Opinion
B224875
12-08-2011
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. VINCENZO DELL'OLIO, Defendant and Appellant.
Tara K. Hoveland, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Pamela C. Hamanaka, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Paul M. Roadarmel, Jr., Supervising Deputy Attorney General, Rama R. Maline, Deputy Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
(Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. PA061858)
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County. Kathryne A. Stoltz and Richard F. Walmark, Judges. Affirmed.
Tara K. Hoveland, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Pamela C. Hamanaka, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Paul M. Roadarmel, Jr., Supervising Deputy Attorney General, Rama R. Maline, Deputy Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Defendant Vincenzo Dellolio was charged with two counts of first degree burglary of his neighbors' home and, in a separate information, one count of grand theft by embezzlement from his former employer. Over defendant's objection, the trial court consolidated the counts for trial. A jury found defendant guilty of both counts of burglary, but did not reach a verdict on the embezzlement count, which the trial court later dismissed.
On appeal, defendant makes two arguments. First, he argues the trial court committed reversible error by consolidating the embezzlement count with the two burglary counts. Second, he claims the evidence was insufficient to support conviction on the burglary counts. We are not persuaded and affirm the judgment.
BACKGROUND
1. Preliminary Hearings
Because defendant claims the trial court improperly joined the embezzlement count with the burglary counts before trial, we review the testimony from the two preliminary hearings held on the separate charges.
a. Burglary
The two burglary counts alleged defendant had burglarized the Sipprell family home on two separate occasions. (Pen. Code, § 459.) The preliminary hearing on those charges was held August 13, 2009.
Steve Sipprell, the homeowner, testified at the hearing. He explained that, on January 10, 2009, he and his family had returned from vacation in Idaho to find their house was not in the same condition as when they had left. Exterior doors were ajar and a laptop was missing. Mr. Sipprell was not sure if the laptop was stolen, however, because he thought either his wife might have had it or he had left it in Idaho. ~(CT 79)~
Mid-day on January 14, 2009, Mr. Sipprell left his house to go to a trade convention. Mr. Sipprell was waiting in front of his house for a car to pick him up, when defendant, who lived nearby, came over to talk to him in the driveway. Mr. Sipprell described defendant as a neighborhood friend and said their children played together.
Mr. Sipprell returned from the convention a few days later and, again, the house was not in the same condition as when he had left. In particular, a safe was missing from the master closet and two framed oil paintings were missing from the downstairs guest room. The safe held jewelry, a Rolex watch, some manuscripts and about $20,000 to $25,000 in cash.
The Sipprells have a home surveillance system, which includes 12 to 14 digital cameras that record the perimeter of their house. The surveillance footage is recorded onto a hard drive at the Sipprells' house. The information on the hard drive is recorded over approximately every 20 days. Mr. Sipprell and an employee from the company that installed the surveillance system reviewed footage from the cameras. The surveillance video showed defendant entering and exiting the Sipprells' home on two separate occasions. The first time, defendant did not appear to take anything from the house. The second time, however, defendant left the house with the Sipprells' safe, putting it in a pickup truck at the end of their driveway, and driving away. In his review of the surveillance footage, Mr. Sipprell did not see defendant or anyone carrying the two missing oil paintings. Mr. Sipprell never gave defendant permission to enter his house.
The employee from the company that installed the Sipprells' surveillance system assembled a video of the surveillance footage showing defendant entering and leaving the Sipprells' home. The employee did not download all of the digital recordings from the hard drive. The recordings did not show defendant entering the house between January 1st and January 10th, when the Sipprells were in Idaho.
b. Embezzlement
The embezzlement count alleged that, between November 2006 and January 2008, defendant embezzled money and property from Paiho North America, where he used to work as a sales manager. (Pen. Code, § 487, subd. (a).) The preliminary hearing on that charge was held August 5, 2009.
Paiho manufactures a hook and loop material, similar to Velcro, as well as orthotic soft goods, such as elbow and knee braces.
Paiho's director of operations and administration, Michael Stein, testified at the hearing. Mr. Stein worked with defendant when defendant was Paiho's national sales manager. Mr. Stein explained that, as national sales manager, defendant negotiated deals with clients and, on some accounts, was responsible for everything, including orders, delivery, and payment. Defendant reported to the director of sales, Adam Singer, who, like defendant, no longer worked for the company.
