings." Counsel's certificate tracked the language of the rule, and there is thus no good-faith argument that he failed to comply.

¶ 42 Defendant has filed a response to OSAD's motion. It can best be described as a rambling narrative and does not address the legal issues raised by OSAD's motion or any other issues related to the proceedings below.

¶ 43 CONCLUSION

¶ 44 As this appeal presents no issue of arguable merit, we grant OSAD leave to withdraw and affirm the circuit court's judgment.

¶ 45 Motion granted; judgment affirmed.


Summaries of

People v. Dennis

Illinois Appellate Court, Fifth District
Oct 27, 2023
2023 Ill. App. 5th 220419 (Ill. App. Ct. 2023)
Case details for

People v. Dennis

Case Details

Full title:THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ROBERT J…

Court:Illinois Appellate Court, Fifth District

Date published: Oct 27, 2023

Citations

2023 Ill. App. 5th 220419 (Ill. App. Ct. 2023)