People v. DeMont

6 Citing cases

  1. People v. Hannan

    540 N.E.2d 1064 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989)   Cited 5 times

    This interpretation of the statute has been consistently upheld. People v. Parrott (1982), 108 Ill. App.3d 222, 438 N.E.2d 1313; People v. DeMont (1986), 146 Ill. App.3d 437, 496 N.E.2d 1215. Furthermore, the burden of proof is on the defendant to show that he may be conditionally released without endangering the public, although the Department of Corrections may be required to cooperate with the defendant in good faith to attempt to formulate a plan that will provide for his conditional release, treatment and supervision.

  2. People v. Cooper

    177 Ill. App. 3d 942 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988)   Cited 6 times

    It has been held that a person could spend his entire life under commitment if he is never cured. ( People v. DeMont (1986), 146 Ill. App.3d 437, 443.) A defendant who is convicted for a violation of his conditional release obviously is not cured.

  3. People v. Swartwout

    311 Ill. App. 3d 250 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000)   Cited 18 times
    Reviewing court will not second-guess State's trial strategy

    When the legislature amends a statute, it is presumed that it intended to effect some change in the law as it formerly existed. People v. DeMont, 146 Ill. App.3d 437, 442 (1986); see also Woodard, 175 Ill.2d at 449. The amended statute broadens application of section 12-5.1 in two ways. The use of the term "any condition" suggests that the legislature intended the revised statute to reach as many threats to health and safety as possible. More importantly, the replacement of the word "inhabitant" with the phrase "any person" implies that the legislature intended to extend the protection of the revised statute to the largest possible class, and further implies that a structure need not be inhabited or even habitable to fall within the meaning of the phrase "residential real estate."

  4. People v. Rogers

    574 N.E.2d 1374 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991)   Cited 1 times

    • 1 We note that when a defendant is conditionally released, it is his burden to show by a preponderance of the evidence that he is no longer sexually dangerous and that the conditions of his release should therefore be terminated. ( People v. Cooper (1989), 132 Ill.2d 347, 547 N.E.2d 449; People v. Hannan (1989), 184 Ill. App.3d 937, 540 N.E.2d 1064.) Although treatment of the defendant is one purpose of the Sexually Dangerous Persons Act, the primary purpose is to protect the public. See People v. DeMont (1986), 146 Ill. App.3d 437, 496 N.E.2d 1215. • 2 The instant defendant's offenses occurred over a 12-year period.

  5. People v. Cooper

    557 N.E.2d 902 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990)   Cited 3 times
    Reflecting that a psychiatrist, a psychological administrator, a clinical services supervisor, and the administrator of the psychiatric center prepared the socio-psychiatric report

    Indeed, it appears from the case law that psychiatric testimony has always been admitted at recovery hearings. See, e.g., People v. Beksel (1973), 10 Ill. App.3d 406, 407 (two psychiatrists were appointed to examine the defendant, of whom one testified for defendant's recovery and the other against defendant's recovery, and four inmates testified regarding conversations with the defendant indicating he had not recovered. "[I]n addition to this testimony, pursuant to [section 9], the court properly considered the [socio-psychiatric report]"); People v. Hannan (1989), 184 Ill. App.3d 937, 940-41; People v. Sweeney (1969), 114 Ill. App.2d 81, 86 (psychiatrist testified without objection by the defendant); see also People v. DeMont (1986), 146 Ill. App.3d 437, 443-44. We cannot agree with defendant that section 9 can be read to limit the evidence admissible at a hearing on recovery.

  6. Powell v. Board of Education

    189 Ill. App. 3d 802 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989)   Cited 8 times

    When a statute is amended, it is presumed that the legislature intended to effect some change in the law as it formerly existed. ( People v. DeMont (1986), 146 Ill. App.3d 437.) Under the new section 24-12, a hearing officer is responsible for reviewing the teacher's evaluations written pursuant to article 24A and for deciding whether or not a teacher shall be dismissed. Further, the decision of the hearing officer is final unless reviewed by a circuit court under the Administrative Review Law. Thus, a reading of section 24-12 as amended, reflects the legislature's intent to remove from the jurisdiction of local boards the ultimate responsibility on a termination decision following remediation to a disinterested hearing officer.