Defendant was at least partially responsible for two Paiho clients—Hely and Weber, and Point Blank Body Armor—both of which had problems with Paiho orders. In 2008, Mr. Stein investigated an unpaid invoice for more than $129,000 worth of Paiho product allegedly sold to Hely and Weber. Defendant was the salesperson listed on that invoice. Those products were eventually found at a storage facility rented by defendant. Defendant did not have permission to store the products at the storage facility, nor had he ever paid for them. Mr. Stein spoke with executives at Hely and Weber, who told him defendant had given Hely and Weber almost $90,000 worth of Paiho products for free. Paiho's records showed an unpaid invoice for those goods. Defendant had no authority to make such a gift.
Similarly, Mr. Stein investigated an unpaid invoice for more than $28,000 worth of product allegedly sold to Point Blank Body Armor. Again, defendant was the salesperson listed on the invoice. In January 2009, a search warrant was executed at the same storage facility rented by defendant where other Paiho products had been found. During that search, the Paiho products allegedly sold to Point Blank Body Armor were found. Defendant did not have permission to have those products, nor had he ever paid for them.
The investigating detective also testified at the preliminary hearing on the embezzlement charge. He had spoken with the employee at Point Blank Body Armor who placed and received orders from Paiho. She said that, in November 2006, Point Blank Body Armor received product from Paiho that the company had never ordered. The same day that product arrived, Point Blank Body Armor sent it back to Paiho. The detective also spoke with an employee at Hely and Weber, who told the detective Hely and Weber never placed a $129,000 order with Paiho, but that the company had received $89,000 in Paiho product for free. The employee said defendant had made that deal with them. The detective confirmed defendant was renting the storage unit where the Paiho products were found.
2. Joinder and Consolidation
Over defendant's opposition, the trial court granted the People's motion to join the embezzlement count with the two burglary counts. The embezzlement count became count three.
3. Trial
a. Burglary
Mr. Sipprell's wife, Julie Shepard, testified at trial. She said defendant lived nearby and their children played together. She said she and the others in their family usually entered their house through the garage. They opened the garage using a keypad or garage door opener, but once inside the garage, the interior door to the house was left unlocked.
Ms. Shepard said the family was in Idaho from January 2-15, 2009. She did not notice anything amiss at the house when they returned home. The morning after arriving home from their vacation, Ms. Shepard left for a trade convention in Long Beach for a few days. Her husband, Mr. Sipprell, attended the convention for one day. While she was at the convention, her husband or older son dropped off and picked up their younger son at school and were home with him in the afternoons.
Between one to five days after returning home from the trade show, Ms. Shepard noticed something in their master closet did not look right. She and her husband realized their safe was gone. She said the safe held her jewelry, her husband's Rolex, a rare manuscript, a baseball, and about $9,000 in cash from a bank account they had recently closed. The safe was a biometric safe, which she could open with her finger. But it could also be opened with a key or a code.
They contacted the company that installed their video surveillance system to help retrieve and view footage from the surveillance cameras. She saw defendant on the surveillance footage entering and exiting their house on at least two separate occasions. On one occasion, he carried their safe out of their house and put it in his truck. Her husband believed defendant also took a laptop and two paintings from the guest room because those things were also missing from the house.
She and her husband went to the Sheriff's Department to report the theft. They wanted to be discreet because of their younger son's relationship with defendant's children. Had a stranger committed the theft, they would have called the police right away. A sheriff's deputy came to their house to speak with them and to view the surveillance footage showing defendant entering and exiting the house. Ms. Shepard had not given defendant permission to enter their house.
The Sipprells' two sons also testified at trial. Their older son Stevie said he went to school from about 8:00 a.m. to noon each day, after which he would come home. He reviewed the surveillance video, which showed him and defendant entering and exiting the house. Their younger son Collin said he played with defendant's children on the weekends. They would come over to his house and usually came inside through the garage. He never gave the garage code to anyone, including defendant. Neither son gave defendant permission to take property from their house.
Mr. Sipprell testified again at trial. His trial testimony was similar to his testimony at the preliminary hearing. He added that, the day he left for the convention, he told defendant where he was going. Mr. Sipprell also said he never asked defendant to take the safe and dump it so that he could commit insurance fraud. In fact, although Mr. Sipprell began the process of filing an insurance claim for the stolen items, he never finalized it because his insurance would have covered less than a fourth of what was in the safe. He also said that, before the burglaries, he had loaned defendant seven thousand dollars, which defendant never paid back, despite requests for him to do so.
Mr. Sipprell explained that Mike Watern, who installed the Sipprells' surveillance system, reviewed the surveillance footage with him. Mr. Watern copied to a disc the footage showing defendant entering and exiting the house. That disc was shown to the jury. It showed defendant entering the Sipprell home on two separate occasions. On the first occasion, the cameras recorded the Sipprells' older son Stevie coming home after defendant had already entered the house. As one camera recorded Stevie parking in the driveway and walking toward the house, another camera recorded defendant exiting the house through a side door, looking out toward the driveway, running toward the back of the house, then finally jumping through some bushes into the neighbors' yard. On the second occasion, a camera recorded defendant parking his truck at the end of the Sipprells' driveway, entering their house, exiting the house carrying a safe, putting the safe in his truck, and driving away down the street.
Mr. Sipprell estimated it took about three days to collect the excerpts of the surveillance footage used at trial. While reviewing the footage, Mr. Sipprell discovered both that the time and date stamp on the recordings was off by about one day and that there was a way to get in and out of the house without being recorded by the cameras.
The Sipprell's safe was eventually found at the apartment of Stacy Shimabukuro. Neither Mr. Sipprell nor Ms. Shepard knew Ms. Shimabukuro. She testified she had been having an affair with defendant for many years, during which time she did not know he was married. Although they never lived together, defendant had a key to her apartment and was the only other person besides herself and the landlord who had a key. In January 2009, she called the police because she found a safe in a closet in her apartment. Defendant told her he had brought the safe over after getting it from a friend who no longer wanted it.
b. Embezzlement
Because they are not all pertinent to the issues on appeal, we do not recite all the facts relevant to the embezzlement charge. We summarize only those relevant to defendant's arguments on appeal.
Paiho's director of operations and administration, Michael Stein, again testified at trial. His testimony was similar to his testimony at the preliminary hearing. With respect to Paiho client Point Blank Body Armor, Mr. Stein said Point Blank tried unsuccessfully to return an order. When the order arrived back at Paiho, Mr. Stein refused to accept the return because it had not been authorized. Defendant said he would take care of the matter. Mr. Stein did not follow-up with defendant after that. The items from that order were later found at the storage facility rented by defendant.
With respect to Hely and Weber orders, Mr. Stein said there were three questionable orders written by defendant. As to one of the orders, Hely and Weber said they never placed the order and would not pay for it. The product related to that order was eventually found at the storage facility rented by defendant. As to another order, Hely and Weber again said they had not placed the order, but that defendant told them they could keep the product for free, and they did. As to the third order, Hely and Weber again said they had never ordered it. That time, defendant told them the invoice for that order had been sent in error and to disregard it. When questioned by his superiors at Paiho as to these Hely and Weber orders, defendant gave many different stories, none of which were true. Mr. Stein said defendant appeared to fabricate emails from and to Hely and Weber executives addressing Paiho orders and shipments.
Adam Singer, defendant's direct supervisor at Paiho, said he spoke with defendant about some Hely and Weber invoices that were past-due. Defendant assured him Hely and Weber would eventually pay. Mr. Singer never asked or authorized defendant to create false purchase orders or to send free product to clients. He also never authorized defendant to store Paiho products in a self-storage unit. Mr. Singer was fired from Paiho due to mismanagement
Jocelyn Willis also testified. She worked for Paiho and, while defendant was there, he was her boss. During his time at Paiho, defendant had an affair with Ms. Willis, who thought defendant was divorced. Twice, defendant borrowed money from Ms. Willis. During her relationship with defendant, Ms. Willis was also married.
c. Defendant's Testimony
Defendant took the stand in his own defense. He said he had filed for divorce in 2005, but the divorce was not finalized right away. He and his wife agreed he would continue to live at home for the sake of their children. Defendant stayed downstairs, while his wife stayed upstairs.
Defendant admitted that, while he was married, he had an affair with Ms. Willis and with Ms. Shimabukuro. He denied having an intimate relationship with Nicole Gibson (a Paiho employee), saying he flirted with her but did not have sex with her.Defendant also admitted lying to people, including the women with whom he had had affairs and who thought he was divorced.
On rebuttal, Ms. Gibson testified she had a relationship with defendant, during which they had sexual intercourse.
As to the burglary charges, defendant said Mr. Sipprell had asked him if he could dump their old safe because they had bought a new, larger safe. According to defendant, Mr. Sipprell said he could keep the safe if he wanted to. Defendant agreed to help Mr. Sipprell, but said he would have to come back at another time. He came back later with his truck and took the safe away, as a favor to Mr. Sipprell. He said the door to the safe was open when he picked it up and there was nothing inside. First, he took the safe to his garage, where he and his kids played with it. Later, he took it to Ms. Shimabukuro's apartment. Defendant admitted lying to the police when he was arrested. He said he was scared and therefore told them he had thrown the safe away behind a Chuck E. Cheese.
Defendant also said he was not sure what he was doing when the surveillance cameras recorded him on the side of the Sipprell's home when Stevie came home. He thought he might have been playing hide and seek with the neighborhood kids, which he often did.
As to the embezzlement charge, defendant described Paiho as an unethical company. He said Adam Singer (defendant's boss) encouraged improper sales practices. For example, instead of shipping "military spec" product to the military (one of Paiho's larger customers), Paiho shipped standard goods to the military. Mr. Singer also directed Paiho employees to duplicate clients' orders and to ship the inflated orders to the clients.
Defendant discussed a few instances of unusual sales practices with respect to Paiho clients Hely and Weber and Point Blank Body Armor. On one occasion, Hely and Weber was dissatisfied with a particular order for fabricated goods. In an attempt to appease the client, Mr. Singer told defendant to send Hely and Weber some free Paiho product. Thus, at Mr. Singer's direction, defendant sent Hely and Weber an $89,000 order free of charge. On another occasion, Mr. Singer had purposely ordered too much product for Hely and Weber. He asked defendant to obtain off-site storage for the excess product, which defendant did. As to Point Blank Body Armor, defendant said that client rejected a shipment because the product was the wrong color. When the shipment arrived back at Paiho, Mr. Singer decided to resend it to Point Blank in the hopes they would keep it. But they did not. Eventually, Mr. Singer again asked defendant to arrange off-site storage for that product, which he did. Defendant denied embezzling or trying to sell any of the Hely and Weber or Point Blank Body Armor shipments that were in storage.
4. Verdict and Sentencing
The jury found defendant guilty of residential burglary (counts one and two). As to count two, however, the jury found not true the special allegation that there was a person present in the residence during the commission of the burglary. The jury did not reach a verdict on the embezzlement charge (count three) and the trial court granted the People's motion to dismiss that count in the interests of justice.
The court sentenced defendant to three years and four months in prison. Defendant appealed.
DISCUSSION
1. Consolidation
Defendant argues consolidation of the embezzlement count with the burglary counts was improper for two reasons. First, he claims the trial court abused its discretion in granting consolidation. Second, he claims that, as a result of the consolidation, his trial was grossly unfair, resulting in a violation of his rights to due process. We disagree on both counts.
a. Motion for Joinder of Offenses
A trial court may permit offenses that are of the same class of crime, or are connected in their commission, to be charged and tried together. (Pen. Code, § 954.) Even when joinder is permissible under section 954, however, severance may be constitutionally required if joinder of the offenses would be so prejudicial that it would deny defendant a fair trial. (People v. Musselwhite (1998) 17 Cal.4th 1216, 1243-1244 (Musselwhite).) "Whether offenses properly are joined pursuant to section 954 is a question of law and is subject to independent review on appeal; the decision whether separate proceedings are required in the interests of justice is reviewed for an abuse of discretion." (People v. Cunningham (2001) 25 Cal.4th 926, 984.) We assess the trial court's exercise of discretion from the court's perspective at the time it ruled, and not in light of events that happened at trial. (Musselwhite, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 1246; see also id. at p. 1244 [assessing trial court's exercise of discretion "'in light of the showings then made and the facts then known'"].)
i. Same class of crime
For purposes of section 954, "'"[o]ffenses are of the same class when they possess common attributes."'" (People v. Grant (2003) 113 Cal.App.4th 579, 586 (Grant).) Cross-admissibility of evidence is not required. (Pen. Code, § 954.1.) Here, as the parties correctly agree, the burglary and embezzlement crimes are of the same class; i.e., theft. Thus, the statutory requirement for joinder was met here.
ii. Cross-admissible evidence
Even when joinder is statutorily authorized, as it was here, severance may be required if the defendant demonstrates joinder would be so prejudicial that it would make the trial unfair. (Musselwhite, supra, 17 Cal.4th at pp. 1243-1244.) The defendant "must make a '"clear showing of prejudice to establish that the trial court abused its discretion."'" (People v. Soper (2009) 45 Cal.4th 759, 774, italics omitted (Soper); see also People v. McKinnon (2011) 52 Cal.4th 610, 630 (McKinnon).) Although we must review the particular circumstances of each case, "'certain criteria have emerged to provide guidance in ruling upon and reviewing a motion to sever trial.'" (Soper, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 774.)
Initially, we consider whether evidence would be cross-admissible if each set of offenses was tried separately. (Soper, 45 Cal.4th at p. 774.) Generally, if evidence of one crime would be admissible at a separate trial of the other crime, any potential prejudice is ordinarily dispelled. (McKinnon, supra, 52 Cal.4th at p. 630.) However, lack of cross-admissibility is not, by itself, sufficient to demonstrate prejudice and bar joinder. (Id. at pp. 630-631.)
Here, the parties dispute whether the evidence would have been cross-admissible in separate trials. But, because "cross-admissibility is not the sine qua non of joint trials," (Frank v. Superior Court (1989) 48 Cal.3d 632, 641) and because, as explained below, defendant fails to show he was unfairly prejudiced by the joinder of charges, we need not and do not decide this issue. (See McKinnon, supra, 52 Cal.4th at pp. 630-631.)
iii. Other factors
Assuming without deciding that the evidence would not have been cross-admissible in separate trials, we consider whether the benefits of consolidation outweighed the possible "'spill-over'" effect the "'other-crimes'" evidence might have had on the jury in its consideration of each set of offenses. (Soper, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 775.) Three factors guide our analysis in this respect. First, we consider whether some of the charges were likely to inflame the jury against the defendant. (Ibid.) Although, before the trial court, defendant argued the residential burglary charges could inflame the jury against him, he does not make that argument on appeal. In any event, we do not consider any of the charges likely, or more likely than the others, to inflame the jury against him.
Below, defendant argued most people agree that "a man's home is his castle" and, therefore, "the fact that one neighbor is accused of burglarizing the 'castle' of another neighbor is the type of case which would inflame the passions of a juror against the defendant."
Second, we consider whether a weak case was joined with a strong case so that the totality of the evidence could have altered the outcome as to some or all of the charges. (Soper, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 775.) In order to demonstrate the potential for a prejudicial spill-over effect, defendant must show an extreme disparity in strength or inflammatory character. (Belton v. Superior Court (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 1279, 1284.) Defendant does not argue either case was stronger or weaker than the other. And we do not consider either one to be extremely stronger or weaker than the other.
Third, we ask whether one of the charges (but not the others) is a capital offense, or whether the joinder of the charges converted the matter into a capital case. (Soper, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 775.) This factor does not affect our analysis because this case is not a capital case.
"[T]he benefits of joinder are not outweighed—and severance is not required— merely because properly joined charges might make it more difficult for a defendant to avoid conviction compared with his or her chances were the charges to be separately tried." (Soper, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 781.) "The danger to be avoided in joinder of offenses is that strong evidence of a lesser but inflammatory crime might be used to bolster a weak case on another crime. [Citation.] That danger was not present here where neither incident was significantly stronger or more inflammatory that the other." (People v. Hill (1995) 34 Cal.App.4th 727, 735-736.) Thus, based on the facts then before the trial court, we conclude the court did not abuse its discretion in granting the motion to join charges.
b. Constitutional Analysis
Although the trial court's decision to consolidate and to deny severance was correct at the time it was made, we must nonetheless reverse the judgment if defendant demonstrates consolidation actually resulted in "'gross unfairness,'" amounting to a denial of due process. (Soper, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 783.) This is a "high burden" for defendant to meet (ibid.), and we conclude he has not and cannot satisfy it here.
Defendant claims the trial was grossly unfair and due process was denied because "the spill-over evidence from the embezzlement charge was unduly prejudicial to the credibility of [his] defense against the burglary charges." In particular, defendant points to testimony related to the embezzlement charge tending to show defendant lied to people as well as engaged in extramarital affairs. The obvious problem with defendant's position, however, is that similar evidence of deceit and an extramarital affair was presented to the jury with respect to the burglary charges. Thus, the evidence presented to support both sets of charges was similar in those respects. Moreover, the evidence against defendant on the burglary counts was strong. The jury viewed surveillance video of defendant entering the Sipprell residence on two separate occasions—once carrying a safe away from the home with him and, on the other occasion, behaving in a way that the jury reasonably could interpret as an attempt to hide from Stevie Sipprell as he drove into the driveway and entered the house.
In summary, the trial court did not err in joining the charges and the joinder of charges for trial did not result in gross unfairness such that defendant was deprived of due process.
2. Sufficiency of the Evidence
Defendant also argues the evidence was insufficient to support the two convictions for residential burglary. In particular, he claims conflicting testimony and the redacted surveillance video could not support a finding of the specific intent required for residential burglary. We disagree.
Before a judgment of conviction can be set aside for insufficiency of the evidence, it must clearly appear that on no hypothesis whatsoever is there sufficient substantial evidence to support the judgment. (People v. Redmond (1969) 71 Cal.2d 745, 755; People v. Johnson (1980) 26 Cal.3d 557, 575-578.) The record must be reviewed in its entirety when determining whether any rational trier of fact, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. (Jackson v. Virginia (1979) 443 U.S. 307, 319; People v. Marshall (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1, 34.) "[T]he court must review the whole record in the light most favorable to the judgment below to determine whether it discloses substantial evidence— that is, evidence which is reasonable, credible, and of solid value—such that a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable double." (People v. Johnson, supra, 26 Cal.3d at p. 578.)
"The crime of burglary consists of an act—unlawful entry—accompanied by the 'intent to commit grand or petit larceny or any felony.' (§ 459.) One may be liable for burglary upon entry with the requisite intent to commit a felony or a theft (whether felony or misdemeanor), regardless of whether the felony or theft committed is different from that contemplated at the time of entry, or whether any felony or theft actually is committed." (People v. Montoya (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1027, 1041-1042, fn. omitted; see also Pen. Code, § 459.) Thus, as the trial court correctly instructed the jury, in order to convict defendant of first degree residential burglary, the jury had to find (1) defendant entered an inhabited dwelling and (2) when he entered the inhabited dwelling, he intended to commit theft. The People were not required to show defendant actually took anything. (People v. Montoya, supra, 7 Cal.4th at pp. 1041-1042; People v. Magallanes (2009)173 Cal.App.4th 529, 536 ["the crime of burglary can be committed without an actual taking"].)
We conclude substantial evidence supports the jury's guilty verdicts as to the two residential burglary counts. Although defendant points to inconsistencies in testimony and that the surveillance video was edited so as not to play days worth of surveillance, neither of those detracts from the fact that the surveillance video shows defendant on two separate occasions entering the Sipprells' home. In one instance, defendant is seen entering the home, leaving the home carrying a safe, putting the safe in his truck, then driving away. The other time, defendant is seen entering the home, then exiting the house from a side door and behaving in a way the jury reasonably could interpret as an attempt to hide from Stevie Sipprell as he returned home. It is immaterial that the video did not show defendant taking anything from the house at that time.
Apparently, the jury believed the Sipprells' testimony (that they did not give defendant permission either to enter their home or to take anything from their home) and did not believe defendant's version of events (that Mr. Sipprell asked him to take the safe and that he was probably playing hide and seek when the cameras recorded him along the side of the house). In essence, defendant asks us to reweigh the evidence. But that is not our role. "We do not reweigh the evidence, resolve conflicts in the evidence, or reevaluate the credibility of witnesses." (People v. Riazati (2011) 195 Cal.App.4th 514, 532.) As explained, substantial evidence supports the guilty verdicts.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
CHANEY, J. We concur:
ROTHSCHILD, Acting P. J.
JOHNSON, J.